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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Benefits, Financing, and Coverage 
A Report to the President and Congress 




Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
CHAIR 
Dr. Janet Norwood 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
Dr. Laurie Bassi 
To the President and Congress; 
February 1, 1995 
tel (202) 219-4985 
fax (202) 219-4467 
I am pleased to present this second annual report of the Advisory Council 
on Unemployment Compensation-Unemployment Insurance in the United 
States: Benefits, Financing, and Coverage-in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 908 of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164). 
For the past sixty years, the Unemployment Insurance system has served 
as the foundation of economic security for millions of hard-working 
Americans who find themselves unemployed through no fault of their own. 
This program is an example of federal-state cooperation at its best. Each 
state operates its Unemployment Insurance program to meet the needs of its 
workers within minimum standards established by the federal government. 
This successful partnership can serve as a useful model for other federal-state 
programs that provide important services to the citizens of our country. 
The recommendations included in this report address fundamental 
elements of the Unemployment Insurance system-including the adequacy of 
benefits, financing, and coverage-and their relationship to the system's wage 
replacement and economic stabilization goals. The recommendations balance 
the diverse viewpoints of the members of the Council and will help to 
improve the program's operation. 
In addition, my colleagues and I believe that the recommendations in this 
report and in last year's report will help the Unemployment Insurance system 
adjust to the needs of today's labor market. Finally, as the Council begins 
its last year, the American public is clearly demanding improvements in 
government programs; we believe that the recommendations presented here 
respond to this demand and that they will, when implemented, increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's Unemployment Insurance system. 
Sincerely, 
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Preface 
IN NOVEMBER 1991, THE CONGRESS of the United States passed the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (P.L. 102-164). The act 
included a section that created the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation, which was charged with the task of evaluating "the 
unemployment compensation program, including the purpose, goals, 
countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund 
solvency, funding of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, 
and any other aspects of the program and to make recommendations for 
improvement. " 
The Advisory Council is made up of eleven members, representing the 
interests of business, labor, state governments, and the pUblic. Five mem-
bers are appointed by the President, three members are appointed by the 
Senate, and three members are appointed by the House of Representatives. 
In addition to its regular meetings, the Council has conducted a series 
of public hearings across the country to provide interested individuals and 
organizations the opportunity to present their views on the Unemployment 
Insurance program. The Council has also been involved in research, spon-
soring a conference on Unemployment Insurance issues in 1994, and 
planning a legal symposium and another research conference for 1995. 
The Advisory Council will issue a total of three reports. The first 
Report and Recommendations, published in February 1994, primarily 
addressed reform of the Extended Benefits program. It also presented 
recommendations on a number of specific questions posed by the Congress. 
This report, the Council's second, focuses primarily on issues related to 
Unemployment Insurance benefits, financing, and coverage. The final 
report of the Council, to be published in February 1996, will focus on 
issues related to program administration, including efficiency and funding. 
xvii 
xviii I PREFACE 
This report is divided into two sections. Section I introduces the report 
and presents the findings and recommendations of the Council. Section II 
contains a broad background discussion of related Unemployment Insurance 
issues. 
The chapters in Section II include both original research and syntheses 
of existing information. The primary authors of Section II are Laurie J. 
Bassi, Amy B. Chasanov, Stacey G. Grundman, and Daniel P. McMurrer. 
Chapter 6 was written by Robert Pavosevich. 
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fiNDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

1 / Introduction 
As THE ADVISORY COUNCIL on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) 
submits its second annual report to the President and Congress, the U.S. 
Unemployment Insurance system begins its sixtieth year of operation. The 
members of the Council unanimously agree that the goals established at the 
inception of the Unemployment Insurance program are as relevant today as 
they were in 1935. First, the program provides an initial line of economic 
defense for working Americans who become unemployed through no fault 
of their own, and spares many of them the indignities of public relief. 
Second, it accumulates reserves during periods of prosperity. These 
reserves are then used during economic downturns to assist unemployed 
workers in meeting their necessary expenses. This function serves the 
important macroeconomic role of helping to stabilize the economy during 
recessions. 
Although the original goals of the Unemployment Insurance program 
remain valid, much else has changed. Increasingly, jobs are part-time, 
contingent, or temporary. Many workers find that they must either accept 
these jobs or have no job at all. At the same time, states compete more 
fiercely with each other to attract and retain employers than they did in the 
past. This competition creates great pressure for states to sacrifice the 
solvency oftheir UnemploymentInsurance systems by reducing Unemploy-
ment Insurance taxes during periods of prosperity. As solvency has 
declined, the system has increasingly been forced to rely on tax hikes 
during recessions. This pay-as-you-go financing has eroded the system's 
macroeconomic stabilization capacity. 
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Other important changes are on the horizon. Those being recom-
mended in the nation's welfare system will almost surely result in 
increasing numbers of low-wage workers entering the labor force. Because 
these workers are often responsible for single parenting and frequently have 
little work experience or job training, they are likely to suffer more 
unemployment than do other members of the labor force. Like other 
workers do, these workers should be able to turn to the Unemployment 
Insurance system when they lose their jobs. Thus, as the country moves 
to reform its welfare system, attention must be given to the effects that 
welfare legislation may have on the Unemployment Insurance system. 
These and other important changes in the operation of the labor market 
require that some reforms be made to ensure that the nation's Unemploy-
ment Insurance system remains on a sound footing. 
The law that established the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation-the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1991-instructs the Council "to evaluate the unemployment compensation 
program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, 
coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State adminis-
trative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the 
program and to make recommendations for improvement." While the 
Council has discussed each of these issues, this report focuses primarily on 
the most basic aspects of the Unemployment Insurance program-its 
benefits, financing, and coverage. 
Since its inception, the Unemployment Insurance system has been based 
on the principles of federalism, with the majority of responsibility for 
financing the program and administering its benefits residing at the state 
level. The federal government maintains more limited responsibilities, 
including allocating funds for financing program administration, ensuring 
the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance trust funds, providing loans 
to states' trust funds when necessary, and financing one-half of the costs 
of Extended Benefits during periods of significant economic downturn. In 
addition, by creating minimum standards, the federal government ensures 
that competitive pressures among the states will not force the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system into a race to the bottom. Each of the partners-the 
federal government and the states-has a unique role in ensuring the 
smooth operation of the nation's entire Unemployment Insurance system-a 
system that serves as a safety net for millions of working Americans and 
their families. 
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It is clear that the citizens of the United States expect government to 
run more efficiently and effectively. Implemented together, the recom-
mendations presented in this report would move the Unemployment 
Insurance system toward more fully meeting those expectations. The 
recommendations focus primarily on strengthening the federal-state 
partnership so that the program is able both to achieve its goals of 
providing temporary assistance to unemployed workers and countercyclical 
stabilization of the economy during recessions. 
The recommendations in this report should be considered together with 
those for reforming the Extended Benefits component of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance program. (The Council's recommendations for improving 
the operations of that important component of the program were originally 
presented in its first annual report, published in 1994, and are reprinted for 
reference in Appendix E of this report.) When operating properly, the 
Extended Benefits program automatically triggers on during economic 
downturns. By reducing the need for expensive ad hoc emergency benefits 
extensions, which are often ineffectively targeted and poorly timed, an 
effective Extended Benefits program holds promise of contributing to the 
creation of more cost-effective and efficient government. 
The current report also includes several recommendations for improving 
the administrative efficiency of the Unemployment Insurance program. 
The Council intends to return to this issue more comprehensively during 
its third and final year, continuing to seek ways to make the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system operate more effectively and efficiently for all 
Americans. 
In recent years, many sectors of the economy have undergone 
substantial restructuring that has resulted in improved efficiency and 
enhanced competitiveness. During the past two years, the economy has 
experienced growth in employment. While unemployment has dropped 
since the previous recession, the dynamic nature of the labor market 
suggests that change will continue. Good economic policy is difficult to 
make during bad economic times. Now is the time for Congress to 
consider Unemployment Insurance reform. 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
Section I of this report includes two chapters. Following this introduction, 
Chapter 2 presents the current findings and recommendations of the 
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Advisory Council. Section II, comprising Chapters 3 through 14, then 
offers more detailed explorations of a number of Unemployment Insurance 
issues related to the findings and recommendations. 
Beginning the second section, Chapter 3 addresses the purpose and 
objectives of a system of unemployment insurance, and Chapter 4 focuses 
on the links between those objectives and the methods available for 
financing such a system. Two central issues in the current U.S. system of 
financing Unemployment Insurance-forward funding and experience 
rating-are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapters 7 and 8 address issues related to monetary and nonmonetary 
eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits. Chapters 9 and 10 then 
discuss the level, duration, and adequacy of the benefits that are paid to 
eligible claimants. Chapter 11 addresses exceptions to universal coverage 
and universal federal taxation. Coverage and taxation issues related to 
compliance are discussed in Chapter 12. 
Facilitating reemployment for unemployed individuals is discussed in 
the final two chapters. Chapter 13 focuses on possible reemployment 
incentives for the unemployed, and Chapter 14 describes many of the 
reemployment services that are currently available. 
The appendixes of the report present the following: figures and tables 
providing additional background information on financing and benefits 
issues; the 1994 findings and recommendations of the Council; the charter 
of the Council; and information regarding the calendar and public hearings 
of the Council. 
2 / Findings and 
Recommendations 
THE PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation finds that, 
although an increasing percentage of the unemployed experience long spells 
of unemployment, the majority of the unemployed experience relatively 
short unemployment spells. Similarly, while a growing minority of 
individuals who receive Unemployment Insurance exhaust their benefits 
without having found new employment, the majority of individuals receive 
Unemployment Insurance benefits for a relatively short period of time 
before returning to employment. This reality dictates that the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system must be designed to deal effectively with a variety 
of needs. In particular, the system must both provide temporary wage 
replacement to individuals and facilitate the productive reemployment of 
those individuals who experience longer spells of unemployment. 
The Unemployment Insurance system also serves an important 
macroeconomic stabilization role by injecting additional money into the 
economy during periods of downturn. This objective, however, can only 
be achieved effectively if the system is forward-funded, thereby accumu-
lating funds during periods of economic health. 
These findings lead the Council to a formulation of the following 
statement of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system. 
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1. Statement of Purpose 
The most important objective of the U.S. system of Unemployment 
Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as 
a matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have 
demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor force. This support 
should help to meet the necessary expenses of these workers as they 
search for employment that takes advantage of their skills and 
experience. Their search for productive reemployment should be 
facilitated by close cooperation among the Unemployment Insurance 
system and employment, training, and education services. In addition, 
the system should accumulate adequate funds during periods of 
economic health in order to promote economic stability by maintain-
ing consumer purchasing power during economic downturns. 
FUNDING OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
The Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to promote economic 
stability rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the 
funding of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have 
been responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and 
consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, during 
periods of prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then spent 
during periods of economic decline. 
Some members of the Council believe that experience rating is a crucial 
component of the program, providing effective incentives for employers to 
avoid laying off workers. Other members believe that experience rating 
causes employers to make excessive use of the system's appeal mechanism 
in an attempt to keep their experience-rated taxes as low as possible. 
Although the Council was unable to resolve this difference of opinion, it 
intends to address the issue of experience rating in its next annual report. 
The Council unanimously concludes, however, that promoting economic 
stability is an objective that transcends the interests of the states and cannot 
be achieved by states working in isolation. While some states have 
attempted to maintain an adequate degree of forward funding, others have 
not. The low reserves in some states' trust funds weaken the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system's capacity to achieve its economic stabilization 
function. 
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Effectively promoting the forward funding of the Unemployment 
Insurance system requires a coherent federal strategy that includes 
congressionally stated goals. 
2. Recommendation 
Congress should establish an explicit goal to promote the forward 
funding of the Unemployment Insurance system. In particular, during 
periods of economic health, each state should be encouraged to 
accumulate reserves sufficient to pay at least one year of Unemploy-
ment Insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous "high 
cost." For purposes of establishing this forward-funding goal, previous 
"high cost" should be defined as the average of the three highest 
annual levels of Unemployment Insurance benefits that a state has 
paid in any of the previous 20 calendar years. 
To complement these forward-funding goals, financial incentives to 
encourage forward funding should be created. This can be done by 
changing the structure of the interest rates that the federal government pays 
to the states on their Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances. A 
slight reduction in the interest rate paid on low levels of states' trust funds 
could be used to finance a fairly substantial interest rate premium paid on 
high levels of reserves. While it is difficult to predict with accuracy how 
many states would respond to such incentives, careful management of the 
interest rate structure could ensure that these incentives could be financed 
without additional cost to the federal government. 
3. Recommendation 
To encourage further forward funding, an interest premium should be 
paid on that portion of a state's Unemployment Insurance trust fund 
that is in excess of one "high cost" year of reserves. The cost of this 
interest rate premium should be financed by a reduction in the 
interest rate paid on that portion of each state's trust fund that is less 
than one "high cost" year of reserves. The U.S. Department of Labor 
should be given authority to adjust periodically the interest rate 
structure to ensure that these incentives create no additional cost to 
the federal government. 
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The Council finds that the current federal policy of providing short-
term, interest-free loans to state trust funds creates a disincentive for states 
to forward fund their systems. Preferential loan treatment should be 
available only to states that have met, or made satisfactory progress toward, 
the forward-funding goal. An example of how satisfactory progress might 
be defined is presented in Chapter 5 of this report. 
4. Recommendation 
Preferential interest rates on federal loans to the states should be 
restricted to those states that have achieved (or made satisfactory 
progress toward) the forward-funding goal. In particular, the current 
system of making interest-free, cash-flow federal loans generally 
available to all states should be ended. Rather, these interest-free 
loans should be made available only to those states that have achieved 
(or made satisfactory progress toward) the forward-funding goal prior 
to the onset of an economic downturn. In other states, these loans 
should be subject to the same interest charges that are incurred on 
long-term loans to state Unemployment Insurance trust funds. 
5. Recommendation 
A method is needed for determining whether a state that has not yet 
metthe forward-funding goal has made "satisfactory progress" toward 
the goal. This method should be based on an empirical analysis of the 
rate at which state trust funds must be restored during periods of 
economic health in order to achieve the forward-funding goal prior to 
a recession. 
6. Recommendation 
When states have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) the 
forward-funding goal, yet find it necessary to borrow from the federal 
government, the interest rate charged on long-term loans should be a 
preferential rate that is 1 percentage point lower than would other-
wise be charged. 
The Council has discussed the level at which the taxable wage base and 
tax rate established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUT A) should 
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be set. This is a complex issue. FUT A revenues are earmarked for 
financing the administration of the nation's Unemployment Insurance 
system, as well as that of the U.S. Employment Service. However, because 
the trust funds are currently held within the unified federal budget, it is not 
possible for these programs to achieve direct access to the funds that are 
earmarked for them. In addition, a two-tenths surcharge that was imposed 
in 1977 to payoff trust fund debts has been extended well beyond the time 
when the debt was repaid. Quite apart from these issues, the Council has 
not yet made a determination of whether or not additional revenues from 
FUTA would contribute to more efficient and effective operation of the 
Unemployment Insurance system and the Employment Service. 
Another element of complexity results from the fact that the minimum 
taxable wage base that the states use for financing their Unemployment 
Insurance benefits is tied to the FUT A taxable wage base. On average, 
those states with higher taxable wage bases have a higher level of reserves 
than do states that have set their taxable wage base at the minimum level 
of $7,000. Consequently, raising the FUTA taxable wage base might 
contribute to the overall forward funding of the system. 
Furthermore, a low taxable wage base within a state tends to impose the 
burden of Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes disproportionately on 
employers of low-wage workers. To the extent that employers pass on a 
portion of the tax to their workers in the form of lower wages, therefore, 
a disproportionate share of the burden of the tax is ultimately borne by 
low-wage workers. Those low-wage workers who work part-time or part-
year, however, are often ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. As a 
result, the low taxable wage base within the Unemployment Insurance 
system is both regressive and unfair. 
The Council has not yet reached a consensus on how to address these 
interrelated issues most effectively. As it considers the issues of adminis-
trative funding and efficiency over the course of the next year, however, 
the issue of the FUT A taxable wage base and tax rate will once again be 
addressed. 
The Council does note, however, that the Unemployment Insurance 
system was intended as a self-contained system of social insurance. 
Inherent in this design is the principle that funds are accumulated and held 
in trust solely for their intended purpose: namely, the payment of benefits 
to eligible unemployed workers, economic stimulus, and the costs of 
administering the system. 
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Inclusion of FUTA accounts and state Unemployment Insurance trust 
fund accounts within the unified federal budget undermines the integrity of 
the Unemployment Insurance system. Since federal budget offsets must be 
identified before additional FUT A funds (which are earmarked for program 
administration) can be appropriated, some states have found it necessary to 
divert their trust funds to pay for administrative expenses---expenses that 
should be paid out of the FUT A trust fund. This diversion, while perhaps 
necessary, tends to erode the integrity of the system's financing. Employer 
willingness to contribute to the system, state capacity to develop and 
maintain adequate trust funds, and worker confidence in the system are all 
undermined. 
Furthermore, when Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances that 
have been explicitly accumulated for countercyclical purposes are used to 
balance the annual federal budget, the system loses its capacity to increase 
spending automatically during recessions. Consequently, unlike other trust 
funds held by the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance trust 
funds are rendered fundamentally incapable of achieving one of their major 
objectives---economic stabilization-through their inclusion in the unified 
federal budget. 
7. Recommendation 
All Unemployment Insurance trust funds should be removed from the 
unified federal budget. 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TAXATION 
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by Unemployment 
Insurance, and their employers pay taxes into the system accordingly. 
There are, however, two important exceptions. The first exception is that 
nonprofit employers do not pay FUTA taxes, despite the fact that their 
employees are eligible for Unemployment Insurance, use the system, and 
generate administrative costs for the system. In calendar year 1992, this 
exemption cost the federal trust funds approximately $300 million. The 
second exception is that agricultural workers on small farms are not 
covered by Unemployment Insurance. The Council finds no justification 
for either of these exceptions. 
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8. Recommendation 
The FUTA exemption for nonprofit employers should be eliminated. 
9. Recommendation 
The exemption of agricultural workers on small farms from Unemploy-
ment Insurance coverage should be eliminated. * 
The Council also finds that Unemployment Insurance taxes owed by 
farm labor contractors ("crew leaders") often are not paid. Federallaw 
specifies that, under most circumstances, these farm labor contractors are 
the designated employers of their workers and that they are responsible for 
the payment of Unemployment Insurance taxes. It is difficult, however, to 
enforce this provision because of the many obstacles that prevent locating 
crew leaders who have outstanding tax obligations. 
10. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended so that farm owners or operators are 
assigned responsibility for unpaid Unemployment Insurance taxes 
owed by the crew leaders with whom they contract for workers on 
their farms. * * 
The Council finds that some employers improperly avoid paying 
Unemployment Insurance taxes by misclassifying their employees as 
independent contractors. Clear definitions that delineate the conditions 
under which an individual would legitimately be qualified as an indepen-
dent contractor would help to alleviate this problem. 
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 protects businesses that have 
"reasonable basis" for misclassifying employees as independent contractors. 
Businesses that fall under the Section 530 "safe harbor" are not required to 
correct the classification of employees and cannot be assessed back taxes 
or penalties based on the misclassification of workers. Section 530 also 
prohibits the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the guidelines 
*Two members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
**One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
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for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor. The ambiguity of these guidelines is the cornerstone of the 
misclassification problem and the tax revenue losses associated with it. In 
addition, revenue collection is limited by Section 3509 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which caps the employment tax liability of those businesses 
not covered by Section 530. 
The greatest revenue loss results from businesses that do not file 
information returns on independent contractors. These are circumstances 
under which businesses are most likely to misclassify workers, as well as 
the circumstances under which independent contractors are least likely to 
report their entire income. Increasing the penalty for failing to file 
information returns would increase the incentive to file, increase the 
percentage of independent contractor income reported, and provide the 
information needed to identify employers that misclassify workers-thereby 
creating an incentive to classify workers correctly. 
While the Council recognizes that correcting these problems would 
have ramifications that reach far beyond the Unemployment Insurance 
system, the Council finds that the problems are sufficiently serious to merit 
action at both the state and federal levels. 
11. Recommendation 
States should review and consider adopting the best practices of other 
states to address classification issues which include the following: 
clarifying the definitions of employee and independent contractor; 
specifying employer liability for payroll taxes; licensing, bonding, or 
regulating the employee leasing industry; and strategic targeting of 
audits. 
12. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the "prior audit" safe 
harbor provision of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. 
13. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the provision of Section 
530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 that bars the IRS from issuing 
guidelines to define the employment relationship. 
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14. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to repeal Section 3509 of the Internal 
Revenue Code and to require businesses to pay all taxes owed for 
workers that are misdassified after the enactment of the repeal. 
15. Recommendation 
The $50 penalty for businesses that fail to file information returns 
with the IRS or with the independent contractor they have hired 
should be increased. 
The Council notes that available statistics do not accurately measure the 
level of Unemployment Insurance receipt among the unemployed (that is, 
"recipiency"). The measure of the "insured unemployed" (IU) and the ratio 
of insured unemployed to the covered labor force (that is, the insured 
unemployment rate-the IUR) are frequently used for a number of 
purposes. When used as measures of recipiency, however, they are 
misleading. Both statistics consistently overstate the number of individuals 
who actually receive Unemployment Insurance benefits in a given week. 
In addition to counting recipients, the two measures both include indi-
viduals who file a claim for, but do not receive, benefits in a given week 
(these include individuals on a waiting week, individuals whose claims are 
ultimately denied for nonmonetary reasons, and individuals who are 
disqualified for a given week). At the national level, this inclusion has the 
effect of overstating the number of the unemployed who actually receive 
Unemployment Insurance benefits by approximately 10 percent (although 
there is considerable variation among the states in the extent to which 
currently reported statistics overstate the actual receipt of benefits). 
16. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of labor should report a measure of Unemploy-
ment Insurance recipiency. The measure should be a ratio; with the 
numerator defined as the number of individuals who are actually paid 
Unemployment Insurance benefits, and the denominator defined as 
the total number of unemployed individuals. 
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ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Five percent of all workers in 1993 reported that they were unable to find 
full-time employment, and 16 percent of the work force held part-time 
jobs. The Council finds that in some states, these individuals are unable 
to qualify for Unemployment Insurance benefits, even when they have 
substantial labor force attachment. This problem is especially pronounced 
for low-wage individuals, many of whom must work in temporary or part-
time jobs. Welfare reform could result in an increase in the number of 
low-wage workers who find themselves in this situation. 
Some unemployed workers are unable to qualify for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits because of their state's definition of the "base period." 
The base period is the period of time that is used for calculating whether 
or not unemployed individuals' earnings are sufficient to qualify them for 
Unemployment Insurance. Many states define the base period as the first 
four of the past five completed calendar quarters. In these states, therefore, 
between three and six months of an individual's most recent work 
experience is excluded from consideration in calculating eligibility for 
benefits. This may have the effect of disqualifying some workers who 
have worked continuously, but who need the most recently completed 
quarter of earnings to be included in the base period in order to qualify for 
Unemployment Insurance benefits. To solve this problem, some states now 
use a "moveable base period," which allows the minimum earnings 
requirement to be met on the basis of the four most recently completed 
quarters of work if it is not met using the standard definition. 
The Council finds that advances in technology have made it feasible for 
all states to use the most recently completed quarter when determining 
benefit eligibility, and that using this quarter is consistent with the 
legislative requirement that states ensure full payment of Unemployment 
Insurance when due. While the Council has been unable to develop sound 
estimates of the cost of implementing such a change, there are reasons to 
believe that the cost may not be prohibitive. First, many of the individuals 
who are determined to be eligible using a moveable base period would 
become eligible eventually (as soon as an additional quarter of earnings 
information becomes available). Second, some of the increase in the cost 
of Unemployment Insurance benefits would be offset by a reduction in 
benefits paid under means-tested programs, such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps. 
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In some cases, unemployed individuals cannot qualify for Unemploy-
ment Insurance benefits because their eligibility is contingent upon their 
earnings in the calendar quarter in which they became unemployed. 
Information about their most recent earnings is typically not available until 
after the quarter has been completed. These individuals often do not 
realize that they can reapply (and often qualify) for benefits when 
information about their most recent quarter of earnings becomes available. 
This problem could be corrected if these individuals were told when they 
should reapply for benefits, as well as what additional earnings they would 
need to qualify for benefits. 
17. Recommendation 
All states should use a moveable base period in cases in which its use 
would qualify an Unemployment Insurance claimant to meet the 
state's monetary eligibility requirements. When a claimant fails to 
meet the monetary eligibility requirement for Unemployment 
Insurance, the state should inform the individual in writing of what 
additional earnings would be needed to qualify for benefits, as well as 
the date when the individual should reapply for benefits. 
In some states, low-wage workers face an additional impediment in 
qualifying for Unemployment Insurance benefits. In order to meet their 
state's base period and/or high-quarter earnings requirements, low-wage 
individuals must work more hours than workers who earn higher wages. 
For example, an individual who works half-time for a full year (Le., 1,040 
hours) at the federal minimum wage level would not meet minimum 
earnings requirements in 9 states. At an hourly wage of $8.00, however, 
a half-time, full-year worker would be eligible in all states. Similarly, an 
individual who works two days per week for a full year (approximately 
800 hours) at the minimum wage would not meet the minimum earnings 
requirements in 29 states. At a wage of $8.00 per hour, however, that 
individual would be eligible in all but 2 states. 
The Council finds that any individual who works at least 800 hours per 
year should be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits and that 
states' minimum earnings requirements should be set accordingly. If all 
states set their earnings requirements at this level, the number of indi-
viduals eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits would increase by 
approximately 5.3 percent, and the amount of benefits paid would increase 
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by approximately 3.6 percent. Some of the increase in the cost to the 
system, however, would be offset by a reduction in receipt of means-tested 
benefits such as AFDC and Food Stamps. 
18. Recommendation 
Each state should set its law so that its base period earnings require-
ments do not exceed 800 times the state's minimum hourly wage, and 
so that its high quarter earnings requirements do not exceed one-
quarter of that amount. 
Fourteen states preclude workers in seasonal industries from collecting 
Unemployment Insurance except during the season in which work is 
normally done within the industry. In addition, twelve of these states 
disallow seasonal workers' earnings from being counted toward their 
minimum earnings requirement, even if the individual subsequently works 
in a nonseasonal job. The Council finds these exclusions to be problem-
atic. 
19. Recommendation 
States should eliminate seasonal exclusions; claimants who have 
worked in seasonal jobs should be subject to the same eligibility 
requirements as all other unemployed workers. 
In addition to the monetary requirements for qualifying for Unemploy-
ment Insurance, each state has a variety of nonmonetary requirements that 
unemployed individuals must satisfy in order to qualifY for benefits. These 
requirements include stipulations about availability for suitable work, 
ability to work, work search requirements, voluntary separation for good 
cause, discharges due to misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and 
unemployment as a result of a labor dispute. In some cases, part-time 
workers (who meet monetary eligibility requirements) are explicitly 
precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance. 
20. Recommendation 
Workers who meet a state's monetary eligibility requirements should 
not be precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance benefits 
merely because they are seeking part-time, rather than full-time, 
employment. 
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State legislation often does not address the specifics of many of the 
situations that Unemployment Insurance claimants face. As a result, 
interpretations of nonmonetary eligibility requirements can also be found 
in administrative and judicial case law and administrative rules. Testimony 
presented in the Council's public hearings indicates that the complexity of 
these nonmonetary requirements creates confusion about eligibility 
requirements. It can be difficult for both claimants and employers to 
understand these requirements with a reasonable degree of certainty. These 
problems can be particularly pronounced for multi state employers. 
Not only can this lack of certainty impede the receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance, it may also increase unnecessarily the number of appeals filed 
by both claimants and employers. These problems appear to be particularly 
severe with regard to determinations involving employee misconduct, 
refusal of suitable work, and voluntary leaving for good cause. Clarifying 
these issues would serve the interests of both groups. 
21. Recommendation 
A state-specific information packet that clearly explains Unemploy-
ment Insurance eligibility conditions (both monetary and non-
monetary) should be distributed by the states to unemployed 
individuals. 
The Council is particularly concerned about a number of specific 
nonmonetary eligibility conditions. For example, it is not always clear 
whether an individual who is unavailable for shift work (perhaps due to a 
lack of public transportation or child care) will be found to be eligible for 
Unemployment Insurance. Consideration needs to be given to situations in 
which individuals quit their jobs because of one of the following circum-
stances: a change in their employment situation (e.g., change in hours of 
work), sexual or other discriminatory harassment, domestic violence, or 
compelling personal reasons, including family responsibilities. In addition, 
the Council is concerned about the variability in the definition of miscon-
duct across states, and about the treatment of individuals who refuse 
employment because it is temporary or commission work. The Council 
intends to address these and related issues in its third annual report. 
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ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
At the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system, much debate was 
devoted to the adequacy of benefits. Many of the founders of the system 
argued that benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings; they 
believed that this percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase 
basic necessities, but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work. 
A number of presidents, including and following Dwight Eisenhower, 
have endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the 
Unemployment Insurance system. President Richard Nixon advocated that 
the Unemployment Insurance system should seek to replace 50 percent of 
lost earnings for four-fifths of all Unemployment Insurance recipients. 
The level of a state's maximum weekly benefit amount has a direct 
impact upon the percentage of Unemployment Insurance recipients who 
receive benefits that equal or exceed a given replacement rate. Those indi-
viduals whose earnings qualify them for their state's maximum weekly 
benefit amount typically have less than half of their wages replaced. 
Therefore, when a state's maximum benefit amount is relatively low as a 
percentage of the state's average weekly wage, the state will not meet the 
50 percent replacement rate goal for a large percentage of recipients. 
The Council endorses the long-standing goal of 50 percent replacement 
of lost earnings, and notes that a state is likely to be able to achieve this 
goal for a large number of workers by setting the state maximum weekly 
benefit amount equal to two-thirds of state average weekly wages. 
22. Recommendation 
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of 
lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit 
amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wages. * 
The Council also notes that, starting in 1986, all Unemployment 
Insurance benefits became subject to taxation. Taxation of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits results in a reduction of the effective replacement rate. 
*One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
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23. Recommendation 
Unemployment Insurance benefits should be tax-exempt. * 
The Council finds that the current system for reporting the average 
replacement rate of lost earnings within the Unemployment Insurance sys-
tem needs to be improved. While the U.S. Department of Labor routinely 
reports the replacement rate, the concept used in the calculation is flawed. 
The reported replacement rate is calculated by dividing Unemployment 
Insurance benefits paid by the wages of all covered workers. To the extent 
that those who receive Unemployment Insurance have lower wages than the 
average covered worker, the reported replacement rate will understate the 
actual replacement rate. Conversely, if those who receive Unemployment 
Insurance have higher wages than the typical covered worker, the reported 
replacement rate will overstate the actual replacement rate. Advisory 
Council calculations using data available from selected states suggest that 
the reported replacement rate significantly understates the actual replace-
ment rate. 
24. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the actual 
replacement rate for individuals who receive Unemployment Insur-
ance. This replacement rate should be calculated by dividing the 
weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average weekly earnings 
paid to those individuals prior to unemployment. 
REEMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES 
The Council finds that financial incentives (such as reemployment bonuses 
or self-employment subsidies) for facilitating rapid reemployment have a 
positive impact on a small portion of the unemployed. In some cases, this 
positive impact could be offset partially by negative impacts on others who 
find jobs more slowly because they are displaced in the job queue by those 
who receive the incentives. This displacement effect is likely to be more 
pronounced during periods of relatively high unemployment. 
*Four members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
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The Council concludes, therefore, that the states should be permitted to 
experiment with reemployment incentives, but it opposes incentives to 
encourage (or require) states to implement such strategies. 
Some members of the Council object to the use of self-employment 
incentives within the Unemployment Insurance system---especially when 
an individual's entire benefit is paid in lump-sum form. 
25. Recommendation 
States should be given broad discretion in determining whether 
reemployment incentives, such as reemployment bonuses or self-
employment allowances, should be included as a part of their 
Unemployment Insurance systems. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING 
States' administrative costs are financed by the federal government with a 
portion of the revenues generated by FUTA. This situation requires some 
systematic method for allocating these revenues among the states. The 
Council finds that whatever method is chosen, it is important to create 
financial incentives for states to administer their Unemployment Insurance 
systems efficiently. For example, those states that are able both to admin-
ister their Unemployment Insurance systems with less money than is 
allotted to them and to achieve U.S. Department of Labor performance 
requirements could be allowed to keep all or part of the surplus for other 
uses within their UI systems. The Council intends to address this issue, in 
conjunction with the U.S. Department of Labor's performance require-
ments, in its next annual report. 
The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed an Administrative 
Financing Initiative (AFI) that would allocate FUTA funds based on a 
national unit cost with base-level and contingency-level funding. The 
Council takes no position on the AFI, because the U.S. Department of 
Labor and the states have not yet agreed on the details of this initiative. 
The Council notes that it is inefficient for the federal government to 
require employers to fill out and submit separate forms and payments for 
their FUTA and state Unemployment Insurance taxes. Not only does this 
impose an unnecessary paperwork burden on employers, it also creates 
redundant tax collection units in the federal and state governments. The 
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expense of collecting Unemployment Insurance taxes could be reduced by 
allowing the states to collect FUTA taxes on behalf of the federal 
government. 
26. Recommendation 
FUTA taxes should be collected with other Unemployment Insurance 
taxes by each of the states and submitted to the federal government 
for placement in the federal trust fund. States' Unemployment Insur-







3 / Purpose and 
Objectives 
THE STRUCTURE OF ANY NATION'S SYSTEM of unemployment insurance! 
reflects numerous value judgments regarding the desired weighting of 
social objectives and the optimal distribution of rights and responsibilities. 
Such judgments are likely to vary across, as well as within, societies. In 
order for a system to function as intended, it must be constructed around 
objectives that have been explicitly identified and prioritized. In addition, 
the very structure of the system must assign numerous rights and responsi-
bilities, either implicitly or explicitly, to different groups. While many of 
these rights and responsibilities are a direct consequence of the objectives 
being pursued, there are various ways that they can be assigned. 
In the next section, the potential objectives of an unemployment 
insurance system are discussed. The section on "Balancing Objectives" 
then describes the current Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in the 
United States and considers how its objectives and related rights and 
responsibilities compare with those of systems in other countries. 
Additional burdens that are necessarily assigned by unemployment 
insurance systems are briefly considered in the last section. The financing 
structure of the system, which has the fundamental effect of allocating 
many of the costs that are associated with unemployment, is discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
POTENTIAL OBJECTIVES 
Four potential primary objectives for unemployment insurance programs 
can be identified. Such programs can (1) provide partial replacement of 
lost wages to unemployed individuals, (2) help stabilize the macroeconomy, 
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(3) help prevent unemployment from occurring, and (4) facilitate the 
reemployment of unemployed individuals. Each of these possible objec-
tives is discussed below. 
Wage Replacement 
Most unemployment insurance programs provide eligible unemployed 
workers with a monetary payment that replaces some percentage of their 
previous wages. This objective is based largely on the beliefs that some 
unemployment is inevitable in a dynamic and fluid labor market and that 
many unemployed individuals need some assistance in order to avoid 
significant hardship. Wage replacement is an objective that is shared by 
all unemployment insurance systems, although they differ considerably in 
the extent to which they pursue this objective. 
The extent to which a system attempts to replace wages can be 
measured along two dimensions. First, the greater the percentage of 
unemployed individuals who are eligible for benefits, the more extensive 
is the wage replacement role of the system. Second, the "level" of benefits 
provided to eligible individuals also reflects the degree to which the goal 
of wage replacement is pursued. A number of factors determine this 
overall level of benefits. Often, benefits are determined as some percent-
age of an individual's pre-unemployment wages, and the absolute level of 
benefits is subject to a minimum andlor maximum level. In addition, the 
potential duration of benefit payments may be limited, which restricts the 
total potential amount of benefits that individuals can receive. 
Economic Stabilization 
Unemployment insurance programs can serve as a fiscal stimulus tool that 
helps stabilize the macroeconomy by injecting additional money into the 
economy during periods of downturn. This occurs because the number of 
unemployed individuals increases as economic conditions deteriorate, 
resulting in an automatic flow of additional money into the economy as 
unemployment benefits are paid to more people. 
The extent to which an unemployment insurance system can fulfill the 
function of economic stabilization during recessions depends on two major 
factors. The first is the extent to which the system pursues the wage 
replacement objective. That is, the greater the level of benefits paid out, 
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the greater the stimulus provided to the economy, particularly during 
recessionary periods. The second factor is the funding mechanism for the 
system. Economic stabilization can be achieved most effectively when 
unemployment benefits are paid out of a trust fund established at an earlier 
time (that is, under a principle of forward funding). Under pay-as-you-go 
funding, which prevails today in the systems of many states in the United 
States, few reserves are available to be pumped into the economy because 
they were not built up during healthier economic times. 
Prevention of Unemployment 
At a microeconomic level, unemployment may be prevented to some extent 
by charging employers for the costs of the unemployment benefits of 
former employees. In the U.S. system, this financing method is called 
"experience rating." (See Chapter 6.) It provides a disincentive to layoffs 
and, all other things being equal, is likely to reduce the number of 
individuals who lose their jobs. By slightly increasing the cost of 
employing workers, however, experience rating sometimes has the effect 
of decreasing worker hiring. Thus, the overall effect of financing systems 
such as experience rating may be a more general smoothing of employ-
ment, by reducing both hiring and layoffs. 
As it helps stabilize the economic situation, an unemployment insurance 
system can also help prevent unemployment indirectly--on a macro-
economic level-by maintaining overall purchasing power within the 
economy, thereby partially ameliorating a downward spiral of income and 
employment during recessions. Indeed, some experts view economic 
stabilization and the prevention of unemployment as two elements of the 
same objective (Blaustein 1993). 
Facilitation of Reemployment 
By helping to minimize financial disruption for unemployed individuals, 
the payment of unemployment insurance benefits allows them to focus 
more time and energy on seeking new, appropriate employment, and less 
time on making other financial adjustments. The provision of unemploy-
ment insurance, therefore, may enhance individuals' chances of finding 
productive reemployment quickly. In this view, unemployment benefits 
can be a useful support for job search. Others believe, however, that too 
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generous a wage replacement program reduces incentives for unemployed 
individuals to seek rapid reemployment. 
Unemployment insurance programs can also facilitate reemployment by 
making labor market information available and by steering unemployed 
individuals to other job search and job training services. Because unem-
ployment offices are generally the first point of contact between the 
government and the unemployed regarding their employment status, the 
initial visit to these offices is usually the first opportunity to offer 
potentially useful reemployment services. The contact also affords an 
opportunity to screen individuals to determine the circumstances of their 
unemployment and to identify the most appropriate available services for 
ensuring their rapid return to productive reemployment. 
BALANCING OBJECTIVES 
To a significant extent, all of the objectives discussed above are positive 
outcomes. Nevertheless, for two reasons, they cannot all be fully pursued 
simultaneously within one unemployment insurance system. First, because 
some of the objectives require a commitment of scarce resources, they must 
be weighted according to their relative priority in a given system. Second, 
the pursuit of some objectives can have a negative effect on others. For 
example, generous wage replacement provisions may hamper efforts to 
facilitate reemployment by reducing the costs of unemployment to 
individuals. Similarly, the desire for an extremely limited wage replace-
ment program is likely to reduce the capacity of unemployment insurance 
to serve as a significant tool for economic stabilization during periods of 
recession. Because of these tensions, the design of an unemployment 
insurance system often requires a subtle balancing of competing objectives. 
Thus, in determining the structure of an unemployment insurance 
program, the identification and prioritization of objectives, as well as the 
intrinsic tensions among those objectives, must be taken into consideration. 
To a great extent, the appropriate balance among the objectives must 
ultimately depend on value judgments, which will inevitably vary across 
(and within) societies and cultures. The following subsections discuss the 
operation and interaction of the objectives of the Unemployment Insurance 
system in the United States, comparing their operation and interaction with 
those of systems in other industrialized nations. 
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Unemployment Insurance Objectives in the United States 
The purposes of the Unemployment Insurance system in the United States 
have been the subject of disagreement since the system's inception. A 
1946 congressional review of the program stated that "there is still some 
disagreement as to its primary purpose and as to its basic principles. It is 
generally conceived of as a multi-purpose program, although different 
groups emphasize different aspects of it" (quoted in Blaustein 1993, 43). 
In 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt focused on employment stabilization in 
stating that "an unemployment compensation system should be constructed 
in such a way as to afford every practicable aid and incentive toward the 
larger purpose of employment stabilization" (quoted in Blaustein 1993, 46). 
In 1936, however, the U.S. Social Security Board had suggested the 
following broad statement of purpose for adoption by the states, placing 
greater emphasis on the burden felt by the unemployed worker: 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to 
the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involun-
tary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and 
concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten the burden which now so often 
falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his 
family. The achievement of social security requires protection 
against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be 
provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable 
employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during 
periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemploy-
ment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious 
social consequences of poor relief assistance. [Quoted in Blaustein 
1993, 46.] 
The last official federal expression of the program's major objectives 
was issued in 1955.2 That year, the U.S. Department of Labor stated the 
following: 
Unemployment insurance is a program--established under Federal 
and State law-for income maintenance during periods of involun-
tary unemployment due to lack of work, which provides partial 
compensation for wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and 
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dispatch, to eligible individuals. It helps to maintain purchasing 
power and to stabilize the economy. It helps to prevent the 
dispersal of the employers' trained work force, the sacrifice of 
skills, and the breakdown of labor standards during temporary 
unemployment. [U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Economic 
Security, quoted in Blaustein 1993, 47.] 
While a number of other goals are articulated in the preceding 
statement, it suggests that wage replacement is perhaps the primary goal of 
the system. Many experts agree with this perspective. Haber and Murray 
(1966, 26-27) state that "unemployment insurance is primarily alleviative 
in that it assists the unemployed worker, when preventive and curative 
measures fail, to meet his nondeferrable expenses. It is an insurance 
program that provides partial replacement of a worker's wage loss during 
unemployment in a manner that will maintain his self-respect." 
More recently, Blaustein (1993, 48-49) states that "relieving or 
forestalling financial hardship for the unemployed is the central aim of the 
program." He continues, "Unemployment insurance can and does serve 
other valuable ends; if alleviation of hardship were not the focal objective, 
however, it is difficult to imagine the program's existence based on other 
objectives. " 
Thus, there is some agreement that the U.S. system serves a wage 
replacement role first, while also strongly pursuing a number of other 
objectives. Such a statement could also likely apply to the systems in most 
other industrialized countries. Nevertheless, in comparison with those 
countries, a number of features of the U.S. system stand out. 
United States in Comparative Perspective 
Those features of the U.S. Unemployment Insurance system that are 
particularly noteworthy are discussed here, and are compared with those of 
other countries. The features discussed are the broad objectives identified 
above. It is important to recognize that this discussion is limited to the 
extent to which these objectives are pursued through a nation's unemploy-
ment insurance system, since a number of them can also be achieved in 
other ways. Additional policies or prevailing societal norms may serve the 
same objectives. For example, employee rights legislation in many nations 
prevents layoffs under some circumstances. The United States has no such 
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legislation and is more direct in its use of the UI system for this purpose. 
Therefore, the extent to which a given objective is emphasized in the UI 
system should not necessarily be viewed as a measure of the overall 
importance of that objective in a given society. 
Wage Replacement 
Despite the primacy of wage replacement in the U.S. system, most 
measures of this function suggest that it is less generous in this country 
than elsewhere. Among the Group of Seven (G-7) nations/ benefits in 
relation to previous wages are generally the lowest in the United States.4 
(See Table 3-1.) It is difficult to make general statements regarding the 
levels of benefits because each nation uses a unique system to calculate 
benefit levels, with six of the seven nations relating benefits in some way 
to past wages. According to comparisons by the Congressional Research 
Service (1992b) of the benefits that would be available in specific cases, 
the United States pays a level of benefits similar to that of other G-7 
nations to young workers with low wages and low job tenure. Benefits 
tend to increase more quickly in the other 0-7 nations, however, for older 
individuals, workers with higher wages, or workers with longer job tenure. 
The maximum regular duration of benefits in the United States is also 
among the lowest of the seven systems compared here. The maximum UI 
benefit duration for full-time workers is 26 weeks in most states in the 
United States.5 Among the other G-7 nations, UI benefits also generally 
continue for approximately half a year in Italy and Japan, two-thirds of a 
year in Canada and France, and a full year in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Other factors can increase the maximum length of benefits in 
many of these countries (see Table 3-2). Age and work history can 
increase benefit duration in France, Germany, and Japan.6 The level of 
unemployment can increase the maximum duration in Canada, France, and 
the United States.7 In addition, in France, Germany, and the United King-
dom, means-tested unemployment assistance programs can extend benefits 
(at a lower rate) indefinitely. 
Furthermore, the percentage of the unemployed who receive UI in the 
United States is significantly lower than it is in the other countries. This 
is of added importance because, as noted above, the United States does not 
have unemployment assistance programs available for workers who are 
ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. Among the G-7 nations, expend-





60% of average gross 
wage, maximum of 
$353/week 
France $6.91/day plus 30% of 
average gross wageb 
Gennany 63% of average net wage 
Italy None-benefit is $0.87/ 
day (+ 66% of average 
gross wage for workers 




80% of average gross 
wage at low wage levels, 
60% at high wage levels, 
maximum of $59/day 




50% of average gross 
wage in most states, 
maximum of $116 to 
$335/week (maximum in 
median state is $212/week) 
UI Benefit Formula Varies in Relation to: 
Work 




x x x 
x x 
SOURCE: Congressional Research Service (1992b, 20). 
a Currency figures were converted to U.S. dollars using December 31, 1991, exchange rates. 
b After the original and extended benefit periods have lapsed, the benefit paid is a flat amount 
unrelated to wages. 
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TABLE 3-2. Detenninants of Maximum ur Benefit Durations in G-7 Nations 
Maximum Duration Varies in Relation to: 
Maximum Benefit 
Duration for Work Unemployment 
Nation Full-time Workers History Age Rates Region 
Canada 35 weeks X X X 
(worked all year) 
France 8 months X X X X 
(worked more than 
half-year) 
Gennany 52 weeks X X 
(worked last 3 years) 
Italy 180 days X 
Japan 180 days X X 
United 52 weeks 
Kingdom 
United 26 weeks in 51 states X X X 
States (must have worked 
certain amount in 43 
states) 
SOURCE: Congressional Research Service (1992b, 24). 
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itures on unemployment programs as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), adjusted for unemployment rate, were either the lowest or 
the second-lowest in the United States throughout the 1970s and 1980s.8 
Recipiency (the percentage of the unemployed who receive benefits) in 
the United States9 is much lower than in the other G-7 nations despite 
eligibility standards that are not particularly strict relative to those other 
countries. Eligibility generally requires that an individual work in covered 
employment for some minimum time during a base period. Italy has the 
strictest requirements, while those in the United States, based primarily 
upon previous earnings, are relatively minimal. The United States does, 
however, generally impose the longest disqualification period for non-
monetary factors such as voluntary quits. (For a more detailed discussion 
of nonmonetary eligibility standards, see Chapter 8 in this report.) 
Overall, the evidence suggests that, relative to other industrialized 
countries, the wage replacement capacity of the UI system in the United 
States is limited. As a result, unemployed workers in the United States are 
implicitly assigned more responsibility for their unemployment situation 
than are workers in other nations. (See the discussion of this subject in the 
next section.) 
Economic Stabilization 
In the United States, the economic stabilization capacity of the UI system 
is also one of the most limited among nations with similar economies, for 
two main reasons. First, because the wage replacement function is limited, 
the capacity of the UI system to have a significant macroeconomic effect 
is also limited. Indeed, recent estimates suggest that the UI program was 
only about two-thirds as effective as a countercyclical stabilizer in the 
1980s as it was in the 1970s, with a large part of this decline being 
potentially attributable to decreases in recipiency rates in the United States 
during that period (Dunson et al. 1990). Second, the increasing reliance 
on a pay-as-you-go funding structure in the U.S. system has also limited 
its capacity to act as a significant economic stabilizer. lo 
Prevention of Unemployment 
The United States is the only one of the G-7 nations that relates employers' 
tax rates to their unemployment experience. Thus, the United States pro-
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vides perhaps the most direct UI-related incentives to employers to reduce 
unemployment. In many other countries, however, employee rights legis-
lation may tend to have a similar effect. 
facilitation of Reemployment 
Overall, the extent to which this objective is pursued in the U.S. Unem-
ployment Insurance program relative to that of other countries is unclear. 
Because benefit levels, benefit duration, and recipiency rates are low in the 
United States, workers may face additional pressure to find reemployment 
rapidly. There is some evidence that rates of movement out of unemploy-
ment into employment are higher in the United States than they are in other 
countries. II 
It is not clear, however, whether the jobs that are being accepted by 
unemployed individuals are the most appropriate jobs in that they take full 
advantage of an individual's skills, education, and experience. Indeed, 
some believe that more generous unemployment benefits, for a relatively 
long duration, serve primarily as a support for individuals' job search 
efforts. To the extent that such benefits facilitate effective matching of 
workers' skills with employers' needs, other nations' systems that are more 
capable of minimizing the disruption caused by unemployment would also 
be more effective in achieving reemployment objectives. 
In addition, unemployment insurance programs, to a greater or lesser 
extent, are often linked to reemployment services. In the United States and 
other G-7 nations, most UI recipients are required to register with the 
public employment service as a condition of continuing eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits. New "profiling" initiatives in the United 
States are also designed to strengthen the direct link between Ul and other 
reemployment services. (See Chapter 14.) 
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Three significant responsibilities are assigned, directly or indirectly, 
through the functioning of any unemployment insurance system. The 
appropriate assignment of the following burdens, therefore, should be 
explicitly considered in designing the structure of the system: (1) the 
responsibility for bearing the costs of finding reemployment, (2) the 
responsibility for ensuring compliance in the system, and (3) the responsi-
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bility for funding the system. The first two issues are discussed below; the 
third issue is addressed in the next chapter. 
Finding Reemployment 
One justification for the payment of unemployment benefits is that they 
allow an individual to focus on searching for a new job. The overall level 
of a nation's unemployment insurance benefit payments (including amount 
and duration) may be seen as a reflection of the level of responsibility for 
an individual's unemployment spell that is borne by the groups that finance 
the system. This responsibility implicitly includes costs related to finding 
reemployment. Thus, the exhaustion of an individual's benefits may be 
seen as ending the system's responsibility for all elements related to the 
unemployment spell. 
Overall, therefore, the duration of benefits paid should strongly reflect 
two factors: (1) the prevailing social view about the responsibilities for 
unemployment and reemployment, and (2) the amount of time it takes an 
individual to acquire and apply relevant labor market information and to 
find and accept an appropriate job offer. In the United States, which has 
a relatively short duration in comparison to other G-? nations, the 
unemployed worker bears more responsibility for finding reemployment 
rapidly than do unemployed workers in other countries. 
Compliance 
An additional responsibility assigned in part through the structure of an 
unemployment insurance system is that of ensuring compliance with the 
system. If system costs are directly imposed on certain groups, then those 
groups will have an additional incentive to ensure that the regulations and 
standards of the system are met. In the United States, this occurs through 
the experience rating of the system. 12 Under an experience-rated system, 
employers generally monitor eligibility compliance because they are 
directly affected by unemployment insurance claims of former employees. 
Some argue that the incentives for employers to monitor the system are too 
strong in the United States and that the result is an excess of appeals cases. 
In the absence of incentives for monitoring compliance such as those 
created by the experience rating system, the responsibility for compliance 
falls by default to system administrators. The extent to which compliance 
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is enforced by unemployment insurance administrators is likely to depend 
primarily upon other, external incentives. As a result, compliance may be 
unpredictable and may vary across jurisdictions. 
NOTES 
1. The discussion that follows is limited to unemployment insurance programs, which 
are distinguished from unemployment assistance programs. While unemployment 
assistance provides aid for the unemployed on the basis of need alone, unemployment 
insurance programs adhere to some (although not all) insurance principles. Thus, 
unemployment insurance benefits paid to an individual are related in some way to past 
contributions made on behalf of that individual. In addition, it is generally understood 
that funds paid into an unemployment insurance program will not be used for purposes 
unrelated to the "insurance" that is being provided to covered individuals. Because 
unemployment insurance programs are usually considered to be social insurance 
programs, however, not all private insurance principles are followed. The structure of 
a social insurance program and the benefits that it pays to individuals are the result of 
balancing the often-conflicting objectives of social adequacy and private equity. The 
benefits paid under such a system are determined both by need and by past 
contributions. For additional information on unemployment insurance as an insurance 
program, see Blaustein (1993). 
2. The 1980 National Commission on Unemployment Compensation was unable to 
agree on a general statement of purpose. 
3. Unless otherwise noted, all comparisons between the United States and other G-7 
nations are taken from Congressional Research Service (1992b). Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States comprise the G-7 
nations. 
4. The United States is the only G-7 nation without a national wage formula. As a 
result, there is significant variation across states and it is difficult to make statements 
that apply to all states. Generally, some features of the most-generous state systems are 
sometimes comparable with those in other G-7 nations; many features of the systems 
in average states and less-generous states rank far behind those in other G-7 nations. 
5. Two states have greater maximum durations: Massachusetts and Washington allow 
up to 30 weeks of benefits. 
6. In France, the regular 8-month period can increase to 27 months for workers over 
age 55 who have worked at least 2 of the previous 3 years. In Germany, an additional 
year of benefits is available for workers over age 54 who have worked at least 6 years. 
In Japan, an additional 4 months of benefits are available for workers over age 55 who 
have worked at least 10 years. 
7. In Canada, up to 15 additional weeks can be made available on the basis of regional 
unemployment rates. In France, benefit extensions of up to 7 months can be granted 
as a result of the unemployment rate. In the United States, 13 weeks can be added on 
the basis of measures of state unemployment. In addition, the United States has enacted 
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temporary extensions of benefits during eaeh recession since 1958. No other nation has 
made use of temporary programs for benefit extensions. 
8. Italy is the other G-7 nation that ranked in the lowest two countries in 
unemployment compensation expenditures as a percentage of GDP after adjustment for 
unemployment. Per percentage point of unemployment, expenditures in the United 
States and Italy were, on average, slightly below 0.1 percent of GDP. 
9. For additional information on recipiency in the United States, see Advisory Couneil 
on Unemployment Compensation (1994). 
10. For additional information, see Advisory Couneil on Unemployment Compensation 
(1994). 
11. Comparing eight eountries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1985, Atkinson and Mieklewright (1991) find that a much 
higher percentage of those individuals in the United States who were unemployed 12 
months earlier had moved into employment than was the case in most of the other 
countries (49 percent in the United States and Denmark, compared to 32 pereent in 
Italy, 29 pereent in Franee and the United Kingdom, 24 pereent in the Netherlands, 22 
percent in Belgium, and 18 percent in Ireland). It should also be noted that in the 
United States, a higher percentage of individuals had also moved out of the labor force 
entirely. 
12. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the effeetiveness of experience rating in bringing 
about employer involvement in the UI system. 
4 / Financing: 
links to 
Program Objectives 
THE MECHANISM CREATED TO FINANCE unemployment insurance benefits 
is the primary means of allocating the economic costs created by the 
system. By extension, therefore, the financing method that is chosen 
should reflect the prevailing view in society about the optimal distribution 
of the costs that result from unemployment. In addition, the financing 
mechanism should be designed to be consistent with, and even to reinforce, 
the other objectives that are selected for the program. 
Two fundamental factors determine the extent to which a financing 
structure for unemployment insurance can promote the system's objectives. 
The first is how the system is financed, which determines the system's 
potential capacity for meeting its objectives. The second factor is the 
monetary level at which the system is financed, which determines its actual 
capacity for meeting those objectives. This chapter addresses the links 
among financing choices, structure, and program objectives. In addition, 
it compares the current financing system in the United States with the 
systems of other industrialized nations. 
FINANCING MECHANISMS 
Three basic choices determine the method of financing any unemployment 
insurance system. The first choice is whether to have a forward-funded or 
a pay-as-you-go system. The second is whether the system should be 
financed by workers, employers, the government (through general tax 
collections), or some combination of the three. If it is decided that either 
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workers and/or employers should at least partially finance the system, then 
a third choice is whether revenues from either of those two groups should 
be generated through a flat tax or an experience-rated tax. 
The discussion that follows focuses on the relationship among these 
choices in designing an unemployment insurance system's financing 
mechanism and the potential capacity of the system to meet the objectives 
outlined above. The actual capacity of the system is addressed in later 
chapters. l 
It should be stressed that because much of what is discussed would 
represent a significant departure from the existing structure of financing the 
U.S. system of Unemployment Insurance, little research evidence can be 
drawn upon to inform the discussion. Rather, it is possible only to 
speculate on the types of effects that such changes in financing could be 
expected to produce. 
Forward Funding Versus Pay-As-You-Go Funding 
A forward-funded system accumulates reserves during periods of economic 
prosperity and draws upon them during recessions. The VI program in the 
United States operated on a forward-funded basis during its first four 
decades, but in the past 10 years has moved toward pay-as-you-go 
funding. 2 Pay-as-you-go systems recoup current and previous benefit costs 
rather than building a trust fund to withstand increased benefit demands 
during recessionary periods. A pay-as-you-go system allows states to 
remain more flexible by avoiding large excess reserves. During periods of 
recession, however, when unemployment is highest and the demands on the 
system are greatest, a pay-as-you-go system must rely exclusively on tax 
increases to accommodate these greater demands. 
Who Pays for the System 
Three groups could potentially be assigned responsibility for financing an 
unemployment insurance system-workers, employers, and the government 
(through general revenues).3 Currently the VI system in the United States 
is financed almost entirely through a payroll tax on employers, with 
provisions for worker payment of a small payroll tax in four states.4 
Economists argue, however, that the entity that actually pays the tax may 
not be the entity on which the tax is legislatively imposed (that is, the 
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entity that appears to be paying the tax). The ultimate burden of any tax 
depends on how demand and supply respond to changes in an item's price, 
including taxes. (This responsiveness is called elasticity.) For example, 
when the supply of labor is less responsive to price changes than is the 
demand for labor, workers will bear a greater percentage of the tax 
(through wage reductions) than employers bear, regardless of whether the 
tax is legislatively imposed on employers or on workers.5 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the legislative selection of the group 
or groups on which to impose the unemployment insurance tax would have 
political consequences that could have a significant effect upon the 
structure of a nation's unemployment insurance system. Imposing the tax 
on employers, for example, could result in resistance from employers, since 
they would likely view the tax as a cost to them that generates benefits for 
others (namely, workers)-even if the tax was ultimately passed on to 
workers in the form of lower wages and/or to consumers in the form of 
higher prices. Imposing the tax on workers could result in less resistance, 
since workers would be expected to view the tax as both a cost and a 
benefit. If, however, the benefits were paid primarily to one group of 
workers while the costs were imposed on another group, resistance to a tax 
imposed on workers would be expected to increase. If the system was 
financed with government general revenues, political support by taxpayers 
would probably depend on the distribution of benefits and the public 
perceptions of the program. 6 
Flat Tax Versus Experience-Rated Tax 
If either employers or workers are chosen as the group on which the 
unemployment insurance tax is legislatively imposed, then a determination 
must be made about whether to have a flat tax or an experience-rated tax. 7 
Under a flat tax, taxes would be imposed uniformly regardless of program 
use or individual circumstances. Flat taxes on employers could take the 
form of a fixed amount per worker or a fixed percentage of payroll. 
Similarly, flat taxes on workers could take the form of a fixed amount per 
worker or a fixed percentage of a workers' earnings. 8 Flat taxes inherently 
result in a redistribution of costs between those who cause high unemploy-
ment insurance expenditures and those who cause low expenditures. 
Currently, the U.S. Unemployment Insurance system relies primarily on 
an experience-rated payroll tax on employers.9 This tax is tied to the level 
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of VI benefits that are paid to the employer's former workers. With 
"perfect" experience rating, each extra dollar of benefits paid results in an 
additional dollar of taxes charged to the employer who is deemed 
responsible for the benefits. With "imperfect" experience rating, the 
responsible employer is charged less than the full amount of benefits 
received, resulting in some subsidization among employers. (See Chapter 
6 for further information on experience rating.) 
Alternatively, some analysts have suggested that it would be possible 
to have an experience-rated tax on workers (see, e.g., Topel 1990). Vnder 
such a system, workers would have individualized accounts similar to the 
individualized VI accounts that U.S. employers currently have. A worker 
would pay into his or her account while employed and draw from it when 
unemployed. Vpon returning to work, individuals with low (or negative) 
account balances would be required to pay a higher tax rate on their 
earnings. Within such a system, it would be possible to provide a "cash-in" 
option, whereby the account balance could be turned over to the worker on 
retirement. lo If such a system was "perfectly" experience-rated, it would 
impose extremely high tax rates on individuals who experience the most 
unemployment. I I 
FINANCING CHOICES AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
The discussion that follows focuses on the relationships that might be 
expected between specific funding mechanisms and the potential capacity 
to achieve specific objectives of an unemployment insurance system. A 
funding mechanism might have one of five possible effects. It might 
(1) actively promote an objective, (2) be consistent with an objective, (3) 
have an insignificant effect on an objective, (4) be inconsistent with an 
objective, or (5) actively impede an objective. 
Wage Replacement 
The extent to which an unemployment insurance system replaces wages 
depends on both recipiency (that is, the percentage of the unemployed who 
receive benefits) and the overall level of benefits (that is, weekly benefit 
amounts and durations). During recessions, pay-as-you-go systems must 
rely on tax increases as the number of unemployment insurance recipients 
increases. Since a recession is precisely the time when raising taxes is 
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most harmful, both to individual employers and to the overall economy, 
there may be a tendency to reduce benefits during recessions. 12 As a result, 
a pay-as-you-go system is likely to be less effective in achieving a wage 
replacement objective than a forward-funded system would be. 
As discussed above, imposing a tax on employers is likely to result in 
employer resistance to the system's wage replacement function--even if the 
tax is ultimately passed on to workers and/or consumers. Experience-rated 
taxation of employers may be more detrimental to the wage replacement 
objective than a flat tax on employers, because under an experience-rated 
system, it is in the interest of each individual employer to minimize its 
unemployment insurance costS.13 
A system paid for either by workers or by the government may result 
in less resistance to the wage replacement objective than would a system 
financed by a tax on employers alone. An unemployment insurance tax on 
workers, for example, might promote the wage replacement objective if 
workers perceive that they receive benefits in exchange for the costs that 
the tax imposes on them. 
By similar reasoning, financing the system through general revenues, 
thereby spreading costs among workers and employers, is likely to result 
in less resistance to the wage replacement objective than would a tax on 
employers alone. A system financed through general revenues, however, 
might be expected to encounter more resistance to the wage replacement 
function than would a system financed exclusively through taxes paid by 
workers (because employers would pay for at least a portion of such a 
system). 
Economic Stabilization 
The extent to which an unemployment insurance system provides economic 
stabilization is linked to the extent to which the wage replacement function 
is achieved and also to the funding mechanism of the system (Dunson et 
al. 1990). During recessions, a pay-as-you-go system is largely ineffective 
in stabilizing the economy, since it primarily redistributes money rather 
than pumping previously collected funds back into the economy. A 
forward-funded system promotes economic stabilization by increasing total 
buying power during recession. 14 
The economic stabilization objective is closely correlated with the wage 
replacement objective. Consequently, relative to a system financed by a 
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tax on employers, a system financed either through general revenues or a 
tax paid by workers might contribute more effectively to economic 
stabilization (to the extent that an employer tax impedes the wage 
replacement objective). 
Compared to a flat tax, an experience-rated tax on employers may 
further impede the wage replacement objective, and, by extension, 
economic stabilization. On the other hand, to the extent that an experience-
rated tax serves to prevent unemployment by reducing layoffs (discussed 
below), it might contribute to the economic stabilization goal. 
Prevention of Unemployment 
The extent to which an unemployment insurance system helps prevent 
unemployment may be indirectly linked to its capacity to stabilize the 
economy by maintaining overall purchasing power during recessions. For 
this reason, a forward-funded system may be somewhat more consistent 
with the prevention of unemployment during economic downturns than a 
pay-as-you-go system would be. Because a pay-as-you-go system does not 
represent a drag on the economy, however, it may be more consistent with 
the prevention of unemployment during periods of expansion. 
As discussed earlier, some analysts have suggested that each worker 
could have an experience-rated account into which the worker contributes 
while employed and from which he or she draws benefits while unem-
ployed. Under such a system, the incentives to prevent unemployment 
would be strengthened if workers were allowed to cash in their accounts 
upon retirement. Workers would be unable to respond to such incentives, 
however, if there are no jobs available. 1s By similar reasoning, an 
experience-rated tax on employers could prevent some unemployment to 
the extent that firms can and do respond to financial incentives that 
discourage firms from laying off workers. 16 
A flat tax (either on employers or workers) would not provide a 
financial incentive for preventing unemployment. Similarly, financing 
through general revenues would probably not have a significant effect on 
the goal of preventing unemployment, since under such a system the cost 
of benefits is not at all related to the cause of the unemployment. 
Facilitation of Reemployment 
An unemployment insurance system's capacity to facilitate reemployment 
is determined in large part by the reemployment services and incentives 
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that the system offers. (See Chapters 13 and 14.) The extent to which 
reemployment is facilitated is also determined both by the level of 
benefitsl7 and by who pays for the benefits. An experience-rated tax on 
workers could potentially have some influence on reemployment (by 
creating additional incentives for workers to attempt to reduce the length 
of their unemployment spells). To the extent that jobs are unavailable, 
however, workers will be unable to respond to these incentives. 
Whether the system is forward-funded or pay-as-you-go is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on the goal of reemployment. Nor would the 
system's capacity to facilitate reemployment likely be affected by a choice 
between employer or government funding. 
Conclusions 
Table 4-1 summarizes the relationships that are likely to exist between 
alternative objectives for an unemployment insurance system and a variety 
of financing mechanisms. Overall, the financing mechanism that might be 
expected to promote the system's capacity to achieve wage replacement and 
economic stabilization objectives most effectively would rely on forward 
funding, either through general revenues or a tax paid (at least partially) by 
workers. The objective of preventing unemployment might be achieved 
most effectively by using an experience-rated tax (either on workers or 
employers). An experience-rated tax on employers, however, might work 
against the objective of wage replacement and possibly against that of 
economic stabilization. The reemployment objective might be promoted 
most effectively by an experience-rated tax on workers. In all cases, 
however, the effect of experience rating (either of workers or employers) 
on the system's capacity to achieve its objectives will be mitigated to the 
extent that unemployment is unavoidable. 
UNITED STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
All of the G-7 nations use a payroll tax to fund their unemployment 
insurance program. 18 Six of the seven rely on this earmarked tax 
exclusively for the payment of benefits, with the taxes varying across 
countries along a number of dimensions, including the following: (1) the 
percentage of the tax paid by employers and employees; (2) the taxable 
wage base; (3) whether the tax is a fixed or variable percentage; and 
TABLE 4-1. Anticipated Relationship Between VI Objectives and Financing Mechanisms 
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NOTE: Arrayed from most positive to most negative, the anticipated relationships are as follows: the mechanism promotes the objective; the 
mechanism is consistent with the objective; the mechanism is insignificant with respect to the objective; the mechanism is inconsistent with the 
objective; the mechanism impedes the objective. 
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(4) among countries with variable tax rates, the dimensions along which the 
rates vary. The details of financing systems in the G-7 nations are 
discussed below. 
Who Pays for the System 
Five of the G-7 nations apply unemployment insurance payroll taxes to 
both the employer and employee, while Italy and the United States (with 
the exception of four states19) do not tax employees directly.20 The 
proportion of the program financed by employers ranges from 37.5 percent 
in Japan to 100 percent in Italy. Employees' shares range from 0 percent 
in Italy to 50 percent in Germany. Japan is the only nation that relies upon 
general government revenues for partial financing of its program, with 25 
percent of the system's costs financed by the government. Additional 
detail on the funding sources for unemployment insurance benefits is 
available in Table 4-2. 
Taxable Wage Base 
Two of the G-7 nations, Japan and the United Kingdom, apply their 
unemployment insurance taxes to all wages. Four other countries have 
ceilings on taxable wages, ranging from approximately the first $7,000 of 
a worker's salary in some states in the United States to the first $100,000 
of a worker's salary in France. Italy takes the opposite approach, taxing 
all wages above $44 per day. 
Tax Rate 
Four of the G-7 nations have fixed tax rates, with employee rates ranging 
from 0.6 percent in Japan to 2.5 percent in France and employer rates 
ranging from 0.6 percent in Japan to 4.4 percent in France. The United 
Kingdom, United States, and Italy vary their tax rates on the basis of other 
criteria. In the United Kingdom, rates vary with wage level. Rates in the 
United States vary by state and by firm within state, due to the federal-state 
and experience rating elements of the system. In Italy, rates are higher for 
industrial and construction firms, while rates for other firms are fixed at a 
lower level. 
'" o 
TABLE 4-2. Funding Sources for VI Benefits in the G-7 Nations, 1992 
Percent of Benefit Cost Paid from: Level of Tax on: 
Pa~roll Tax on: Employee Employee 
Nation EmElo~ee EmElo~er Government Tax Rate Wage Basea 
Canada 42 58 0 2.25 $30,576 
France 36 64 0 2.52b 97,668 
Germany 50 50 0 2.15c 48,285 
Italy 0 100 0 
Japan 37.5 37.5 25 0.55d All wages 
United Kingdom N.A. N.A. 0 2.0!9.0f,g 31,616g 
United States 1-4h 96-99h 0 0.0-l.l25h 0-22,600h 
NOTE: "NA" indicates data are not available; a dash (-) indicates such taxes are not paid. 
SOURCE: Congressional Research Service (1992b, 8-9). 
a Wage base figures were converted to U.S. dollars using December 31, 1991, exchange rates and annualized. 
b Tax rate is 2.47 percent on first $24,420 of earnings. 
C The employer pays full 4.3 percent for employees earning less than $4,828 per year. 



















e Employers of seasonal workers pay 0.65 percent, and construction firms pay 0.75 percent. 
f The first rate applies to the first $4,160 of weekly earnings and the second rate to additional earnings. A range of rates is shown for employers 
because the rate is higher at higher wage levels. 
g The United Kingdom payroll tax funds other social security programs in addition to VI. In 1989, VI benefits were 4.4 percent of these revenues. 
h Employee share is estimated to be 4 percent or less. Only four states have provisions to tax employees. 
i Tax rates and taxable wages vary by state, and tax rates vary by firm in each state. The rates shown are the lowest and highest average state rates. 
The national average tax rate applied to taxable wages in covered employment is 1.9 percent state and 0.8 percent federal. If all covered wages were 
taxable, the national average rate would be 1.0 percent. The taxable wage base for the median state is $8,250. 
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NOTES 
1. See especially Chapters 5 and 9. The actual capacity of the system to achieve its 
objectives necessarily hinges on the sufficiency of funds within the system. Not only 
must the system have sufficient funds to achieve its stated objectives, but it must also 
have sufficient funds to administer benefits in an efficient and timely manner. 
Determining whether or not funds are adequate either to payor to administer benefits 
is a difficult task that depends on both empirical evidence and value judgments. 
2. For the purposes of this discussion, building up reserves could take the form of 
reducing a negative balance. Consequently, forward funding could consist of relying 
heavily on borrowing during recessions and paying back loans during periods of 
expansion. 
The increased reliance on pay-as-you-go funding is the result of both a failure to 
build reserves and a reduced reliance on loans. See Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation (1994) for more information on this subject. 
3. General revenues are, for the most part, collected from workers and employers, 
but also come from other individuals not in either category. 
4. ill recent years, Alaska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia have had 
provisions for levying UI taxes on employees. ill all cases, collections from employees 
represent only a small percentage of total UI tax collections. Employee taxes in these 
states are either permanent taxes or triggered surtaxes. 
In Alaska and New Jersey, the employee tax is permanent, and has been in place 
for many decades. (New Jersey, however, has diverted employee tax revenues from 
the state UI trust fund to a health care and a work force development fund until 1997.) 
In Alaska, the tax rate on employees varies, but is currently 0.5 percent of the state 
taxable wage base. In New Jersey, the tax is 0.625 percent of the state taxable wage 
base. The original purpose of the New Jersey employee tax was to cover UI costs 
unmatched in the experience rating system. In both states, these employee 
contributions are only a small percentage of total contributions. 
In Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the employee tax is a surtax, used only when 
federal loans need to be repaid or when the state trust fund falls below a certain level. 
ill both states, the provisions for the tax were enacted within the past 10 years, after 
extensive consultation with both business and labor organizations. In Pennsylvania, 
when a solvency index falls below a certain level, variable employee taxes are levied 
on all of an employee's income (not simply the taxable wage base). In recent years, 
the taxes have been 0.15 percent. Under such circumstances, a surtax is also added 
to employer taxes. These taxes have been in effect in Pennsylvania since 1992. ill 
1993, collections from employees represented 9 percent of total contributions. 
In West Virginia, employee taxes are levied for debt repayment. (Until 1990, it 
was also possible to levy the taxes in order to stabilize the state trust fund.) Employees 
are charged up to 0.35 percent of their total wages. Under such circumstances, 
employers are also charged a higher rate. It is set to ensure that additional employer 
contributions equal employee contributions. The employee tax was in effect and was 
set at the maximum rate between 1987 and 1991. ill 1990 and 1991, contributions 
from the employee tax were approximately 20 percent of total UI contributions 
collected in West Virginia. 
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5. Many economists believe that a substantial proportion of taxes that are legislatively 
imposed on employers are ultimately borne by employees in the form of lower wages. 
This is discussed in more detail below. 
6. For both a worker-financed and government-financed system, the program is likely 
to have more broad-based support to the extent that (1) benefits are broadly distributed 
to workers in all socioeconomic groups and (2) the program maintains its distinction 
as a social insurance program for individuals with labor force attachment (and therefore 
clearly distinguishes itself from welfare). 
7. If the tax is paid by the government ou t of general revenues, it cannot be 
experience rated. 
8. A variant of flat taxation would be a tax on all earnings (or payroll) either below 
or above some specified level. If the earnings (or payroll) level on which taxes are 
paid is capped, then the tax is "regressive" (that is, the tax is a higher percentage of 
the income of low-income individuals). Alternatively, if taxes are paid only on those 
earnings (or payroll) that exceed a specified level, the tax is "progressive" (that is, the 
tax is a higher percentage of the income of high-income individuals). 
9. A flat federal tax on employers is used to finance the costs of program 
administration and 50 percent of Extended Benefits. The majority of states use an 
experience-rated tax on employers to finance their share (50 percent) of Extended 
Benefits costs, and the other states finance these costs through a flat tax. 
10. Alternatively, workers could be allowed to cash in their account balances to pay 
for education or training. 
11. Consequently, it is likely that an unemployment insurance system financed by 
taxes on workers' earnings would be "imperfectly" experience rated, with subsidization 
of individuals who experience substantial unemployment by those who experience little 
unemployment. Such a system would be similar to the current UI system, which 
imposes higher taxes on employers who generate the greatest costs to the system, but 
at the same time pools some of the costs. Such a system would also bear many 
resemblances to the current Social Security system. 
12. For a discussion of the extent to which low reserves tend to result in a reduction 
in wage replacement, see Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994). 
13. For example, under an experience-rated system, employers may be more likely 
to deny eligibility or to use the appeals process in order to reduce the number of 
former workers who receive unemployment insurance benefits. (See Chapter 6.) 
Under a flat tax system, it would not be in an individual employer's interest to engage 
in this type of activity. 
14. During periods of expansion, a pay-as-you-go system does not represent a drag 
on the economy because it does not build up reserves (or pay back loans), although for 
these reasons, a forward-/unding system can serve as a drag on the economy during 
such periods. 
15. Overall, the capacity of an experience-rated cash-in bonus to prevent 
unemployment is expected to be limited. Evidence suggests that individuals have only 
a very limited ability to respond to financial incentives designed to reduce 
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unemployment. See Chapter 13 for a summary of the literature that has examined the 
extent to which offering reemployment bonuses to unemployed workers can reduce the 
length of unemployment spells. Such incentives have consistently been found to have 
a modest effect at best. 
16. See Chapter 6 for a review of the literature that has attempted to determine the 
empirical magnitude of this effect. 
17. Holding all else constant, more generous benefits may be expected to result in 
longer spells of unemployment. On the other hand, more generous unemployment 
insurance benefits may result in a better job match and possibly higher wages. 
18. Unless otherwise noted, all comparisons between the United States and other G-7 
nations are taken from Congressional Research Service (1992b). Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States comprise the G-7 
nations. 
19. See note 4 in this chapter for additional information. 
20. As discussed above, however, the entity upon which a tax is legislatively imposed 
is not necessarily the entity that ultimately pays the tax. 

5 I Financing: 
Forward Funding 
IT IS GENERALLY AGREED that forward funding is necessary to ensure that 
the u.s. Unemployment Insurance system achieves both its wage replace-
ment and economic stabilization functions. (See Chapter 3 regarding UI 
objectives.) At the same time, excess reserves can create a drag on the 
economy and also engender the temptation to divert funds to alternative 
uses. These competing economic concerns require that states continuously 
engage in a delicate balancing act, which is played out in a political 
environment. Some states are successful in forward funding their trust 
funds at "adequate" levels (by some current definitions); others are much 
less SO.l Table 5-1 displays the trust fund solvency of states in 1993, as 
measured by the high cost multiple.2 Overall, the entire system is at a low 
level of forward funding by historic standards. (See Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation 1994.) If the economy were to experience 
a deep recession (as in the 1970s) or back-to-back recessions (as in the 
early 1980s), most analysts agree that the UI system generally would be 
forced to move to one of the following alternatives: (1) reductions in 
program size through the enactment of stricter eligibility requirements 
andlor smaller benefit payments (Vroman 1990), or (2) reliance on heavy 
borrowing. 
State borrowing often represents an appropriate response to a deep or 
prolonged recession. For this reason, the federal government maintains a 
federal loan program. In the recent past, however, heavy state borrowing 
has raised a number of concerns about the interest rates charged on loans, 
the terms of loan repayment, and the penalties (or lack thereof) for failure 
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TABLE 5-1. High Cost Multiple, by State, 1993 
State HCM State HCM 
Virgin Islands 2.08 New Hampshire 0.68 
Puerto Rico 1.90 North Dakota 0.68 
New Mexico 1.77 New Jersey 0.67 
Oklahoma 1.55 Montana 0.63 
Kansas 1.54 Nevada 0.61 
Oregon 1.44 South Carolina 0.61 
Hawaii 1.42 Kentucky 0.57 
Utah 1.40 Arizona 0.51 
Washington 1.40 California 0.38 
Mississippi 1.39 West Virginia 0.37 
Wyoming 1.35 Rhode Island 0.36 
Iowa 1.22 Pennsylvania 0.33 
Delaware 1.18 Arkansas 0.32 
South Dakota 1.18 Minnesota 0.30 
Indiana 1.15 Ohio 0.28 
Vermont 1.14 Illinois 0.27 
Idaho 1.10 Texas 0.26 
North Carolina 1.06 Maryland 0.25 
Alaska 1.00 Maine 0.22 
Nebraska 0.96 Michigan 0.11 
Wisconsin 0.92 District of Columbia 0.03 
Colorado 0.91 New York 0.03 
Alabama 0.89 Connecticut 0.00 
Georgia 0.84 Massachusetts 0.00 
Louisiana 0.80 Missouri 0.00 
Florida 0.78 
Virginia 0.77 U.S. Average 0.57 
Tennessee 0.72 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994c). 
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to meet these terms. These concerns have pointed to the critical interaction 
between the federal loan program and the need for responsible, but not 
excessive, forward funding by the states. 
Many experts agree that the federal government must playa vital role 
in ensuring that the UI system is able to serve as an economic stabilizer for 
the nation (see, e.g., Blaustein 1993). In pursuing this goal, the federal 
government has a number of options from which to choose, many related 
to the federal loan program. It can maintain the status quo (as described 
in the next section), or it can opt for a more active role. For example, the 
federal government could establish forward-funding minimum standards, 
with penalties for not meeting the standards. Alternatively, it could estab-
lish forward-funding goals (which would presumably be set at higher levels 
than minimum standards), accompanied by a set of financial incen-
tives-rewards or penalties-for achieving or failing to achieve those goals. 
Several issues, including the following, must be considered in 
establishing either minimum standards or goals: (1) a method for measur-
ing the degree of a state's forward funding, (2) the desired level of that 
measure, (3) a method for determining the conditions under which a state's 
progress toward achieving the measure is or is not sufficient, and (4) a 
penalty or incentive structure. The following sections discuss the available 
policy options. 
CURRENT SITUATION 
Currently, the U.S. Department of Labor recommends a voluntary solvency 
guideline of a high cost multiple of 1.5, which has also been endorsed by 
the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA).3 
There is, however, no direct incentive from the federal government that 
encourages states to pursue this goal. 
loan and Repayment Provisions 
Interest-free, short-term loans from the federal government are available to 
the states in order to ameliorate cash-flow problems during the year.4 
Since 1982, interest has been charged if loans are not repaid by Septem-
ber 30 of the calendar year in which the advances were made. The interest 
rate charged by the federal government on such loans is identical to that 
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paid by the federal government to the states on their positive trust fund 
balances.5 
In addition to interest charges, penalties are assessed on any loans that 
are not repaid within 22 to 34 months after they are obtained.6 After that 
time, employers in the state are subject to reductions in the 5.4 percent 
offsetting tax credit under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUT A). 
The penalty structure, which is the result of a number of pieces of 
legislation, is quite cumbersome. In the first effective calendar year, the 
FUTA credit reduction is 0.3 percent. This credit reduction increases over 
time and is applied to loan repayment. There are, however, opportunities 
for states to defer or cap the penalties if they meet a number of specific 
criteria, including those related to tax structure, unemployment rate, 
changes in state solvency status, or loan repayment.7 These factors are not 
related in any way, however, to the Department of Labor's voluntary 
solvency standard. 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OR GOALS 
The federal government could choose a minimum forward-funding standard 
or a forward-funding goal for states, along with accompanying financial 
incentives. The purpose of a forward- funding minimum standard would be 
to assure that all states make a minimal effort to forward-fund their systems 
during times of economic health, thereby improving the overall national 
macroeconomic stabilization capacity of the system. A minimum forward-
funding standard would affect those states with extremely low trust fund 
reserves but would have little or no impact on states already maintaining 
minimal forward funding. Such a standard would be similar in spirit to 
other legislated minimum standards and would allow individual states to 
determine what they believe their optimum funding strategy should be 
(provided it met this minimum standard). A minimum standard would 
allow individual states to incorporate both forward-funding and pay-as-you-
go mechanisms (that is, financing mechanisms-such as multiple tax 
schedules linked to solvency or solvency surtaxes-that are activated during 
economic downturns to help prevent insolvency but that do not help 
achieve forward funding). 
The purpose of establishing an enforceable optimal goal for forward 
funding, on the other hand, would be to increase significantly the reserves 
of the entire UI system. Unlike a minimum standard, this could affect 
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most states. Setting "optimal" targets with accompanying financial incen-
tives would be a significant departure from federal-state interactions in 
other areas of the VI system, in which the federal government has tended 
to establish minimum standards. 
Forward-Funding Measure 
There is no ideal measure of trust fund solvency that can determine the 
most appropriate level and type of forward funding. Absolute trust fund 
levels, for example, are not a good measure of forward funding, since they 
are not related to changes in wages or the size of the labor force. 
The most frequently used measure to assess the adequacy of trust fund 
reserves is the high cost multiple (HCM).8 The HCM is a rough estimate 
of how long recession-level benefits could be paid from a state's current 
trust fund balance. It is calculated by dividing a state's reserve ratio by the 
highest cost rate (that is, the highest ratio of benefits paid divided by total 
covered wages) incurred in any 12-month period. The strong historical 
correlation between the value of the HCM and a state's borrowing expe-
rience suggests that it is a fairly good predictor of forward funding (see 
Table 5-2). 
The HCM, however, suffers a number of limitations. For example, it 
may be a poor measure of future trust fund adequacy when states have 
made significant changes to their VI provisions (for example, changes in 
eligibility standards or benefit levels). In addition, it is not a perfect 
predictor of fund adequacy, since states that build an HCM of 1.0 or 1.5 
may still find it necessary to resort to heavy borrowing when faced with a 
deep or prolonged recession. Finally, many state tax systems are already 
structured to respond to declines in trust fund balances by employing 
techniques such as solvency surtaxes and multiple tax schedules linked to 
trust fund adequacy. While these methods may help ensure solvency, they 
do not help achieve forward funding, and their effectiveness is not reflected 
in the HCM. 9 
It is possible that some of the problems with the HCM can be corrected 
by technical modifications to the formula. Some analysts believe the 
current method of calculating the HCM may be too conservative, because 
it measures current reserves relative to the highest cost period ever incurred 
by a state. High cost periods incurred many years ago may no longer be 
relevant if a state's labor force and/or VI system have changed signif-
TABLE 5-2. Relationship Between High Cost Multiple and Actual Borrowing Patterns 
Value of No. of States in 1974-1979, by HCM: No. of States in 1980-1987, by HCM: 
High Cost 
Multiple (HCMt States Borrowers Large Loans States Borrowers Large Loans 
2.00+ 9 0 0 0 0 0 
~ 1.50-1.99 12 2 2 0 0 a 
1.00-1.49 12 5 1 12 2 1 
0.50-0.99 14 12 8 16 10 5 
< 0.50 5 5 5 22 19 8 
SOURCE: Vroman (1990, 49). 
a HCMs are measured in December 1973 and December 1979. Large loans are defined as those exceeding 1 percent of total wages. 
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icantly. Under these circumstances, it may be more appropriate to calculate 
the highest cost rate within a shorter historical period. An alternative 
modification to the current HCM would be to base the calculation on the 
second-highest (rather than the highest) cost period, or on an average of the 
highest cost years within a given time period. This form of modification 
would have the effect of producing a somewhat less conservative measure 
of forward funding. 
The HCM has merit as both a simple and as a widely recognized 
measure of forward funding. Nevertheless, it is an imprecise measure. As 
a result, the higher the level of a proposed HCM standard (that is, a stan-
dard requiring more absolute reliance on forward funding), the more care 
must be given to its adoption. The application of stringent criteria 
regarding the HCM (or any other forward-funding standard) could be 
inequitable to some states, because no single measure can incorporate all 
relevant state differences in UI program laws and operations, industry 
concentration, and economic growth. 
Level of the Forward-Funding Measure 
There is perhaps general agreement that extremes in forward funding are 
inappropriate. Most would probably agree, for example, that 3 months of 
benefit reserves do not represent a sufficient level of forward funding and 
that 48 months of reserves are excessive. There is less agreement, 
however, regarding the appropriate level for either a minimum standard or 
optimal forward-funding goal. As noted above, both the U.S. Department 
of Labor and ICESA have endorsed a voluntary guideline (similar to an 
optimal goal) of a 1.5 HCM. lO 
Table 5-3 shows the number of states that would have achieved a 
forward- funding goal, based on a variety of alternative HCM measures and 
a variety of levels. For example, as of December 1993, 20 states had 
accumulated enough reserves to pay at least 1 year of benefits at the high-
est ratio of benefits ever paid in the state (that is, using the current 
definition of HCM). If the most recent 20-year period is used for calcu-
lating the highest cost rate, then 21 states would have accumulated reserves 
of at least 1 year; if the most recent I O-year period is used, 32 states would 
have accumulated reserves of at least 1 year. Table 5-4 identifies those 
states that had achieved an HCM of 1.0 or more (that is, accumulated at 
'" N 
TABLE 5-3. Number of States That Meet Various Forward-Funding Goals Using Alternative HCM Defmitions and 
the Reserve Ratio 
No. of States Meeting Alternative Measures 
No. of Current 
States with HCM Second- Average of 3 Second- Average of 3 
an "HCM" Defmition Highest Cost Highest Cost Highest Costs Highest Cost Highest Cost Highest Costs 
of at Least: (no. of states) in 20 Years in 20 Years in 20 Years in 10 Years in 10 Years in 10 Years 
0.25 46 46 47 47 46 47 47 
0.50 36 36 36 36 38 44 42 
0.75 28 28 34 34 35 38 36 
1.00 20 21 28 28 32 34 34 
1.25 11 13 23 19 29 34 32 
1.50 5 5 16 13 24 28 28 
1.75 3 3 10 5 16 26 25 
NOTES: The current HCM is the 1993 reserve ratio divided by the highest cost rate in any 12-month period (that is, period with highest ratio of 
benefits paid divided by total wages in covered employment). The alternative HCMs use high cost rates in the preceding 10 years (calendar years 1983 
through 1992) or the preceding 20 years (calendar years 1973 through 1992). All calculations use 1993 reserve ratios. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994b,c). 
TABLE 5-4. States That Had at Least 1 Year of Reserves (as of December 1993) 
Alternative Measures 
Second- Average Second- Average 
Current Highest Highest of 3 Highest Highest Highest of 3 Highest 
HCM Cost Rate Cost Rate Cost Rates Cost Rate Cost Rate Cost Rates 
State Defmition in 20 Years in 20 Years in 20 Years in 10 Years in 10 Years in 10 Years 
Alabama X X X X X 
Alaska X X X X X X X 




'-' Colorado X X X X 
Connecticut 
Delaware X X X X X X X 
District of Columbia 
Florida X X X X X 
Georgia X X X X X 
Hawaii X X X X X X X 
Idaho X X X X X X X 
Illinois 
Indiana X X X X X X X 
Iowa X X X X X X X 
Kansas X X X X X X 
Kentucky X X 
(continued) 
TABLE 5-4. (continued) 
Alternative Measures 
Second- Average Second- Average 
Current Highest Highest of 3 Highest Highest Highest of 3 Highest 
HCM Cost Rate Cost Rate Cost Rates Cost Rate Cost Rate Cost Rates 





Q", Michigan ... 
Minnesota 
Mississippi X X X X X X X 
Missouri 
Montana X X X X X X 
Nebraska X X X X X X X 
Nevada X X X 
New Hampshire X X X X X 
New Jersey X X X 
New Mexico X X X X X X X 
New York 
North Carolina X X X X X X X 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma X X X X X X X 
Oregon X X X X X X X 
Pennsylvania 
Puerto Rico X X X X X X X 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota X X X X X X X 
Tennessee X X X 
Texas 
Utah X X X X X X X 
Vermont X X X X X X X 
Virgin Islands X X X X X X X 
Virginia X X X X X 
Washington X X X X X X 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin X X X X X X X 
'" Wyoming X X X X X X X VI 
NOTE: An "X" indicates that the state has achieved a trust fund balance equal to at least I year ofreserves in the "high cost" year(s). 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994b,c). 
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least 1 year of reserves), based on the various measures of high cost 
multiples used in Table 5-3. 
Measuring Satisfactory Progress 
Under certain circumstances, the government could require that a state need 
only be moving toward compliance at an acceptable rate, rather than that 
it immediately achieve the appropriate level of a forward-funding standard. 
These circumstances could include the period following the initial 
introduction of such a standard, and also those times when a state's UI 
program is operating in the midst of economic decline, is recovering from 
an economic downturn, or is in debtor status. Granting incentives, such as 
preferential loan treatment, to such a state would require a method for 
determining when a state's progress toward forward funding was satisfac-
tory. 
During the post-World War II period, recessions have occurred, on 
average, every 5 years. The past two decades have seen back-to-back 
recessions, followed by a long recovery. Nevertheless, the average over 
these two decades is still quite similar to the general average over the entire 
post-World War II period. On average, the typical recession lasts approx-
imately 11 months, and the typical period of expansion prior to the onset 
of the next recession is approximately 50 months. 
This suggests that the following method may represent a reasonable 
standard for establishing satisfactory progress. On average, a state's UI 
trust fund should be recovering at a rate that would enable the forward-
funding goal to be achieved prior to the onset of the next recession. If, for 
example, at the end of a recession a state had a trust fund balance of zero, 
then each month the UI trust fund would need to grow by about 2 percent 
of the total amount required to achieve the HeM target (since the next 
recession would, on average, be expected to occur in 50 months). If, 
however, the state ended the recession with an HeM of 0.5, satisfactory 
progress toward the forward-funding goal would only require that the trust 
fund grow by approximately 1 percent of the HeM target per month. The 
target annual growth rates in these two examples would be 24 percent and 
12 percent, respectively. 
The criterion for measuring satisfactory progress should make 
allowances for states that were recovering from a recession but that still 
had unusually high unemployment. In such states, "satisfactory progress" 
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would allow a slower recovery rate than in an otherwise comparable state 
with a lower level of unemployment. 
A matrix of targeted recovery rates could be developed for a variety of 
combinations of unemployment and solvency. States with low unemploy-
ment would be expected to recover more quickly than those with high 
unemployment. States with low levels of solvency would need to recover 
more quickly than those with higher levels of solvency. 
Table 5-5 presents a hypothetical example of the annual recovery rates 
that might be used to determine whether a state had (in the past) made 
satisfactory progress toward forward funding, which would qualify it (in 
the future) for financial incentives. Suppose, for example, that a state was 
beginning to recover from a recession, its insured unemployment rate was 
declining, its overall unemployment rate was 6 percent, and its trust fund 
had reserves equivalent to one-half year of high cost benefits. "Satisfactory 
progress" for this state could be defined as being achieved if the annual 
growth of the trust fund was equal to 12 percent of the HeM goal. An 
otherwise comparable state with an overall unemployment rate of 8 percent 
would be expected to achieve a lower annual accumulation rate, perhaps 8 
percent per year. For those states in which reserves had been more 
depleted (for example, zero reserves and a 6 percent unemployment rate), 
satisfactory progress might require a higher annual accumulation rate, 
perhaps 24 percent. 
TABLE 5-5. An Example of Satisfactory Progress for Forward-Funding of States' 
UI Trust Funds 
Unemployment Rate 
Trust Fund 
Reserve 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 
-0.50 72 60 48 36 30 24 18 
-0.25 60 50 40 30 25 20 15 
0.00 48 40 32 24 20 16 12 
0.25 36 30 24 18 15 12 9 
0.50 24 20 16 12 10 8 6 
0.75 12 10 8 6 5 4 3 
NOTES: The numbers in this table are suggestive of the types of targets that might be set. They 
represent the percentage of the HeM target that a state would accumulate over the course of a year 
during which the state's economy is not in a recession. 
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Incentive Structure 
The federal government could use penalties andlor rewards to encourage 
states to meet forward-funding goals or standards. One penalty for non-
conformance (that is, for not making satisfactory progress toward a 
forward-funded trust fund or not maintaining the appropriate trust fund 
level) could be the loss of some portion of the FUT A offsetting tax credit. 
Any amounts collected through the penalty could be deposited directly in 
that state's UI benefit account. I I Such a system would have the effect of 
imposing the specified recovery rate on a state's trust fund. 12 
Two types of rewards could be offered. The federal government could 
offer a reduced, or "preferential," interest rate to states that had met or 
made satisfactory progress toward the chosen forward-funding criteria, but 
still found themselves needing to borrow to pay VI benefits during a 
recession. 13 Alternatively, the federal government could offer supplemental 
interest payments on a portion of the reserve balance to those states that 
maintained the designated level of forward funding. For example, the 
federal government could offer a one-half point interest rate premium on 
balances within some range (such as a reserve balance above 1 high cost 
year but below 1.5 high cost years). 
It is impossible to calculate the cost of implementing financial 
incentives of this type, since the costs would depend on the number of 
states that both qualified for and made use of the preferential treatment. 
It is likely that more generous financial incentives offered by the federal 
government to encourage forward funding would result in greater-and 
therefore more costly- responses by the states. If the financial incentives 
were small, they would be expected to generate a smaller response from the 
states and would, therefore, be less expensive. 
In addition to the hypothetical penalties and rewards discussed above, 
an additional change might be made to the existing financing arrangement, 
under which the federal government currently offers interest-free "cash-
flow lt loans to states that borrow and repay an amount by September 30 of 
the calendar year in which the advance was made. This currently creates 
a financial disincentive for states to forward fund their UI programs. 
Eliminating these short-term, interest-free loans would remove this 
incentive. It would also bring additional interest revenue to the federal 
trust funds from the states. From the federal perspective, the savings that 
would result are displayed in Table 5-6. 
TABLE 5-6. Cost of Federal Interest-free Loan Program 
Average Daily 
Loan Balance Annual Annual Cost 
(millions of Interest Rate (millions of 
Year dollars) (percent) dollars) 
1983 122.0 10.8 13.2 
1984 20.9 9.8 2.0 
1985 77.7 10.4 8.1 
1986 57.8 10.0 5.8 
1987 92.6 9.3 8.6 
1988 25.8 8.5 2.2 
1989 0.0 8.4 0.0 
1990 0.0 8.7 0.0 
1991 0.0 8.6 0.0 
1992 19.8 8.1 1.6 
1993 98.5 7.5 7.3 
NOTES: The data are rounded. The total cost of the interest-free loan program 
over the entire II-year period was $48,867,529. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data from the Unemployment Insurance 
Service, U.S. Department of Labor. 
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NOTES 
1. It should be noted that there may be low federally held trust funds in a few states 
that have decided to accumulate separate state-level trust funds. This may be a result 
of state reluctance to contribute large reserves to state trust funds that are included as 
part of the unified federal budget. 
2. The definition of the high cost mUltiple and alternatives to this measure are 
discussed below (see the subsection, "Forward-Funding Measure," in the section on 
"Minimum Standards or Goals"). 
3. While the 1980 National Commission on Unemployment Compensation did not 
recommend a federal standard, it did note that "further study should be devoted to the 
concept of a Federal solvency standard, not only to determine an appropriate standard, 
but also to see how it could be administered." The Commission did recommend that 
"each state should develop in its State law a specific solvency plan to finance benefits 
over a business cycle and to maintain adequate reserves to accomplish that result." It 
recommended that states have a 2.0 HCM (using a modified HCM definition) at the 
beginning of any economic downturn. National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation (1980). 
4. The repayment provisions are set by Congress but are not related to the 
Department of Labor's voluntary solvency guideline. The provisions reflect the 
perspective that some short-term borrowing is to be expected (and therefore is not 
necessarily undesirable), but that over the long term, states that are insolvent should 
be assessed additional charges and be "forced" to repay their loans. An additional 
policy option would involve modest reform of the current situation through 
simplification of the current loan and repayment provisions. 
5. The rate is determined by the weighted average of all long-term and short-term 
federal debt during the last quarter of the preceding calendar year. 
6. fu order to avoid penalties, states must repay any outstanding loans from the 
federal government by November 10 of the calendar year in which the second 
consecutive January 1 passes after the state borrowed the funds. For example, if a 
state borrowed on January 2, 1994, it would have until November 10, 1996, to pay 
back the loan. If, however, the state borrowed on December 31, 1993, it would only 
have until November 10, 1995, to make repayment. 
7. For additional detail on the penalties and how they are assessed, see Congressional 
Research Service (1992a) or Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(1994). 
8. Alternative measures, which are often more complex than the HCM, have been 
proposed to measure trust fund adequacy. One alternative measure, for example, 
estimates the maximum insured unemployment rate (IUR) a state can reach while 
remaining solvent. Based on various levels of the IUR, this measure determines the 
level of current benefits that could be sustained over the next year in the state. The 
research literature, however, has been unable to identify an indicator or group of 
indicators that is clearly superior to the HCM. 
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9. These techniques usually take the form of automatic pay-as-you-go fmancing 
mechanisms that are activated during economic downturns to help prevent insolvency. 
10. A few states have adopted more conservative guidelines (that is, reflecting higher 
HCMs), while some researchers have advocated an optimal HCM of closer to 1.0. As 
of December 1993, only five states had a high cost multiple of 1.5 or more, indicating 
that a standard set at this level would affect the vast majority of states. 
11. This would require a transfer of funds, since FUTA (that is, federal tax) 
collections from employers are normally deposited into federal accounts that pay for 
the administration of UI benefits. Under the proposed penalty, some portion of the 
FUTA funds would be deposited in the state accounts that pay UI benefits. 
12. If the penalty was in effect, a state's trust fund would recover at the same rate 
as if the state had followed the specified target recovery path. The only difference 
would be that the funds collected through a penalty would be collected later and would 
not be experience-rated, as they probably would have been if collected through an 
increase in state employer taxes. 
13. States could be allowed to borrow funds not only to finance their benefits but also 
to cover their administrative costs if the allocations they received were insufficient 




THE FUNDAMENTAL METHOD of financing the U.S. system of Unemploy-
ment Insurance has been a contentious issue since the system" was 
established. During the debates in the 1930s that shaped the basic structure 
of the system, some argued that it should be funded through an 
"experience-rated" tax that imposes the highest tax rates on employers that 
generate the most cost to the system. Others argued that the system should 
be financed by a flat tax on employers. 
Proponents of experience rating eventually prevailed. They argued that 
experience rating had the following three fundamental advantages, which 
are still offered today as reasons for its continuance: (1) the encouragement 
of stable employment, (2) the attribution of the costs of unemployment 
insurance benefits to the employer responsible for the unemployment, and 
(3) the creation of an incentive for employers to participate actively in 
policing the UI program. 
Despite these apparent advantages, the United States is the only nation 
that chooses to finance its UI system through an experience-rated tax. As 
a result, experience rating has come under close scrutiny and has been the 
subject of ongoing debate. To some, experience rating is the root problem 
with the UI system, in that its strict allocation of costs tends to limit 
benefits as employers seek to minimize their costs.! To others, experience 
rating is an essential component in making unemployment benefits one of 
the costs of doing business. 
In the 1960s, Congress debated the elimination of experience rating, 
focusing on the burdens created by employers who contested claims to 
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avoid increases in their tax rates. During the late 1970s and 1980s, 
however, congressional debate focused more on ways to increase the 
amount of experience rating within the system. Despite this ongoing 
debate, the federal statute that broadly governs states' experience rating 
systems has remained largely unchanged.2 Over time, however, state 
legislators, operating within these broad federal guidelines, have refined the 
ways in which employers' experiences with unemployment benefit payment 
will affect their VI taxes. 
SYSTEMS Of EXPERIENCE RATING 
Over the years, states' experience rating provisions have become increas-
ingly varied and complex. Although these systems vary substantially in 
many ways, the incentives that they create are generally similar. Under 
each of these methods, employers are ranked annually against one another 
and are assigned a specific tax rate based on that ranking, with employers 
who generate more costs to the system assigned a higher rate. 
In all states, employers pay an assigned UI tax rate on the amount of 
their taxable wages, which are those annual wages for each employee that 
fall below a prescribed base level. The actual ranges of employer tax rates, 
summarized in Table 6-1, vary substantially from state to state. In the 
1993 tax year, the states' minimum tax rate varied from 0 percent (in 7 
states) to a high of 2.5 percent in New York. The maximum tax rate on 
taxable wages varied from 5.4 percent (in 13 states) to a high of 10.5 
percent in Pennsylvania.3 As a result of the range in tax rates and taxable 
wage bases, taxes paid range from zero for some employers to more than 
$900 per worker for other employers. Within a state, the entire schedule 
of tax rates is often adjusted up or down, depending on the balance in the 
state trust fund.4 
In general, the states' current systems of experience rating can be 
classified in one of four categories: reserve ratio, benefit ratio, benefit-wage 
ratio, and payroll decline.s Specific experience rating systems are discussed 
in more detail below and are summarized in Table 6-2. 
Reserve Ratio 
The reserve ratio formula, which is used by 33 states, is the most common 
method of experience rating. An account is established for each employer; 
TABLE 6-1. Effective VI Tax Rates for Employers, by State, 1993 
Percent of Taxable Wages Average Rate 
Maximum Minimum Percent of Percent of 
State Rate Rate Taxable Wages Total Wages 
Alabama 6.0 0.4 1.5 0.6 
Alaska 5.4 1.0 2.5 1.6 
Arizona 6.4 0.1 1.5 0.5 
Arkansas 6.0 0.1 2.9 1.3 
California 5.4 1.1 3.5 1.0 
Colorado 5.4 0.0 1.3 0.6 
Connecticut 6.4 1.5 3.4 0.8 
Delaware 9.5 1.0 2.4 0.8 
District of Columbia 7.5 2.0 3.9 1.1 
Florida 6.4 0.2 1.8 0.6 
Georgia 8.6 0.1 1.5 0.5 
Hawaii 5.4 0.0 1.0 0.7 
Idaho 5.4 0.5 1.8 1.2 
Illinois 7.7 0.6 3.0 1.0 
Indiana 5.5 0.2 1.4 0.4 
Iowa 7.5 0.0 1.6 0.8 
Kansas 6.4 0.1 1.9 0.8 
Kentucky 9.0 OJ 2.1 0.8 
Louisiana 6.0 OJ 1.9 0.7 
Maine 7.5 2.4 4.0 1.4 
Maryland 8.1 1.8 3.1 1.1 
Massachusetts 8.1 2.2 4.1 1.6 
Michigan 10.0 1.0 4.2 1.4 
Minnesota 9.1 0.6 1.8 0.9 
Mississippi 5.4 1.2 203 0.9 
Missouri 7.8 0.0 2.2 0.7 
Montana 6.4 OJ 1.3 0.9 
Nebraska 5.5 0.1 1.1 0.4 
Nevada 5.4 OJ 1.6 0.9 
New Hampshire 6.5 0.1 2.3 0.7 
New Jersey 5.8 0.5 1.1 0.5 
New Mexico 5.4 0.6 1.6 0.8 
New York 7.0 2.5 4.7 1.1 
North Carolina 5.7 0.0 1.0 0.5 
North Dakota 5.4 0.4 1.5 0.8 
Ohio 8.5 0.7 2.8 1.0 
Oklahoma 5.5 0.1 1.1 0.5 
Oregon 5.4 1.6 2.6 1.6 
(continued) 
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TABLE 6-1. (continued) 
Percent of Taxable Wages Average Rate 
Maximum Minimum Percent of Percent of 
State Rate Rate Taxable Wages Total Wages 
Pennsylvania 10.5 2.1 5.3 1.7 
Puerto Rico 5.4 1.0 3.0 1.4 
Rhode Island 8.3 2.2 3.7 2.1 
South Carolina 5.4 1.2 1.9 0.6 
South Dakota 7.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 
Tennessee 10.0 0.2 1.8 0.6 
Texas 6.4 0.3 1.6 0.6 
Utah 8.0 0.4 1.0 0.6 
Vermont 5.9 0.6 2.7 1.0 
Virginia 6.3 0.2 1.3 0.4 
Washington 5.4 0.5 2.3 1.4 
West Virginia 8.5 1.5 3.1 1.2 
Wisconsin 9.8 0.0 2.2 0.9 
Wyoming 8.8 0.3 2.2 1.0 
U.S. Average 2.5 0.9 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1994a,c). 
contributions are credited to the account and benefits paid to former 
employees are charged against the account. The balance is carried over 
from year to year for the duration of the employer's activity. 
The reserve ratio is defined as the account's balance relative to the 
employer's annual taxable payroll. The higher an employer's reserve ratio, 
the lower the assigned tax rate. Conversely, the lower an employer's 
reserve ratio (which can be negative), the higher the assigned tax rate. 
Benefit Ratio 
The benefit ratio formula is used by 17 states to experience rate UI 
benefits. Under this formula, firms pay taxes in proportion to the ratio of 
benefits paid relative to taxable wages, without directly taking contributions 
into account. Because this ratio uses only the most recent 3 years of data 
to assign tax rates, the benefit ratio formula is more short term in its focus 
than is the reserve ratio formula, which incorporates the entire life span of 
an employer's account. 
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TABLE 6-2. Systems of Experience Rating 
Individual Employer's No. of Percent of Covered 
System Tax Rate Based on: States Employment, 1993 
Reserve Ratio Cumulative 33 58.5 
contributions minus 
cumulative benefits 
charged, divided by 
average taxable payroll 
over the entire history 
of the firm. 
Benefit Ratio Employer's benefit 17 39.7 
charges over previous 
3-year period, divided 
by taxable payroll over 
the same period. 
Benefit-Wage Amount of wages paid 2 1.4 
Ratio to former employees 
who collect UI benefits 
and total state benefits 
over past 3 years. 
Payroll Decline Percentage decline in 0.2 
quarterly payroll. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. 
Benefit-Wage Ratio 
The benefit-wage ratio formula is now used by only two states-Oklahoma 
and Delaware. Under this formula, experience is measured by the number 
of former employees who draw benefits, as well as by their "benefit 
wages," which are defined as their wages in the year prior to separation 
from the employer. A statewide experience factor, which measures the 
total amount of benefits paid in the state in the previous 3 years, is 
calculated. Employer rates are determined by multiplying an employer's 
proportion of charged benefit wages by the state experience factor. Thus, 
the tax rates that are established generate revenues equal to the total 
benefits paid out.6 
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Payroll Decline 
The payroll decline method of experience rating is now used only by 
Alaska. 7 Under this method, an employer's tax rate is determined by 
declines in payroll over the previous years without any reference to 
whether benefits were paid to the employer's former workers. This system 
rests on the assumption that payroll declines reflect an employer's general 
experience with unemployment. The payroll decline system is the only 
method in use that does not relate employer tax rates directly to the number 
of former employees who actually draw UI benefits. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF EXPERIENCE RATING 
The degree to which an experience rating system succeeds in assigning UI 
benefit costs to the employer who generates an individual cost depends on 
the details of the system. If a number of provisions allow assignable UI 
costs to be paid for by entities other than the responsible employer, then 
the degree of overall experience rating in the system declines. The most 
important factors affecting the level of experience rating in a state system 
include the following: the types of benefits that are not charged to an 
employer, the minimum and maximum tax rates that can be imposed, the 
number and size of firms that go out of business, the state taxable wage 
base, and the method by which benefit costs are assigned to an individual 
employer. These factors, which vary considerably by state, are discussed 
below. 
Noncharged Benefits 
All states provide that, in some circumstances, certain benefits paid are not 
charged to the account of an individual employer, but instead are shared 
among all UI taxpayers. The purpose of adopting a noncharging provision 
is often to reduce employer opposition to a particular kind of benefit. 
Common forms of noncharged benefits include these: (1) payments to 
workers who quit their last job, (2) dependents' benefits, (3) payments to 
workers who are enrolled in approved training, (4) erroneous benefit 
payments that are not recovered, and (5) the state share of the Extended 
Benefits program. Differences among the states in the use of noncharged 
benefits are substantial, ranging in 1993 from 1 percent in the District of 
Columbia to 32 percent in Washington (see Table 6-3). 
TABLE 6-3. Noncharged Benefits, by State, 1993 
Percent of Percent of 
State Total Benefits State Total Benefits 
Delaware 0.8 Oklahoma 12.9 
New York 1.1 Arizona 13.4 
Michigan 2.1 Wyoming 14.3 
New Hampshire 3.6 New Mexico 14.7 
West Virginia 4.6 Kansas 15.5 
Kentucky 4.8 Alabama 16.3 
Connecticut 5.4 Montana 16.8 
Colorado 5.6 Georgia 17.3 
California 6.0 ~ Missouri 17.6 
Rhode Island 6.3 Idaho 17.7 
Ohio 6.9 Texas 17.7 
New Jersey 8.2 Oregon 17.8 
Illinois 8.6 South Dakota 17.9 
Virginia 8.9 North Carolina 18.2 
Indiana 9.3 Mississippi 18.4 
- Pennsylvania 10.2 Utah 19.7 
Louisiana 10.6 Vermont 20.2 
Iowa 11.0 Arkansas 20.8 
Nevada 11.3 South Carolina 21.1 
Tennessee 11.5 Maine 22.2 
Wisconsin 12.1 Nebraska 26.2 
Minnesota 12.4 Massachusetts 28.4 
North Dakota 12.6 Hawaii 28.7 
Florida 12.8 ~ Washington 31.8 
NOTE: Data are not available for Alaska, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. 
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Ineffectively Charged Benefits 
Ineffectively charged benefits develop when an individual employer's tax 
rate is too low to cover the benefits paid to that employer's former 
employees, which happens when employers are at a state's maximum tax 
rate. Under these circumstances, benefits charged against the employer 
neither draw on accumulated past taxes nor trigger additional current taxes. 
Such ineffective charges become a drain to the system which must be made 
up in some way through taxes paid by other employers.s 
During 1993, average ineffective charges in the United States ranged 
from less than 1 percent in Montana to 39 percent in Oklahoma (see Table 
6-4). As expected, the average maximum tax rate was higher in states with 
fewer ineffective charges. Among the 10 states with the lowest ineffective 
charges, the average maximum tax rate was 6.7 percent. The 10 states with 
the highest ineffective charges had an average maximum tax rate of 6.0 
percent. 
At the end of each fiscal year, several states also automatically reduce 
the size of an employer's negative balance to a maximum percentage of the 
employer's payroll.9 As a result, employers at those states' maximum tax 
rates routinely benefit from outright tax forgiveness. In those states, 
employers with large negative balances are never required to make tax 
payments on those balances, and their costs are shifted permanently to 
other employers. 
Inactive Charges 
Inactive charges result when an employer goes out of business and, there-
fore, stops paying payroll taxes. Benefits collected by former employees 
result in inactive charges, which also reduce the degree of experience rating 
in the system. 
Changes in the State Taxable Wage Base 
Some states change the level of their taxable wage bases relatively 
frequently.lO The impact of such changes on the degree of experience 
rating is complex. The relationship between experience rating and the 
taxable wage base varies with the type of experience rating system that a 
state uses and the degree to which employers are taxed at state minimum 
and maximum tax rates. Individual employer tax rates would be expected 
TABLE 6-4. Ineffectively Charged Benefits, by State, 1993 
Ineffective Charges Ineffective Charges 
as Percent of as Percent of 
State Total Benefits State Total Benefits 
Montana 0.0 Oregon 18.4 
Tennessee 0.5 Rhode Island 19.3 
Louisiana 0.6 West Virginia 19.3 
Delaware 0.9 Massachusetts 19.9 
Florida 4.4 Colorado 20.3 
Indiana 8.6 Kentucky 20.6 
Arizona 9.4 New Hampshire 20.6 
Utah 10.1 Texas 21.1 
Washington 10.2 Vermont 21.5 
Nebraska 10.3 South Carolina 21.6 
Arkansas 10.6 Pennsylvania 22.7 
Iowa 11.8 Ohio 23.5 
New Mexico 12.7 North Dakota 25.0 
Illinois 13.3 Maine 25.5 
Minnesota 14.4 Idaho 26.4 
Wisconsin 14.4 California 26.6 
Wyoming 15.2 Nevada 28.2 
Alabama 16.3 Hawaii 29.8 
Georgia 16.3 South Dakota 30.5 
Kansas 16.3 North Carolina 30.8 
Michigan 16.4 New Jersey 31.7 
Mississippi 16.6 New York 31.8 
Virginia 16.8 Connecticut 37.3 
Missouri 18.3 Oklahoma 39.4 
NOTE: Data are not available for Alaska, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Puerto ruco, and 
the Virgin Islands. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. 
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to change automatically over time as the system adjusted to the new wage 
base. II Both the change in the average employer tax rate and the overall 
trend in individual employer tax rate changes depend on the type of 
experience rating system. I2 
It is by changing the distribution of employer tax rates across the tax 
schedule in a state, however, that a change in the taxable wage base most 
directly affects the degree of experience rating in a state. This distribution 
varies greatly across states. I3 Raising the taxable wage base reduces the 
degree of experience rating to the extent that it moves more employers 
down to the minimum tax rate. Raising the taxable wage base increases the 
degree of experience rating for employers who were at the maximum tax 
rate prior to the increase, but below the maximum rate after the increase. 
(The reason for this is that these employers then have to contribute a higher 
percentage toward costs attributed to them.) Without detailed information 
on the distribution of employers at the minimum and maximum tax rates 
on a state-by-state basis, therefore, it is difficult to determine in advance 
the overall extent to which an increase in the taxable wage base would 
raise or lower the overall degree of experience rating. 
Benefit Charging for Multiple Employers 
States differ as to how they charge benefits to employers' accounts when 
there are multiple employers. Only nine states charge the most recent or 
principal employer exclusively. This is a particularly effective mechanism 
for preserving the degree to which the funding of the system is experience-
rated. 14 
EXPERIENCE RATING INDEX 
The Experience Rating Index (ERI), published annually since 1988 by the 
U.S. Department of Labor, is the only available index of the overall degree 
of experience rating. IS Although it has several disadvantages that hinder 
comparisons across states, the ERl (displayed in Table 6-5) does provide 
a method for making year-to-year comparisons within states and for the 
system as a whole. I6 
In 1993, the ERl ranged from a low of 36 percent in Hawaii to a high 
of 82 percent in Delaware. Between 1990 and 1993, among the states for 
TABLE 6-5. Experience Rating Index, by State, 1988-1993 
State 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Alabama 71 78 74 56 49 64 
Arizona 80 80 83 78 69 76 
Arkansas 48 47 56 60 58 53 
California 65 67 68 64 52 53 
Colorado 45 53 60 65 64 62 
Connecticut 62 64 58 47 42 49 
Delaware N.A. 51 71 70 N.A. 82 
District of Columbia 47 56 72 72 62 N.A. 
Florida 68 66 50 56 53 67 
Georgia 61 65 62 65 52 58 
Hawaii 47 56 66 63 32 36 
Idaho 55 64 
, 
58 53 44 54 
Illinois 83 86 85 80 79 76 
Indiana 81 91 94 84 78 75 
Iowa 78 77 67 70 74 67 
Kansas 64 73 69 69 57 58 
Kentucky 79 79 75 72 58 66 
Louisiana 42 87 85 88 83 77 
Maine 62 60 60 52 41 50 
Maryland N.A. 72 62 62 65 N.A. 
Massachusetts 55 54 50 40 43 47 
Michigan 80 67 72 70 63 73 
Minnesota 67 66 69 62 58 64 
Mississippi 40 54 53 42 51 53 
Missouri 61 58 59 61 55 63 
Montana 54 58 62 61 55 73 
Nebraska 61 57 63 60 57 56 
Nevada 66 67 68 63 41 59 
New Hampshire N.A. N.A. 81 72 55 68 
New Jersey N.A. 78 75 70 63 51 
New Mexico 61 59 63 63 62 62 
New York 80 73 61 55 51 60 
North Carolina N.A. N.A. N.A. 50 44 42 
North Dakota 62 65 57 64 60 56 
Ohio 70 74 74 70 65 65 
Oklahoma 50 64 60 48 31 37 
Oregon 59 63 56 60 51 50 
Pennsylvania 66 69 65 62 56 57 
Rhode Island 75 69 68 58 55 64 
(continued) 
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TABLE 6-5. (continued) 
State 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
South Dakota 59 38 48 45 49 44 
Tennessee N.A. 69 66 68 71 73 
Texas 53 58 55 52 51 49 
Utah 61 70 70 69 66 61 
Vermont 70 66 63 58 54 48 
Virginia 65 68 70 61 51 66 
Washington 60 63 63 61 57 48 
West Virginia 83 51 56 58 56 62 
Wisconsin 90 82 78 66 65 70 
Wyoming 38 62 N.A. 55 63 60 
U.S. Average 63 66 66 62 56 N.A. 
NOTE: "N .A." indicates data are not available. The ERI is not applicable for Alaska and Puerto 
Rico. Alaska uses the payroll decline method; Puerto Rico had a flat tax until 1993. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. 
which there are complete data, the ERI declined in 36 states and increased 
in 8 states. The most likely explanation for the overall decline is that the 
recession caused a higher percentage of employers to be at their state's 
maximum tax rate, which increased the amount of ineffective charges. The 
drop in experience rating, therefore, may be a cyclical phenomenon caused 
by states' experience-rated tax structures, rather than a more structural 
decrease. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPERIENCE RATING 
As noted above, proponents of experience rating have argued that it has a 
number of advantages, including the following: (1) the encouragement of 
stable employment, (2) the attribution of the costs of unemployment 
insurance benefits to the employer responsible for the unemployment, and 
(3) the creation of an incentive for employers to participate more actively 
in policing the UI program. The existing evidence on the extent to which 
experience rating has actually been able to achieve each of these goals is 
summarized below. 
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Stabilization of Employment 
Theoretically, labor turnover is expected to decrease as the degree of 
experience rating increases. Similarly, employers' willingness to use both 
temporary and permanent layoffs is expected to increase as experience 
rating is reduced. Empirically, however, the evidence is less clear. 
Early attempts to gauge the employment effect of experience rating 
consisted primarily of interviews with employers. In interviews with 
employers in Wisconsin and Indiana, Myers (1945) and Andrews and 
Miller (1956) found that between 26 and 30 percent of employers reported 
that they based layoff decisions on their experienced-rated VI tax. 
Studies during the past 20 years have used more rigorous quantitative 
techniques to estimate the relationship between experience rating and 
layoffs. The largest estimated impacts were reported by Feldstein (1978) 
and Topel (1984). Feldstein suggested that as much as 50 percent of all 
temporary layoffs in the United States under the existing system could be 
prevented through the use of perfect experience rating. Topel found that 
approximately 30 percent of unemployment among men could have been 
prevented through the use of perfect experience rating. 
Halpin (1980) reports similar results, suggesting that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the maximum tax rate would decrease the temporary 
layoff unemployment rate by 10 percent. Most recently, Card and Levine 
(1992) conclude that a perfectly experience-rated system would reduce the 
unemployment rate by about I percentage point, both in the trough of a 
recession and during annual seasonal troughs. 
Each of these studies was constrained significantly by data limitations 
that reduced the studies' ability to attribute layoff decisions to experience-
rated tax rates. I7 Overall, however, all of the studies find that experience 
rating has an impact on employment stability, although it is impossible to 
estimate this impact with precision. IS 
Allocating Costs 
The allocation of labor costs through experience rating is based on the 
perspective that unemployment is a cost of business that should be paid by 
employers. As noted above, however, states have a significant amount of 
freedom in deciding what percentage of their benefit costs will be 
experience-rated and what percentage will be socialized (that is, not 
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assigned strictly to individual employers based on the costs that they have 
generated, but subsidized within the VI system by other employers).19 
States have indeed relied heavily on subsidies from one group of employers 
to another and on socialized cost rates, such as pooled costs, to finance 
state VI systems. 
The first well-known study of subsidization was conducted by Becker 
(1972) and was updated by Munts and Asher (1980). Both studies 
concluded that the largest subsidies go to seasonal employers, declining 
firms, and high-turnover industries, such as construction and apparel 
manufacturing. 
The most recent study of cost allocation was done by the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Labor in 1985, 
examining the period from 1970 to 1983. The report (U.S. Department of 
Labor, OIG, 1985) concluded that the degree of experience rating had 
declined substantially during this period and that the VI system was 
shifting from one based on individual employer responsibility toward a 
socialized system.20 The study reported, for example, that the construction 
and manufacturing industries accounted for about $3.40 in benefits paid for 
each dollar of tax contributions collected. In 1983, the overall experience 
rating of the system was approximately 50 percent. The conclusion that 
costs are becoming more socialized has been called into question by the 
Experience Rating Index, discussed above, which finds a greater degree of 
overall experience rating than was found in the OIG report. 
Proponents of increasing the degree of experience rating have used 
these studies in arguing in favor of raising the maximum tax rate in order 
to reduce the degree of employer subsidization and socialization of costs 
in VI financing. They note that states with low maximum rates tend to 
underfinance their systems, leading to the triggering of higher tax schedules 
and surcharges. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in the degree of exper-
ience rating. 
Opponents of this perspective, while not disputing the findings of the 
cost allocation studies, point to what they see as negative effects that would 
be associated with increasing the degree of experience rating in VI. These 
effects include the following: (1) extreme penalties for some employers 
who, in general, are not responsible for unemployment; (2) more interstate 
competition to attract employers by offering favorable tax rates; and (3) the 
enactment of more restrictive laws concerning the disqualifications for 
benefits. (See Chapters 7 and 8 for discussions of eligibility requirements.) 
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Employer Involvement 
It is clear that the goal of increasing employer involvement through 
experience rating has been achieved. The extent to which this is a positive 
outcome, however, is disputed. While it is clear that experience rating 
leads employers to participate more actively in the system, no clear 
conclusions can be reached regarding either the effectiveness or desirability 
of their policing of the UI system. 
In theory, experience rating clearly provides a financial incentive for 
employers to participate actively in policing UI eligibility. Manyemploy-
ers engage in activities that include the following: (1) scrutinizing all 
notices of claims filed by employees to ensure they have not been filed 
under disqualifying circumstances, (2) protesting claims that are believed 
to be unwarranted, (3) analyzing the annual statements of their account to 
determine any improper charges, and (4) participating in the appeals 
process when the employer finds grounds for protest. Some observers, 
however, criticize the degree and spirit with which some of these activities 
are carried out. 
Several pieces of evidence suggest that experience rating is an 
important factor in influencing employers' involvement in the appeals 
process. For example, in Puerto Rico, which had a flat tax rate until 1993, 
there was an average of only one employer appeal per 1,000 initial claims 
from 1980 to 1990, 7 times lower than the U.S. average for this period. 
Similarly, in the state of Washington, which used a flat tax rate for 10 of 
the 12 years between 1972 and 1983,11 there were three employer appeals 
per 1,000 initial claims during this period, also significantly lower than the 
corresponding U.S. average. 
The 1985 OIG study (U.S. Department of Labor, OIG, 1985) also 
attempted to consider the degree of employer participation in the UI 
system. The report compared the difference in appeals made by employers 
at the maximum tax rate with those that had variable tax rates. For 1983, 
they found that employers at the maximum tax rate were about two times 
less likely to file a benefit appeal than variable-rated employers were. 
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NOTES 
1. In addition, experience rating creates other incentives for employers-for example, 
to make use of contractors or employee leasing services in order to avoid the 
experience rating system itself. For more information on these issues, see Chapter 12. 
2. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act stipulates simply that tax rates shall be 
assigned "on the basis of the employer's experience with respect to unemployment or 
other factors bearing a direct relation to unemployment risk." The few modifications 
to the implementation of experience rating include a 1954 federal amendment allowing 
states to reduce the minimum period allowed for rating unemployment experience to 
1 year from 3 years, and small legislative increases in the maximum taxable wage base 
approximately every 10 years, to the current level of $7,000. 
3. After 1984, the federal law effectively required that state tax rate ceilings be at 
least 5.4 percent in order to qualify employers for the full tax credit against federal 
taxes paid under FUT A. 
4. In many states, the trigger mechanism used to move from one tax schedule to the 
next is based on the trust fund as a percentage of total state payrolls. Effectively, tax 
rates increase as this percentage decreases. 
5. Michigan and Pennsylvania have elements of both the reserve ratio and the benefit 
ratio systems. . 
6. This method was originally adopted by states technically unable to match benefit 
costs to individual employers. As states have gained the capability of assigning 
individual employer benefit costs, many have moved to adopt either the reserve ratio 
or benefit ratio formula. 
7. In 1948, however, seven states used this method (Blaustein 1993). 
8. In benefit ratio states, tax rates are typically determined by benefit outlays over the 
preceding 3 years. Since employer trust fund balances do not enter into tax rate 
calculations, reductions in benefit payments will cause a reduction in taxes-even if the 
overall state trust fund balance is low. This may cause benefit ratio states to incur 
more ineffective charges than reserve ratio states, in which long-term experience is 
directly reflected in tax rates. 
9. This occurs in Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
10. In addition to periodic changes, 18 states index their taxable wage bases to 
increase automatically each year. 
11. For example, a one-time increase in the taxable wage base would cause an 
increase in contributions paid into the system in the year following the increase, as 
employers paid their assigned tax rate on a higher level of taxable wages. After the 
first year, however, the states' systems would respond somewhat differently, depending 
on the experience rating formula that they use. 
12. In reserve ratio states, an increase in the taxable wage base can have two effects 
on employers. For those with large positive reserve ratios, the increase tends to 
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decrease their reserve ratios, thereby bringing about an increase in their tax rates. For 
employers with small balances, it tends to decrease their tax rates, as their reserve 
ratios tend to increase. Overall, it is expected that a one-time increase in the taxable 
wage base would ultimately cause an increase in average employer tax rates in reserve 
ratio states. In benefit ratio and benefit-wage ratio states, an increase in the taxable 
wage base always reduces employers' benefit ratios. Consequently, employers' tax 
rates decline over time, with employers paying a lower tax on a higher taxable wage 
base. 
13. In some states, only 5 percent of employers are taxed at the minimum tax rate, 
whereas in others, more than 40 percent of employers are at the minimum rate. 
Similarly, the percentage of employers at the maximum tax rate ranges from 1 to 20 
percent in different states. 
14. In addition, 37 states charge benefits in proportion to the worker's previous wages 
earned from each employer in the base period, and 8 states charge employers in the 
inverse chronological order of employment. 
15. The index is calculated by subtracting the amount of noncharges, ineffective 
charges, and inactive employer charges from the total benefits paid in a I-year period 
in order to determine the percentage of benefits that are actually charged to individual 
employers. 
16. Due to the dynamic nature of the system, in which employers are continually 
paying rates reflecting past charges and in which there is significant variation in state 
laws regarding employer charging, it is difficult to quantify the exact degree of a 
state's experience rating. 
17. All of the studies had to create proxies for the degree of experience rating rather 
than using the actual degree of experience rating for individual firms. Further, none 
of the studies had data on unemployed workers' benefit status. 
18. In addition to the studies already mentioned, Brechling (1977) also compared 
layoff rates with VI state tax rates for 1962-1969. He found lower rates of labor 
turnover in states that applied higher penalty taxes to firms that had negative 
unemployment insurance account balances. As with the other studies, Brechling's 
analysis used a proxy for individual firms' experience rating. 
19. The existence of noncharges, low maximum tax rates, and higher-than-average 
new employer rates all represent means through which attributable costs are 
intentionally socialized in the VI system. 
20. The OIG study used VI data from the following states: California, Colorado, 
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
21. During this period, Washington used an experience-rated tax for the rate years 




AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION of the benefits paid under Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) must consider two major elements: 1 (1) the conditions that 
determine whether or not an individual is eligible for UJ benefits; and 
(2) the adequacy, level, and duration of the benefits for which eligible 
individuals qualify. This chapter and Chapter 8 address the first of these, 
eligibility for benefits. Chapter 9 then addresses adequacy issues, and 
Chapter 10 discusses variations in the level and duration of benefits. 
Two broad categories of criteria-monetary and nonmonetary-
determine whether or not an unemployed individual is eligible for UI 
benefits. The monetary eligibility conditions are intended to ensure that 
those who receive UI benefits had a substantial attachment to the labor 
force prior to their unemployment. The nonmonetary conditions are meant 
to ensure that UI recipients are available for and actively seeking work, and 
are either involuntarily unemployed (that is, they were laid off from their 
jobs) or voluntarily left their jobs for good cause. 
Both the monetary and nonmonetary conditions are determined by the 
states, with only minor requirements imposed by the federal government.2 
As a result, there is considerable variation across states in these require-
ments. This chapter summarizes the monetary conditions under which an 
individual would be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits; Chap-
ter 8 summarizes the nonmonetary eligibility conditions for benefits. 
Overall, the conclusions from the analysis of monetary eligibility across 
states are as follows: 
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III A full-time, full-year worker earning minimum wage or greater 
meets the monetary eligibility requirements in every state. For full-
year, low-wage individuals who work less than full-time, there are 
significant variations across states in both eligibility and benefit 
amounts. 
III There is little difference in eligibility between a full-year worker 
and a part-year worker who earn similar wages and work similar 
hours per week. 
III The minimum earnings requirements often render individuals 
ineligible for benefits on the basis of their wage rate, rather than 
simply because of the number of hours or weeks worked. This can 
be seen when comparing individuals who work the same number of 
total hours but earn different wage rates; the lower-wage workers 
are eligible for benefits in fewer states. Thus, because of the 
structure of earnings eligibility requirements, low-wage, part-time 
workers must work more hours to qualify than do higher-wage 
workers. 
III The minimum earnings requirements also render some individuals 
ineligible on the basis of their distribution of wages. For example, 
among individuals who work the same total number of hours per 
year at the same wage rate, more states provide benefits for 
individuals who work full-time, part-year than part-time, full-year. 
All states require that a worker earn a specified amount of wages and/or 
work a certain period of time within a "base period" in order to qualify for 
benefits. A state's VI laws prescribe a number of interrelated factors, 
including the earnings and employment needed to qualify for benefits, the 
base period in which the earnings must occur, the computation of the 
weekly benefit amount, and the duration for which VI benefits will be paid. 
Because these factors are so closely linked, examining a single aspect of 
state law in isolation is often misleading. In order to avoid this problem, 
models were developed for the overall eligibility impact of each state's 
1994 VI laws, including monetary eligibility requirements and VI weekly 
benefit and duration calculations.3 The following sections briefly describe 
the structure of the earnings and employment qualification requirements 
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and then use a comparison across states to illustrate the implications of 
these requirements-namely, eligibility across states-for a variety of 
hypothetical workers. 0 
DEFINITION OF THE BASE PERIOD 
The base period is the relevant time period within which an individual's 
earnings and employment are measured in determining eligibility for UI 
and the amount and duration of UI benefits. In most states, the base period 
is defined as the first four of the most recently completed five calendar 
quarters, depending on the date of application for benefits. If, for example, 
an unemployed individual applies for Ulan June 30 (the last day of the 
quarter), the relevant base period is the previous calendar year. If the same 
individual applied for benefits on July 1 (the first day of the quarter), 
however, the relevant base period is the last three quarters of the previous 
calendar year plus the first quarter of the current year. 
Consequently, depending on the date of application for UI benefits, 
between 3 and 6 months of the unemployed individual's most recent 
earnings history is excluded by many states in determining whether an 
individual has met the minimum earnings requirement. In contrast, some 
states use the four most recently completed quarters, in which case the lag 
is less than 3 months.4 
When the most recent quarter is excluded, it has little effect on 
individuals with high earnings and permanent, long-term attachment to the 
labor force. In some cases, however, the exclusion of an individual's most 
recent earnings could disqualify low-wage workers with substantial labor 
force attachment.5 A few states allow for a "moveable base period" that is 
designed to make the base period more flexible so that more low-wage 
workers can qualify.6 
Minimum Earnings and Employment Requirements 
Almost all states require a minimum amount of earnings in the base period, 
ranging from a low of $130 in Hawaii to a high of $4,160 in Oklahoma. 
Twenty-seven states express the required base period amount as a function 
of the high-quarter wages (that is, the highest level of wages earned in any 
of the calendar quarters considered).? Base period wage requirements are 
expressed as a function of the calculated weekly benefit amount in 14 
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states.S States usually have additional qualifying requirements. For exam-
ple, 33 states also require that a minimum amount of earnings be received 
in the individual's high-wage quarter. Forty-five states require that wages 
be earned in at least two of the four base period quarters,9 and 5 states 
require that a minimum number of weeks be worked in the base period. 
VARIATIONS IN MONETARY ELIGIBILITY 
This section summarizes variations in UI eligibility across states, caused by 
differences in state UI laws and eligibility formulas. In addition, it 
discusses variations in eligibility across individuals with different employ-
ment and earnings histories. These variations are discussed below with 
regard to the number of states in which hypothetical individuals are eligible 
for benefits. 
Variations Among Full-Time, Full-Year Workers 
Table 7-1 shows the number of states in which workers with a variety of 
wage rates and work schedules during the base period would qualify for at 
least the state minimum level of UI benefits.IO,1l This table indicates that 
full-time, full-year workers meet the minimum eligibility requirements in 
all 52 states, despite their wage rate. Thus, variations in monetary eligi-
bility affect only those individuals who work part-time, or part-year, or 
both. 
Variations Among Full-Time and Part-Time Workers 
Table 7-1 indicates that a worker earning the minimum wage ($4.25 per 
hour) and working half-time (20 hours per week), full-year would qualify 
for UI benefits in 43 states. A comparable half-time worker earning $8.00 
per hour, however, would qualify for UI benefits in all states. This illus-
trates that the minimum earnings requirements disqualify individuals on the 
basis of their wage rate, rather than simply because of their labor force 
attachment (as evidenced by their work schedule in the base period). 
In addition to differences in eligibility caused by different wage levels, 
in some states,part-time workers are ineligible monetarily because of their 
total hours of work. For example, the minimum wage worker described 
above who works half-time, full-year qualifies in only 43 states, whereas 
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TABLE 7-l. Number of States in Which Workers with Various Work Schedules 
and Rates of Pay Qualify for Minimum Benefits 
Hourly Rate of Pay 
Work Schedule $4.25 $6 $8 $10 $14 $16 $18 
Half-time, 26 wks 37 47 49 50 50 50 50 
Half-time, 52 wks 43 49 52 52 52 52 52 
Full-time, 26 wks 51 51 51 52 52 52 52 
Full-time, 52 wks 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
NOTES: Table assumes a single person with no dependents. For those individuals who worked 
26 weeks, calculations assume they worked 13 weeks in each of the last two qualifying quarters. 
A maximum of 52 states are represented in the table. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands are included; Michigan is not. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a) 
a minimum wage worker working full-time, full-year would qualify for DI 
benefits in all states. Typically, part-time workers are ineligible because 
they do not meet the earnings requirement or the work threshold. These 
differences in eligibility between part-time and full-time workers disappear 
as wage rates increase. Because of the structure of earnings eligibility 
requirements, low-wage, part-time workers must work more hours to 
qualify than higher-wage workers. 
Table 7-2 shows the results of tabulations similar to those discussed 
above. It displays the number of hours per week that four hypothetical 
workers must work to qualify for minimum benefits, and displays the 
average minimum benefit level. For example, a full-year worker earning 
minimum wage and working at least 10 hours per week will qualify for 
benefits in 17 states. By contrast, a full-year worker earning $10 per hour 
and working at least 10 hours per week wi11 qualify for benefits in 47 
states. 
Simulations of UI benefit levels across states illustrate that minimum 
standards and benefit levels vary considerably among the states. Figure 7-1 
provides more detail on the variations in states' treatment of minimum 
wage workers. It shows the number of hours per week that a full-year, 
minimum wage worker would need to work in order to qualify for the 
minimum DI benefit in each state. In addition, the graph shows the weekly 
benefit amount for which the individual would qualify. Thus, for exactly 
"" 0-
TABLE 7-2. Hourly Work Requirement for Minimum Weekly Benefits, by Number of States and Benefit Amounts 
Prototypical Workersa Who Qualify for Benefits 
$4.25/hour, 52 weeks/year $4.25/hour, 26 weeks/year $1O.00/hour, 52 weeks/year $1O.00/hour, 26 weeks/year 
Work Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly 
Requirement No. of Benefit No. of Benefit No. of Benefit No. of Benefit 
(hrs/wk) States Amount Statesb Amount States Amount States Amount 
25+ 3 $59 6 $46 2 $69 
21-25 6 42 8 37 
16-20 12 36 14 37 16 
11-15 14 32 13 32 5 $60 5 47 
6-10 10 33 8 27 26 35 31 35 
1-5 7 25 2 6 21 29 13 25 
NOTES: A dash (-) indicates no additional states qualify workers for the given hour amounts. Table assumes a single person with no dependents. For 
those individuals who worked 26 weeks, it was assumed they worked l3 weeks in the Jast two qualifying quarters. 
Michigan is not included in this table. 
In 29 states, workers earning a wage of $4.25 per hour needed to work the same number of hours to qualify for minimum benefits, despite the portion 
of the year they were employed. In 31 states, workers earning a wage of $1 0.00 per hour needed to work the same number of hours to qualify for minimum 
benefits, despite the portion of the year they were employed. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from u.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
a Prototypical workers defined by hourly wage rate and portion of year spent working. 
b The individual is ineligible in Virginia. 
'" " 
FIGURE 7-1. Weekly Benefit Amounts and Hourly Work Requirements for Minimum 

























I I *1 iii I 
---------~----------t----------l---------i----------t-------*-:---------1----------
~ I I I I * ' /1" I I I I I : *: : : : : : 
---------1----------1----------1---------1----------1----------I---------~----------
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
i * ! iii i i 
---------l-----~--+-------~-r---------~-------~+----------r---------l----------
,1 : * : *: *, : : : * I I I * I I I 
--------+--*-----t----------~--*-_t~----------+--,,-----_+it _______ ~----------
: : * ,1/ * : *: : : 
I I :71' I I I I , , "'JL'* '*' , , 
---------~----------+-------~~--------~----------+----------t---------1----------, , *' , , , I 
:J.c '* I I I I I /1' II I I I I I 
I * *1 : : : : 
---------l-----~- ~--------~----~--l----------t----------~---------l----------
* : ** : *' * : : : : I I I I I I I I I I I I --------~---------i---------~--------~----------+----------~---------~----------* /1" I /1..... I I I I 
* iii ! ! i ! 
I I I I I I I 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Hours of work required to be eligible for benefits 
NOTE: Estimates are for a single worker with no dependents, earning $4.25/hour, and working 52 
weeks in the base period in 1994, 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.s. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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the same worker, there is significant variation across states m both 
eligibility requirements and benefit amounts. 
Variations Among Full-Year and Part-Year Workers 
There is little difference in eligibility between a full-year worker and a 
part-year worker (who earn the same wage and work the same number of 
hours per week). For example, Table 7-1 indicates that a minimum wage 
worker who works full-time, full-year is eligible for benefits in 52 states, 
whereas a minimum wage worker who works full-time, part-year is eligible 
for benefits in 51 states. 
Variations Based on Distribution of Hours 
The eligibility of individuals who work the same total number of hours per 
year (for example, 1,040 hours either half-time for 52 weeks or full-time 
for 26 weeks) vary across states, based on the distribution of hours worked. 
More states provide benefits when a low-wage individual works full-time 
for a shorter portion of the year. Thus, an individual whose work hours 
are concentrated in a shorter number of weeks (in particular, two quarters 
of the base period) is eligible for benefits in more states than is a worker 
with the same total number of hours distributed over the entire year. For 
example, Table 7-1 indicates that a half-time, full-year minimum wage 
worker would meet the minimum eligibility requirements in 43 states but 
would fail to qualify in 9 states, whereas a full-time, part-year worker 
would meet the minimum eligibility requirements in all but 1 state. 
NOTES 
I. The level of receipt among eligible individuals is a third issue that might be 
considered. There is currently little available information on the subject. See Advisory 
Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994) for a discussion of issues generally 
related to recipiency. 
2. Federal law prohibits a state from denying benefits to individuals who are otherwise 
eligible if they refuse to accept ajob (1) when the job is vacant due to a strike, lockout, 
or other labor dispute; (2) when wages, hours, or other conditions are substantially less 
favorable for the individual than those available for similar work in the area; and 
(3) when a condition of employment is that the individual would be required to join a 
company union or to resign from (or not be permitted to join) any labor organization. 
In addition, benefits cannot be denied solely on the grounds of pregnancy. 
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Federal law requires that a state deny benefits under certain conditions, discussed 
in the subsection on "Treatment of Special Groups," in Chapter 8. 
3. Unless otherwise noted, the source for all statistics and figures cited in Chapters 7 
and 10 and parts of Chapter 9 is a series of calculations performed by the ACUC staff 
on the basis of state laws related to eligibility, benefit levels, and benefit durations. 
With few exceptions, the source for information regarding state statutes was U.S. 
Department of Labor (1994a). 
Calculations were made systematically for hypothetical individuals with different 
characteristics, including wage rates, hours of work, weeks of work, state of work, and 
number of dependents. For a small number of states, the minimum benefit amounts 
reported arc estimates based on equations derived from state benefit tables. Because of 
the unique method of calculating benefits in Michigan, this state is excluded from much 
of the discussion. 
Only state laws were considered in making the calculations; hence, case law and 
nonlegislative regulations were not considered in the calculations. Such factors might 
possibly have affected some state benefit calculations. 
Unless otherwise noted, all benefit averages reported are averages for those states 
in which a given hypothetical individual is eligible for benefits. All states are weighted 
equally in calculating the averages. All benefit amounts are pre-tax benefits, and all 
replacement rates relate pre-tax benefits to pre-tax wages. 
Full-year refers to a worker with 52 weeks of work in a base period; half-year 
refers to a worker with work in 26 weeks (concentrated in only two of the four quarters) 
of a base period; full-time refers to a worker who works 40 hours per week; and half-
time refers to a worker who works 20 hours per week. Minimum wage workers earn 
$4.25 per hour of work. 
4. Nebraska uses the last four quarters in all cases. Arizona, Maine, Nevada, and 
Tennessee use the last four quarters in special circumstances. Michigan and New York 
use the preceding 52 weeks and have no lag period, whereas California uses the four 
quarters ending 4 to 7 months before the base year. New Hampshire uses the calendar 
year. U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
5. In some cases, an individual could be monetarily ineligible for UI benefits at the 
time of initial application, but then become monetarily eligible at a later application date 
during the same spell of unemployment (because a new quarter of earnings is included 
in his or her base period). 
6. With a moveable base period, a claimant who does not meet the minimum earnings 
requirement using the first four of the past five completed quarters can use the earnings 
during the four most recently completed quarters instead (that is, a substitution of the 
fifth quarter for the first quarter). If the minimum earnings and employment 
requirements are met under either of these calculations, then a worker is determined to 
have satisfied the requirements. 
States with a "moveable" base period include the following: Maine (until December 
1994), Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. New York uses 
a 104-week period if the individual does not meet the criteria in the last 52-week 
period. U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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7. For example, an individual's base period wages in the District of Columbia must 
be 1.5 times the high-quarter wages in order for that person to be eligible for benefits. 
Since the high-quarter wages must be at least $1,300, the base period wages must be 
$1,950. 
8. A flat amount is used in six states; the remaining states use a function of the 
average weekly wage in that state. 
9. Alternatively, some states require a certain level of earnings outside the high 
quarter, in at least two quarters, or in the last two (chronological) quarters. 
10. UI benefit levels and replacement rates for different workers are discussed in 
Chapter 10. 
11. Michigan is excluded from the tables and discussion; the District of Columbia, 
Puelto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are included. 
8/ Benefits: 
Nonmonetary Eligibility 
IN ADDITION TO THE MONETARY ELIGIBILITY conditions addressed in 
Chapter 7, individuals must also meet a number of nonmonetary conditions 
to be eligible for UI benefits. In general, these require that (1) the 
individual demonstrate an ability and willingness to seek and accept 
suitable employment, and (2) there are no disqualifications related to the 
individual's most recent job separation. The purpose of these restrictions 
is to limit payment to those workers who are unemployed primarily as a 
result of economic causes (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a). 
Because nonmonetary eligibility requirements for receiving Unemploy-
ment Insurance are determined by the states, they often vary significantly. 
Determining the treatment of a given individual "even within a particular 
state is difficult, however, because available sources often provide 
conflicting information on state policies. Often, state unemployment 
compensation statutes do not include specific eligibility guidelines for many 
of the situations faced by UI claimants. Interpretations of eligibility condi-
tions may appear only in state rules and regulations or in administrative or 
judicial case law. 
The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) 
recently conducted a survey of the states, which provides much more 
thorough, current information than was previously available. l UI directors 
in each state were asked to respond to the survey based on their expected 
agency result (that is, the directives given to claims examiners on how to 
make nonmonetary eligibility decisions). The survey focused on a number 
of specific nonmonetary determination situations, including the following: 
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part-time work, restriction of work hours, classification of temporary 
workers, student status, mental or physical conditions that limit work, and 
domestic obligations. 
This chapter focuses primarily on nonmonetary eligibility conditions 
(including availability and work search requirements, and factors causing 
disqualification) across states, including a summary of the information 
available from state statutes and from the ICESA survey. The chapter also 
presents the conclusions from a separate survey of claims examiners in five 
states; this survey was designed to determine whether there are significant 
variations in the nonmonetary determinations within states.2 In addition, 
the results from the ICESA survey are compared with a legal review of 
state positions on one eligibility issue. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the cross-cutting issues suggested by the nonmonetary survey 
results. 
Overall, the conclusions from the analysis of nonmonetary eligibility 
are as follows: 
.. Individuals cannot receive benefits (that is, they are disqualified) 
for some period of time if they voluntarily separate from their 
employer without good cause, are discharged from employment due 
to misconduct, refuse suitable work without good cause, are 
unemployed as a result of a labor dispute, or misrepresent them-
selves in order to obtain or increase UI benefits. 
.. While the length of disqualification imposed varies across states, 
workers are often disqualified for their entire unemployment spell. 
In addition, disqualification can result in a reduction in UI benefit 
payments and/or a cancellation of benefit rights. 
.. The severity of disqualifications and reductions of benefits has 
increased over time. 
.. A lack of concrete information about nonmonetary eligibility 
conditions may work to the detriment of claimants and employers. 
.. Some states' nonmonetary eligibility conditions appear to be 
inconsistent with either the spirit or the letter of the Family and 
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Medical Leave Act of 1993 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990. 
III In at least 13 states, individuals are ineligible for VI benefits when 
they are unable to work because of a change in their employment 
situation (for example, a change in scheduled work hours). 
III The restrictions in nonmonetary eligibility for temporary-help 
workers could make it difficult for them to seek and find permanent 
work. 
AVAILABILITY AND WORK SEARCH REQUIREMENTS 
A claimant must be able to work and must be available for suitable work 
in order to be eligible for DI benefits. All state laws require registration 
for work at a public employment office as evidence of the ability to work 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994a). In addition, claimants must be looking 
for work and submit evidence of their job searches in accordance with 
requirements specified in the state law. This is a continuing eligibility 
requirement. If individuals are ineligible for benefits solely because they 
are deemed unable or unavailable for work, they may receive benefits as 
soon as that condition changes.3 
In practice, determination of nonavailability is often made whenever 
(1) an individual places substantial restrictions on the conditions of 
otherwise suitable work that he or she is willing to accept, or (2) an 
individual refuses a referral of "suitable" work made by the Employment 
Service or a job offer made by an employer. The individual may, 
however, be determined to be ineligible for benefits because of a failure to 
meet other qualifying provisions, including refusing suitable work without 
good cause. In 9 states this means that UI claimants must be able and 
available for work in their usual occupation or in an occupation that is 
consistent with their prior training or experience. In 12 states, UI 
claimants must be able and available for "suitable" work, which is defined 
differently in each state. The remaining 32 states simply require that DI 
claimants be able and available for work. 
A number of related issues, such as whether an individual must be 
seeking part-time or full-time work and whether an individual must be 
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available for all possible work shifts (such as between midnight and 6:00 
A.M., or on weekends), are handled very differently across states. 
A compilation of state statutes indicates that 3 states require that a 
claimant be available for full-time work (U.S. Department of Labor 
1994a).4 The ICESA survey addressed this issue specifically, asking 
whether individuals must be seeking full-time work and whether an 
individual must be available for all possible work shifts. The survey 
results indicate that, in general, individuals are ineligible for benefits in 39 
states if they are seeking only part-time work. 5 In 13 states, the eligibility 
conditions vary significantly based on an individual's circumstances, and 
in only 1 state is an individual eligible for benefits under most conditions. 
In certain limited circumstances, some states report that individuals 
seeking part-time work are eligible for benefits. For example, individuals 
with a history of part-time work are eligible in 14 states, students are 
eligible in 9 states, and individuals who are under physician's advice to 
work part-time either due to a physical or mental condition are eligible in 
9 states.6 States, however, are extremely unlikely to consider individuals 
eligible for benefits when they seek part-time work due to compelling 
personal circumstances (3 states), domestic circumstances (2 states), or 
personal preference (no states). (See Table 8-1.) 
When individuals restrict their available hours (that is, exclude specific 
shifts, hours, or days) but remain available for the hours that are normally 
worked in their occupation in the locality, the ICESA survey results 
indicate that most states consider them eligible (42 states). In the absence 
of this condition, however, states are unlikely to consider individuals 
eligible, despite the presence of other potentially extenuating circumstances. 
(See Table 8-1.) 
FACTORS CAUSING DISQUALIFICATION 
States disqualify individuals from receiving benefits for a number of 
reasons related to job separation and other issues, including the following: 
(1) voluntary separation from work without "good cause," (2) discharge 
from employment due to misconduct connected with the job, (3) refusal of 
suitable employment without "good cause," (4) unemployment as a result 
of a labor dispute, or (5) fraudulent misrepresentation to obtain or increase 
VI benefits. This section describes the disqualification penalties and the 
major factors causing disqualification. 
o en 
TABLE 8-1. Categorizing Nonmonetary Eligibility Status Under Various Conditions, by Number of States, 1994 
ISSUE: "Able and Available for Work" 
Individual Situation: 
Individual is seeking part-time work: 
Due to personal preference. 
Due to compelling personal circumstances. 
Due to domestic circumstances (e.g., care giving). 
On physician's advice, due to physical, mental, or medical condition. 
And has a prior part-time work history. 
And has student status. 
Aggregated response (based on all eight categories). 
Eligiblea 
















Individual is restricting hours available (excluding specific shifts, hours, or days) in seeking work: 
That satisfy those normally worked in occupation in locality. 42 6 
Due to personal preference. 3 8 
Due to compelling personal circumstances. 8 18 
Due to domestic circumstances (e.g., care giving). 7 16 
Due to physical, mental, or medical condition. 12 22 
Due to transportation limitations. 6 14 
And has student status. 4 16 
NOTE: Surveys were received from aliSO states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
Ineligiblea 















SOURCE: This table shows the results from a survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA). (See note 
1 in this chapter for information about the survey.) The survey is meant to reflect the expected Unemployment Insurance agency result, assuming that 
nonmonetary eligibility decisions are consistent with the applicable state policies. 
a The response categories are grouped as follows: "always eligible" and "usually eligible" are displayed as eligible, "often varies" is displayed as varies, 
and "rarely eligible" and "never eligible" are displayed as ineligible. 
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Disqualification Penalties 
Disqualifications may result in a postponement of benefits either for a 
specified period of time or for the duration of the spell of unemployment. 
All state laws specify some length oftime for each type of disqualification. 
When states set the disqualification for less than the duration of the 
unemployment spell, it is based on the view that the worker's continued 
unemployment after a specified period of time is more a result of general 
labor market conditions than of the individual's disqualifying act. In some 
states, the number of weeks of disqualification varies in relation to the 
seriousness of the disqualifying action. 
When a disqualification results in the denial of benefits for the duration 
of the unemployment spell, the individual usually must work for a given 
amount of time before requalifying for UI benetits. The amount of time 
that an individual must work varies significantly by state and by the reason 
for disqualification. For example, an individual in Kansas who is 
disqualified from receiving benefits for the duration of an unemployment 
spell for leaving voluntarily without good cause must then earn 3 times the 
weekly benefit amount (that would have been collected by the individual) 
before requalifying, whereas a similar individual in Idaho must earn 16 
times the weekly benefit amount before requalifying. 
In addition to being disqualified from receiving benefits for a certain 
period of time, an individual may also receive a reduction in UI benefit 
payments when the disqualification period is over and/or have benefit rights 
cancelled. A cancellation of benefit rights, which may occur for incidences 
of "gross misconduct" or fraud, erases all of an individual's recent employ-
ment history for purposes of current and future benefit determination. 
The actual severity of any given penalty to an individual, however, 
ultimately depends on the individual's duration of unemployment. For 
example, disqualification for the duration of unemployment is a small 
penalty for an individual who becomes reemployed in a few weeks, but it 
is much more severe for someone who is unemployed for many months. 
Table 8-2 shows the severity of the disqualifications across states in 
1994 for four major UI eligibility violations-voluntary leaving without 
good cause; discharge for deliberate misconduct connected with work (for 
example, violation of company rules, insubordination, refusal to perform 
assigned work, and absence from work); discharge for gross misconduct 
connected with work (such as arson, larceny, or forgery); and refusal of 
suitable work without good cause. 
TABLE 8-2. Duration (in weeks) of Various UI Disqualifications, by State, 1994 
Additional Penalty 
Voluntary Discharge for for Discharge for Refusal of 
State Leaving Misconduct Gross Misconduct Suitable Work 
Alabama Duration* 3-7* Duration+ 1-10 
Alaska 5* 5* 5* 
Arizona Duration Duration Duration 
Arkansas Duration 7 Duration 7 
California Duration Duration 1-9 
Colorado 10* 10* 26* 20* 
Connecticut Duration Duration Duration 
Delaware Duration Duration Duration 
a District of Columbia Duration Duration Duration " 
Florida Duration Duration Duration Duration* 
Georgia Duration Duration* Duration Duration 
Hawaii Duration Duration Duration 
Idaho Duration Duration Duration 
Illinois Duration Duration + Duration 
Indiana Duration* Duration* + Duration* 
Iowa Duration Duration + Duration 
Kansas Duration Duration Duration+ Duration 
Kentucky Duration Duration Duration Duration 
Louisiana Duration* Duration* Duration+ Duration 
(continued) 
TABLE 8-2. (continued) 
Additional Penalty 
Voluntary Discharge for for Discharge for Refusal of 
State Leaving Misconduct Gross Misconduct Suitable Work 
Maine Duration Duration Duration Duration 
Maryland Varies 5-10 Duration 5-10 
Massachusetts Duration Duration 7* 
Michigan Duration Duration Duration* 6* 
Minnesota Duration Duration Duration+ Duration 
Mississippi Duration Duration 1-12 
C; Missouri Duration 4-16 4-16 Duration 
co Montana Duration Duration 52* Duration* 
Nebraska Varies* 7-10* + 7-10* 
Nevada Duration Duration + Duration 
New Hampshire Duration Duration 4-26+ Duration 
New Jersey Duration 5 Duration+ 3 
New Mexico Duration Duration Duration* 
New York Duration Duration 52 Duration 
North Carolina Varies* Varies Varies 
North Dakota Duration Duration 52 Duration 
Ohio Duration Duration + Duration 
Oklahoma Duration Duration Duration 
Oregon Duration* Duration* + Duration* 
Pennsylvania Duration Duration Duration 
o 
'" 
Rhode Island Duration 
South Carolina Duration 





Virgin Islands Duration 
Virginia Duration 
Washington Duration 


































NOTES: An asterisk (*) indicates iliat, in addition to ilie duration of ilie disqualification noted in ilie table, a state reduces 
ilie benefit amount a claimant receives at ilie end ofilie disqualification period. A plus (') indicates iliat ilie individual's 
earned credits are canceled. A dash (-) indicates iliat iliere are no additional penalties for gross misconduct. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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Voluntarily leaving Without Good Cause 
As shown in Table 8-2, all but five states currently disqualify an individual 
for the duration of unemployment for voluntarily leaving a job without 
good cause.7 Eight states reduce an individual's benefits (as indicated by 
an asterisk in Table 8-2) after he or she requalifies for benefits. 
Over time, state laws have become more restrictive in their definition 
of good cause for voluntary leaving, focusing more exclusively on reasons 
attributable to employment and considering reasons related to the worker's 
personal circumstances less frequently (Blaustein 1993). In addition, states 
have increased their use of disqualifications for the duration of unemploy-
ment. Table 8-3 illustrates how the severity of the penalty for these 
disqualifications has increased.8 
Table 8-4 displays the reasons that are explicitly considered good cause 
for voluntary leaving in state law. Thirty-eight states do not allow personal 
reasons as good cause for voluntary leaving. Table 8-5 presents the ICESA 
survey results regarding good cause for leaving a job. The results indicate 
that when individuals leave a firm due to new employment circumstances, 
such as a change in work hours, they are eligible in 15 states, and 
potentially eligible (that is, eligibility varies based on the circumstances) 
in another 25 states.9 
In only 7 states are there explicit statutes that allow individuals who 
have left their jobs due to sexual or other discriminatory harassment to be 
eligible for benefits. According to the ICESA survey, however, individuals 
are eligible for VI benefits in 44 states. 
Some state statutes explicitly consider reasons related to marital 
obligations not to be good cause for voluntary termination. 10 In most of 
these states, individuals who voluntarily leave work due to marital 
obligations are disqualified not only from receiving benefits for the 
duration of their unemployment, but also until they have had earnings and 
employment in another job. The ICESA survey results, however, indicate 
that a much larger number of states consider reasons related to marital 
obligations not to be good cause for voluntary separation than indicated by 
the state statutes. 11 
Finally, the laws in 28 states render individuals ineligible for benefits 
when they leave work due to an illness. The ICESA survey indicated that 
states are likely to render ineligible those who are pregnant (ineligible in 
38 states) or who have an illness or injury (ineligible in 39 states), unless 
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TABLE 8-3. Duration of Penalty Imposed for Various UI Disqualifications, Over 
Time, b~ Number of States 
No. of States That No. of States 
Reason for PostEone Benefits for:" That Reduce 
Disqualification Fixed or Variable Duration of or Cancel 
and Year Number of Weeks Unemployment Benefits 
Voluntary Leaving 
1948 41 11 16 
1971 35 28 19 
1978 17 42 11 
1994 5 51 8 
Misconduct Dischargeb 
1948 46 6 16 
1971 41 20 18 
1978 31 30 16 
1994 12 42 12 
Suitable Work Refusal 
1948 40 12 17 
1971 35 23 16 
1978 32 26 14 
1994 13 41 11 
SOURCES: Blaustein (1993, 284) and U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
a Some states are counted as having both a denial period of a fixed or variable number of weeks 
and a durational disqualification for a given reason category. In these instances, the severity of 
the penalty imposed is based on the individual circumstance. 
b Count excludes disqualification for gross misconduct. 
they left employment on the advice of a physician (ineligible in 3 states for 
both circumstances). 
Misconduct and Gross Misconduct 
Misconduct is another category of disqualification related to job separation 
(see Table 8-2 for details). When an employee is discharged due to 
misconduct, states deny benefits for part or the entire duration of the 
current unemployment spell, and some states further reduce the individual's 
benefits (as indicated by an asterisk in Table 8-2). About half of the states 
also define "gross misconduct" and enforce stricter benefit restrictions in 
these cases. The restrictions include denying the benefits for longer 
TABLE 8-4. Good Cause for Voluntary Leaving, According to State Laws, by 
State, 1994 
Restricted to Sexual or 
WorklEmployer Unwelcome To Accept Claimant's 
State (not Personal) Harassment Other Work" Illness 
Alabama X X X 
Alaska 
Arizona X 
Arkansas X X 
California X 
Colorado X X 
Connecticut X X X 
Delaware X X 
District of Columbia X 




Illinois X X X X 
Indiana X X X 
Iowa X X 
Kansas X X X 
Kentucky X 
Louisiana X 
Maine X X X 
Maryland X X 
Massachusetts X X X X 
Michigan X X 
Minnesota X X X X 
Mississippi X 




New Hampshire X X 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X 
New York 
North Carolina X X 
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a Type of job varies by state but might include leaving in good faith to accept full-time work with 
another employer or accepting another job while on layoff. 
periods oftime, as well as cancelling the individual's earnings history for 
purposes of determining benefits (indicated by a plus sign in Table 8-2). 
According to the ICESA survey results, in most states, individuals who 
willfully violate an employer rule are ineligible for benefits. In most states, 
however, when individuals inadvertently violate an employer rule, they are 
more likely to be eligible for benefits. In both instances, individuals are 
slightly more likely to be eligible when the act results in no harm to the 
employer or other employees (see Table 8-6). Individuals are least likely 
to be eligible when they test positive for drug use or are repeatedly absent 
from work. 
Refusal of Suitable Work Without Good Cause 
Table 8-2 indicates how states penalize claimants who refuse to accept 
"suitable" work. The definition of suitable work confronts complex issues 
(discussed below), in terms of the number of hours and exact type of work 
for which a UI claimant must be available. In order to protect workers 
from unreasonable job demands, states define suitability on issues of health, 
TABLE 8-5_ Categorizing Nonmonetary Eligibility Status Under Various Conditions, by Number of States, 1994 
ISSUE: "Voluntary Leaving with Good Cause" 
Individual Voluntarily Left Job: 
To move to marry_ 
To move with spouse to another locality_ 
To perform other marital or domestic obligations (e_g_, illness in family)_ 
Due to new personal circumstances_ 
Due to new employment circumstances_ 
Due to sexual or other discriminatory harassment. 
Due to domestic violence_ 
In good faith to accept another job_ 
-/>. Due to illness or injury without physician's advice_ 
Due to illness or injury with physician's advice_ 
Due to pregnancy without physician's advice_ 
Due to pregnancy with physician's advice_ 
After the completion of assignment with temporary agency_ 
Eligiblea Variesa 














NOTE: Surveys were received from all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands_ 
Ineligiblea 














SOURCE: This table shows the results from a survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA)_ (See note 
1 in this chapter.) The survey is meant to reflect the expected Unemployment Insurance agency result, assuming that nonmonetary eligibility decisions 
are consistent with the applicable state policies_ 
a The response categories are grouped as follows: "always eligible" and "usually eligible" are displayed as eligible, "often varies" is displayed as varies, 
and "rarely eligible" and "never eligible" are displayed as ineligible_ 
TABLE 8-6. Categorizing Nonmonetary Eligibility Status Under Various Conditions, by Number of States, 1994 
ISSUE: "Misconduct Violations" 
Individual Situation: 
Individual willfully violated employer rule and employer/other employees were harmed. 
Individual willfolly violated employer rule and employer/other employees were not harmed. 
Individual inadvertently violated employer rule and employer/other employees were harmed. 
Individual inadvertently violated employer rule and employer/other employees were not harmed. 
Individual did not willfolly intend to harm employer/other employees. 
Individual could not reasonably foresee the harm the actions would create. 
Individual inadvertently commits act that results in large monetary loss to employer. 
Individual was repeatedly absent for valid personal reason. 





































SOURCE: This table shows the results from a survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA). (See note 1 
in this chapter.) The survey is meant to reflect the expected Unemployment Insurance agency result, assuming that nonmonetary eligibility decisions are 
consistent with the applicable state policies. 
a The response categories are grouped as follows: "always eligible" and "usually eligible" are displayed as eligible, "often varies" is displayed as varies, 
and "rarely eligible" and "never eligible" are displayed as ineligible. 
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morality, safety, and labor standards. In defining suitability, some states 
also include standards regarding travel distance to work,12 relationship of 
job to previous experience and skills, and length of unemployment. J3 
According to the ICESA survey, in most states, individuals are 
ineligible for benefits if they refused work without "good cause" (see Table 
8-7). The definition of good cause, however, varies significantly by state 
and is typically not an absolute standard; rather, it is considered on a case-
by-case basis. 14 In many states, individuals are eligible if the job offer is 
not in their previous occupation, pays significantly less than prior employ-
ment, is for temporary or commission work and they have no prior history 
in this type of work, or is refused due to a physical or mental condition. 
In most states, however, individuals are ineligible if the job offer is for 
full-time work and they are seeking part-time work, is refused due to 
domestic circumstances, or is for temporary or commission work and they 
have a prior history of this type of work. 
Unemployment Related to a Labor Dispute 
Unemployment resulting from a labor dispute is excluded from UI 
coverage in order to allow the UI system to maintain a neutral position 
with regard to the dispute and also to avoid potentially significant drains 
to the unemployment fund. IS As a result, the disqualification imposed by 
states is always a postponement of benefits and never results in a reduction 
or cancellation of benefit rights. 
At the inception of the UI program, the majority of states adopted a 
"stoppage of work" disqualification, under which benefits are withheld as 
long as work was stopped due to a continued labor dispute. 16 The other 
states adopted an "active progress" statute, under which benefits were 
withheld for workers actively involved in an ongoing labor dispute, 
regardless of any interruption in production. In addition, most states 
initially disqualified workers locked out by their employers. Under these 
provisions, workers were disqualified as long as the prohibited status 
continued; as soon as the condition changed, individuals were able to 
receive benefits. 
Over time, states have shifted from the stoppage-of-work disqualifica-
tion for labor disputes. In addition, some states have moved away from the 
distinction between stoppage of work and active progress, and have moved 
TABLE 8-7. Categorizing Nonmonetary Eligibility Status Under Various Conditions, by Number of States, 1994 
ISSUE: "Refusal of Suitable Work" 
Individual refused: 
A job with good cause. 
An offer of full-time work because of seeking part-time work. 
An offer of part-time work because of seeking full-time work. 
A job not in previous (customary) occupation. 
A full-time job due to domestic circumstances. 
A part-time job due to domestic circumstances. 
A job due to physical, mental, or medical condition. 
A job because it paid significantly less than prior employment. 
A job because of travel time or transportation problems. 
Eligiblea 









An offer of temporary or commission work (with no prior history of such work). 

















NOTE: Surveys were received from all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
Ineligiblea 












SOURCE: This table shows the results from a survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA). (See note I in 
this chapter.) The survey is meant to reflect the expected Unemployment Insurance agency result, assuming that nonmonetary eligibility decisions are 
consistent with the applicable state policies. 
a The response categories are grouped as follows: "always eligible" and "usually eligible" are displayed as eligible, "often varies" is displayed as varies, 
and "rarely eligible" and "never eligible" are displayed as ineligible. 
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toward more hybrid approaches, such as determining when unemployment 
"is due to" a labor dispute. Currently, 23 states use a stoppage-of-work 
disqualification, 13 states use an active progress disqualification, and 17 
states use a different definition. States also have shifted in their initial 
position regarding lockouts and are now more likely to consider an 
individual eligible for benefits during a lockout. 
OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO ELIGIBILITY 
Treatment of Seasonal Employment 
In the majority of states, there is no distinction made between wages earned 
in "seasonal" covered employment and nonseasonal covered employment. 17 
In 14 states, however, payment of UI benefits is restricted for workers who 
earn some or most of their base period wages in employment that is 
defined as seasonal. These conditions, which vary by state, are defined by 
state statute and/or by implementing regulation. The seasonal employment 
restriction usually results in benefit ineligibility during certain parts of the 
year. IS 
Treatment of Special Groups 
In addition to the disqualifications discussed above, special groups of 
individuals are disqualified from receiving benefits because of their type of 
employment. These include professional athletes between two successive 
sports seasons; professional school personnel (specifically, instructional, 
research, or principal administrative employees of educational institutions) 
between successive academic years or terms; and individuals who are 
considered "illegal nonresident aliens." Similarly, students who perform 
work for the educational institutions in which they are enrolled are 
excluded from UI coverage in most states. 
CONSISTENCY OF DETERMINATIONS WITHIN STATES 
In 5 states, a survey was distributed to approximately 30 individuals who 
determine nonmonetary eligibility either at the initial claims level or for 
lower-authority appeals. The purpose of this survey was to determine the 
consistency with which determinations would be made by claims examiners 
within a state for a variety of specific circumstances. 19 
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The only nonmonetary eligibility question that resulted in internally 
inconsistent answers (in 3 of the 5 states) was refusal of suitable work. It 
should be noted that a majority of respondents in these 3 states recognized 
this difficulty, ranking refusal of suitable work as the first or second most 
difficult type of case to determine. Finally, a comparison of the survey 
responses of all claims examiners with those of the state agency (that is, 
the ICESA survey) indicated that in almost all instances the two sets of 
respondents were consistent.2o These results suggest that there is 
considerable consistency in the determinations of claims examiners within 
a state, and that their decisions usually reflect the expected state agency 
result. 
VALIDITY OF NONMONETARY SURVEY 
On the one issue of seeking only part-time work, the ICESA survey results 
can be compared to a legal review of each state's statute, rules and 
regulations, and administrative and judicial case law.21 This comparison 
provides a partial check of the validity of the ICESA survey. The legal 
review indicates that in 10 states, an individual limiting work search to 
part-time work is eligible, and in 24 other states, the same individual is 
ineligible (see Table 8-8)?2 In the 10 states that allow an individual to 
remain eligible for UI when seeking only part-time work, restrictions 
regarding eligibility often apply. 
In 23 of the 24 states in which the legal review indicates that the 
individual is ineligible, the results of the ICESA survey discussed in this 
chapter also conclude that the individual is ineligible. (In the 1 remaining 
state the survey indicated that eligibility varied.) Of the 10 states in which 
the legal review indicates that the individual is eligible (with some 
restrictions), the ICESA survey results conclude that the individual is 
ineligible in 4 states and that eligibility varies in 6 states. The ICESA 
survey asked specific questions regarding an individual's history of part-
time work and an individual's good, cause to leave ajob voluntarily, which 
are the two primary conditions under which an individual would be eligible 
according to the legal analysis.23 Of the 10 states in which the legal 
analysis identified individuals as eligible when seeking part-time work, the 
ICESA survey found the following: in 8 of the states individuals are 
eligible if they have a pPior part-time work history, in 7 of the states 
individuals are eligible if they have a medical condition, and in 5 of the 
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TABLE 8-8. Comparing the ICESA Survey Results to a Legal Review, by Number 
of States, 1994 
ISSUE: "Able and Available for Work-Seeking Only Part-time Work" 
Legal Review Results 
Eligible (10 states) 
Ineligible (24 states) 
No Authority (12 states) 
Conflicting Authority (7 states) 
ICESA Survey Results 
Eligible" 















NOTES: Surveys were received from all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (rCESA) survey results are 
calculated based on an average response for a series of eight situations. 
SOURCES: This table shows the results from a survey conducted by ICESA (see note 1 in this 
chapter) and a legal analysis conducted by the National Employment Law Project (1994). The 
survey is meant to reflect the expected Unemployment Insurance agency result, assuming that 
nonmonetary eligibility decisions are consistent with the applicable state policies. The legal 
analysis includes a review of state statute, rules and regulations, and administrative and case law. 
a The response categories are grouped as follows: "always eligible" and "usually eligible" are 
displayed as eligible, "often varies" is displayed as varies, and "rarely eligible" and "never eligible" 
are displayed as ineligible. 
states individuals are eligible if they have compelling personal reasons. 
These results confirm that the ICESA survey is probably a valid reflection 
of the states' legal positions on nonmonetary eligibility conditions. 
POLICY ISSUES 
The survey results reveal a number of issues that merit consideration. 
First, the results confirm that nonmonetary eligibility requirements vary 
significantly across states and that eligibility is often dependent on the 
specific circumstances of a given case. As a result, the general lack of 
published information regarding state nonmonetary eligibility conditions is 
likely to cause misunderstandings regarding nonmonetary eligibility. Such 
misunderstandings harm both claimants and employers, and also may place 
strains on the resources of the UI system by causing additional appeals. 
A second issue that merits consideration is that, in at least 12 states, 
individuals are considered to have voluntarily left without good cause, and 
therefore are ineligible for UI benefits, when they are unable to work due 
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to a change in the employment situation-for example, a change in 
scheduled work hours. This situation may not have been problematic at the 
inception of the UI system when there was typically one nonworking parent 
at home to care for children in a family. In recent years, however, it is 
likely that changes in scheduled work hours could cause substantial 
hardship for workers with child care or other care-giving responsibilities. 
Third, a number of issues directly affect the VI eligibility of contingent 
workers and individuals working for temporary-help agencies. In many 
states (between 20 and 24, depending on the specific type of disquali-
fication), unemployed individuals who meet the VI monetary eligibility 
requirements are nevertheless ineligible for benefits when they have a prior 
history of temporary (or commission) work and refuse a subsequent offer 
of temporary (or commission) work. This restriction could make it diffi-
cult for the growing number of temporary workers to seek and find 
permanent work. 
NOTES 
1. During October and November 1994, the survey was mailed to UI directors in all 
50 states, as well as in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
The survey included questions on the following: (I) ability and availability for work 
requirements, (2) refusal of suitable employment, (3) voluntary leaving without good 
cause, and (4) misconduct violations. All 53 states responded to the survey. 
2. Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin participated in the 
survey. 
3. For example, a claimant who leaves work with "good cause," such as an illness, 
may not meet the "able or available" test initially. Most states, however, would allow 
the individual to become eligible for benefits as soon as he or she was again able and 
available for work (that is, had recovered from the illness). 
4. The states are Michigan, New Hampshire, and West Virginia. 
5. This is based on calculating an average response for a series of eight situations. 
6. Some states noted on their survey responses that individuals covered by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act are considered "available" for work when they are 
seeking part-time work or restricting their available hours. 
7. This section discusses how states define good cause. A difficult issue related to this 
type of disqualification (which is not discussed here) is the determination of whether an 
individual quit or was fired from a job. 
8. Some analyses have found that increases in the severity of penalties have 
significantly decreased the recipiency rate among unemployed individuals. See 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994). 
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9. These survey results indicate that employer-related issues are not considered to be 
"good cause" as definitively as is indicated in state statutes. 
10. Six states automatically disqualify a UI applicant for voluntarily leaving work to 
marry, 8 states automatically disqualify a UI applicant for leaving work to move with 
a spouse, and 6 states disqualify a VI applicant for leaving to perform marital, domestic, 
or filial obligations. U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
II. The ICESA survey indicates that 43 states disqualify a UI applicant for voluntarily 
leaving work to marry, 38 states disqualify a UI applicant for leaving work to move 
with a spouse, and 32 states disqualify a UI applicant for leaving to perform marital or 
domestic obligations. 
12. The 3 states that include travel distance to work in their definition of suitable work 
are Delaware, New York, and Ohio. U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
13. In some states, the definition of suitable work changes as the duration of the 
claimant's unemployment grows. Over time, claimants must accept a lower offered 
wage. The II states with such provisions include Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Utah, 
Wyoming, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota. U.S. Depart-
mcnt of Labor (1994a). 
14. This is indicated by the large number of responses in the "often varies" category. 
15. This subsection on "Unemployment Related to a Labor Dispute" is a summary of 
McHugh (1994) and U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
16. There is some controversy about how to define both a labor dispute and the 
location at which the disqualification applies. Most states disqualify workers if they or 
others of the same grade or class are unemployed by, participate in (45 states), finance 
(30 states), or are directly interested in (44 states) the labor dispute. In addition, most 
states apply the disqualification to workers who are unemployed at their "establishment" 
(usually defined by the COUtts as the immediate site of employment). Some states also 
include in their disqualification a "functionally integrated" location where there is not 
a labor dispute. 
17. This subsection on "Treatment of Seasonal Employment" is from U.S. Department 
of Labor (1994a). 
18. In 12 of the 14 states, individuals cannot receive benefits based upon seasonal 
wage credits unless they are unemployed during the usual operating period of that 
seasonal employer or industry. In most of these states, the same individual can receive 
benefits at any time during the benefit year for those wage credits earned in nonseasonal 
work. In West Virginia and Wisconsin, benefits are usually not paid to seasonal 
workers who earned a large portion of their base period wages in a seasonal industry 
unless they also meet specified earnings requirements through covered employment in 
other industries. 
19. The survey of claims examiners included questions from the ICESA survey and 
also a number of hypothetical cases. The respondents were asked to determine eligi-
bility for both sets of questions. 
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20. In 1 state there were significant differences between the state agency response and 
the claims examiners' response for a question on refusal of suitable work; the same was 
true in another state for a question on misconduct. 
2l. National Employment Law Project (1994) states that its summary of administrative 
case law is not definitive; it is based on Commerce Clearing I-louse (1994). 
22. In addition, in 19 states, the legal review identified either no authority on the issue 
(12 states) or conflicting authority between the statute and other sources (7 states). For 
these states, the survey results conclude that the individual in question would be eligible 
in I state, ineligible in 12 states, and that eligibility varies in 6 states. 
23. According to the legal review, 1 state requires that an individual have a history of 
part-time work (Colorado), 3 states require that an individual have "good cause" for the 
restriction or that the restriction is "beyond their control" (Delaware, District of 
Columbia, and Illinois), 2 states require a combination of these two (Massachusetts and 
New Jersey), 2 states require that the individual seek a minimum number of working 
days per week (Montana and Washington), and 2 states have no restrictions (California 






























9 / Benefits: 
Adequacy 
THIS CHAPTER ADDRESSES THE ISSUE of the adequacy of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits. Because it considers issues related to the levels of 
benefits, it necessarily includes only those categories of unemployed 
individuals who are eligible for benefits. Chapters 7 and 8 addressed the 
issues related to actual eligibility for benefits, and Chapter to provides an 
analysis of the variations in benefit levels and durations across states and 
across different individual employment and earnings histories. 
The question of what constitutes "adequate" UI benefits has been 
debated since the inception of the UI system. Despite the duration of the 
debate, no general agreement has emerged about the principles that should 
govern the amount of an individual's benefit. Nor has federal law ever 
specified any benefit standard. Thus, benefit levels have varied consider-
ably across states, and continue to do so. 
There is some agreement, however, on three basic elements that are 
relevant to the discussion of benefit adequacy. First, it is generally agreed 
that benefits should be related in some way to an individual's previous 
earnings; all states calculate benefits as a percentage of some measure of 
an individual's wages. Second, it is agreed that there should be a 
maximum amount that any individual can receive in benefits; all states 
place some cap on benefit levels. Third, all states' UI systems function 
generally as social insurance programs, operating on the assumption of 
"presumed need" (see Becker 1965). That is to say, benefits are provided 
on the assumption that a recipient who falls into a given category (usually 
based on previous employment and earnings) requires a certain level of 
125 
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benefits. With the exception of dependent allowances, these benefits are 
generally not based upon any factors related to individual circumstance. l 
The discussion below elaborates on some of these basic points of agree-
ment. 
REPLACEMENT RATE 
Because the replacement rate captures the relationship between an 
individual's VI benefits and previous earnings, most discussions of 
adequacy have used it as the primary instrument through which adequacy 
might be considered. It should be emphasized that a true replacement rate 
must be seen in reference to an individual VI recipient only. 
The ratio that is often reported as a state or national "replacement rate" 
actually compares average benefits paid to VI recipients to average wages 
paid in covered employment. Because it compares data for two different 
populations, this ratio is not a measure of the extent to which VI benefits 
replace the wages of individuals who actually receive the benefits. 
Analysis of available data suggests that the reported ratio significantly 
understates the actual replacement rate for individual VI recipients.2 
Unless otherwise noted, the term "replacement rate" is used in this 
report in the sense of the individual concept of replacement rate. Further, 
the replacement rate is defined as the ratio of pre-tax benefit level to pre-
tax wages over a specified period of time for an individuaP 
DEFINING ADEQUACY 
In selecting a definition of adequacy that is based on a replacement rate 
measure, two factors must be considered: (1) the proportion of wages that 
are to be replaced, and (2) the fraction of the population of VI recipients 
to which the adequacy standard should actually apply. These components 
of adequacy are discussed below. 
Proportion of Wages 
Historically, a 50 percent replacement rate has been the standard of 
adequacy selected when a replacement rate has been specifically designated. 
A goal of a 50 percent replacement rate was originally articulated in 1935, 
although it appears that this was "little more than a common-sense 
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estimate" designed to take into account political factors, estimates of need, 
and estimates of possible work disincentives (Becker 1980, 7). Today, 
most state benefit formulas are implicitly based on this goal. They are 
designed to provide a weekly benefit amount of at least 50 percent of their 
previous wages to recipients who are not at the maximum benefit level. 
Figure 9-1 shows the number of states that currently meet three possible 
definitions of an adequate replacement rate at a number of different wage 
levels.4 
Percentage of Population 
The percentage of the population to which any definition of adequacy 
would apply must also be considered. In all states, replacement rates 
decline (often significantly) as an individual's previous earnings increase 
beyond a given point. This practice reflects the view that a higher percent-
age of wages should be replaced for those with lower incomes. It is related 
to the general belief that not all individuals should receive benefits equal 
to the same proportion of their previous earnings, as reflected in the 
establishment of maximum benefit amounts in all states. Thus, if a specific 
replaceinent rate is defined as adequate, reference also should be made to 
the percentage of a given population to which the rate should apply. 
In 1973, President Richard Nixon articulated a goal of providing "at 
least four-fifths of the Nation's insured work force half-payor better when 
unemployed" (Becker 1980, 4). This "one-halffor four-fifths" standard has 
also been cited frequently in considering the adequacy of VI benefits. 
(See, e.g., O'Leary 1994.) 
Effect of the Maximum Benefit Amount 
The level of a state's maximum benefit amount has a direct impact on the 
percentage of the population that is affected by a standard of benefit 
adequacy based on replacement rate. As noted, in most states, benefit 
amounts are set at one-half of previous wages-up to a given level. 
Consequently, most individuals whose earnings qualify them for the 
maximum benefit amount in a state have less than one-half of their wages 
replaced. 
Thus, in states with relatively low maximum benefit amounts (when 
measured as a percentage of average wages in the state), more individuals 
FIGURE 9-1. Number of States Meeting Various Weekly Replacement Rates for Different 
Wage levels, 1994 
4.25 5 6 7 8 
Weekly replacement rates of... 
III 60% or more 050% to 59% l§!j 40% to 49% 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Hourly pay rate (dollars) 
NOTE: The calculations for this figure include 49 states. the District of Columbia. Puerto Rico. 
and the Virgin Islands; Michigan is not included. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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would qualify for maximum benefits and would therefore have a lower 
percentage of their wages replaced. As a result, the level of the maximum 
benefit amount has a direct effect upon the following adequacy-related 
statistics: (1) the percentage of recipients within a given state who receive 
benefits that are less than 50 percent of previous wages, and (2) the 
average state replacement rate for all individuals receiving VI benefits. 
In 35 states, the maximum benefit amount is indexed to a given 
percentage of state average wages (see Table 9-1). Maximum benefit 
amounts are generally even lower as a percentage of average wages in the 
18 states in which the maximum amount is not indexed. The lower the 
wage rate at which the maximum benefit amount in a state is set, the 
higher is the percentage of workers whose replacement rates are affected 
by the state cap on benefits. A 1980 study found, for example, that in 
order to meet the "one-half for four-fifths" goal, state maximum benefit 
amounts would have to be set, on average, at 75 percent of state average 
covered wages (Crosslin and Ross 1980). 
Analysis of available data, however, indicates that even states with 
maximum benefit amounts significantly lower than 75 percent of state 
average wages have achieved or come close to achieving the "one-half for 
four-fifths" goal. Five of the six states for which data were available had 
maximum benefit amounts between 48 and 55 percent of average weekly 
wages. Three of those five still met the goal by paying replacement rates 
of at least 50 percent to at least 80 percent of workers, and all five states 
paid a 50 percent replacement rate to at least 70 percent of workers. 5 
EXAMINING THE ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS 
A Conceptual Perspective 
Becker states that "a satisfactory norm of adequacy must have two 
elements--one positive, by which it can explain why benefits are as large 
as they are, and one negative, by which it can explain why they are no 
larger" (quoted in O'Leary 1994, 3). Thus, under this definition, a satisfac-
tory norm must take a number of factors into consideration, including an 
individual's previous wages, the expected financial needs of those with 
previous wages of a given level, and the possible work disincentives that 
may result from high replacement rates. 
In a set of criteria,6 Becker suggests that benefits would be adequate if 
they (1) provided sufficient income to pay the nondeferrable expenditures 
TABLE 9-1. Ratio of Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) and State Average 
Weekly Wage (AWW), by State, 1994 
Actual Ratio Actual Ratio 
of Max. WBA of Max. WBA 
State toAWW toAWW 
Hawaii 69* District of Columbia 50* 
Washington 69* New Mexico 50* 
Pennsylvania 67* Ohio 50* 
Arkansas 66* Puerto Rico 49* 
North Carolina 66* South Carolina 49* 
Rhode Island 66* South Dakota 49* 
West Virginia 66* Vermont 49* 
North Dakota 65* Maine 48* 
Minnesota 63* Nevada 48* 
Oregon 63* New York 48 
Idaho 60* Virgin Islands 48* 
Kansas 60* Mississippi 45 
Utah 60* Virginia 45 
Montana 59* Illinois 44* 
Oklahoma 58* Maryland 44 
Massachusetts 57* Tennessee 43 
Florida 56 Arizona 42 
New Jersey 56* Louisiana 42* 
Colorado 55* New Hampshire 42 
Kentucky 55* California 41 
Michigan 55* Georgia 40 
Wisconsin 55 Nebraska 40 
Wyoming 55* Alabama 39 
Iowa 53* Missouri 39 
Delaware 52 Indiana 38 
Connecticut 51* Alaska 35 
Texas 51 
NOTES: An asterisk (*) indicates that the state indexes the maximum weekly benefit amount, 
calculating it as a percentage of average weekly wages in the state. Average weekly wage is based 
on 12 months ending in the second quarter of 1993. 
States with indexed maximum weekly benefit amounts may report a different percentage than 
that calculated above. This is due to one or more of the following factors: (1) state calculations 
of average weekly wage are based on only part of the work force, (2) maximum weekly benefit 
amounts are frozen by states, (3) indexed percentages that change are based on state trust fund 
balances, and (4) average weekly wage amounts are set by law or are based on a different base 
period. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a,b). 
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of recipients and (2) prevented recipients from experiencing "too much" 
hardship (quoted in Haber and Murray 1966, 187). The following sections 
discuss the existing evidence on the extent to which the current VI system 
has met these two general conditions. 
Covering Nondeferrable Expenditures 
A number of empirical studies of benefit adequacy have been conducted in 
the past four decades, although few have been undertaken in recent years. 
This section briefly discusses the major efforts of the past and provides 
some additional information by applying estimates of more recent 
expenditure patterns to the definitions explored in the previous studies. It 
should be noted that there have been a number of serious criticisms of 
efforts to measure poverty and "necessary" expenditures. Overall, efforts 
to define these concepts are complex and remain quite controversial. 
The most recent major efforts to analyze the adequacy of VI benefits 
were undertaken in the late 1970s in South Carolina and Arizona.7 VI 
recipients were asked questions about their expenditures on classes of 
goods that were deemed necessary. The South Carolina study categorized 
as necessary those expenditures that were "recurring." They generally 
include food, clothing, medical care, housing, some transportation, and 
payments on outstanding debt (Blaustein and Mackin 1977). An expanded 
definition, "necessary and obligated" expenses, was used in the Arizona 
study (Burgess and Kingston 1978a,b). This category generally includes 
those items included in the definition of "recurring," plus insurance, regular 
services, and regular support payments. The "recurringfl category yields a 
lower estimate of necessary expenditures; flnecessary and obligated" yields 
a higher estimate. 
The level of VI benefits was then compared to the level of necessary 
expenses in order to determine the "adequacy" of the benefits. The South 
Carolina study found that, at the time, approximately two-thirds of all 
recipients received benefits that were adequate to cover their "recurringfl 
expenditures. The Arizona study found a much smaller proportion of 
recipients received adequate benefits, although this result is partially 
attributed to the expanded definition of necessary expenditures used in that 
study (O'Leary 1994). 
Vsing the definitions in the South Carolina and Arizona studies with 
1992 data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, analysis indicates that 
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the average household spends between 33 percent and 49 percent of its 
income on necessary items, with the difference dependent upon the 
definition of what is necessary.8 These estimates vary widely by income 
category, with lower-income households spending a larger percentage of 
income on necessities than higher-income households spend. Households 
in the second-lowest category (with income between $5,000 and $9,999) 
spend between 84 percent and 113 percent of income on necessities. The 
highest-income category (household income over $70,000) spends, on 
average, between 17 percent and 30 percent of income on necessities (see 
Table 9-2). 
Figure 9-2 shows the following: (1) the average percentage of weekly 
pre-tax income that is replaced by UI benefits for workers who were 
employed full-time, full-year at different wage levels; and (2) the percent-
age of pre-tax household income that is spent on the two different 
categories of necessary expenditures. This graph is intended only to 
provide a rough comparison between two extremely different concepts.9 
It suggests that, in some categories, average replacement rates across states 
may come close to the percentage of household income that is spent on 
necessary expenditures using the more conservative definition of "neces-
sary." 
Table 9-2 reports the number of states that replace sufficient wages to 
meet the two definitions of necessary expenditures for households in each 
of several income categories. The table, therefore, provides some infor-
mation regarding the number of states that would meet an adequacy 
standard based on necessary expenditure data. It indicates that a majority 
of states meet the low estimate of necessary expenditures for average 
incomes between $20,000 and $40,000. Fewer states, however, meet the 
low estimate of necessary expenditures for other income ranges. Almost 
no states meet the high estimates of necessary expenditures at any income 
range. 
Preventing Hardship 
UI benefits do have the effect of preventing some extreme hardship by 
keeping households out of poverty. Almost 20 percent of long-term UI 
recipients receive additional income through VI but still live below the 
poverty line. Estimates suggest, however, that the receipt of UI benefits 
may prevent up to 25 percent more families from falling below the poverty 
line (Congressional Budget Office 1990).10 
TABLE 9-2. Necessary Expenditures by Income Category, Full-time, Full-year 
Workers, 1992 
Percent of Pre-tax Income Spent on Necessary 
Expenditures and Number of States Currently 
Paying Ul Benefits Meeting that Level 
Low Estimate" High Estimateb 
Percentage Number of Percentage Number of 
Income Category Spent States Spent States 
Less than $5,000 276c - d 379c - d 
$5,000 - $9,999 84 _d 113 - d 
$10,000 - $14,999 65 3 90 
$15,000 - $19,999 54 15 75 
$20,000 - $29,999 42 38 62 2 
$30,000 - $39,999 34 30 50 5 
$40,000 - $49,999 31 15 48 0 
$50,000 - $69,999 26 0 41 0 
$70,000 and over 17 0 30 0 
All 33 49 
NOTE: A dash (-) indicates data are not applicable. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations based on data from Consumer Expenditure Survey (1992) and U.S. 
Department of Labor (1994a). 
a The "low estimate" is based on calculations from the 1992 Consumer Expenditure Survey, using 
the definition of "recurring expenditures" suggested by Blaustein and Mackin (1977). Generally, 
this category includes housing, utilities, health care, some transportation, and debt payments. 
b The "high estimate" is based on calculations from the 1992 Consumer Expenditure Survey, using 
the definition of "necessary and obligated expenditures" suggested by Burgess and Kingston 
(1978a,b). Generally, this category includes housing, utilities, health care, transportation, debt 
payments, insurance, regular services, and support payments. 
C The extremely high estimates reported for the lowest income group are likely an overestimate. 
This is a result of a number of factors, including underreporting of income (including cash gifts 
from relatives). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the income data in the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey is less reliable than the expenditure data. 
d Full-time, full-year workers working at minimum wage would earn more than the corresponding 
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Other Issues 
Some research efforts have attempted to avoid the necessity of determining 
whether any given expense is deferrable or not. A recent analysis by 
Gruber (1994) suggests that, despite large positive effects in smoothing the 
consumption of UI recipients, the distortions to job search behavior caused 
by the payments of UI benefits are so large that the current range of 
replacement rates is significantly higher than the optimal UI benefit level. 
A recent theoretical study by O'Leary (1994) found that a replacement rate 
of 50 percent for an average unemployment spell is "adequate and not 
excessive." This study further suggests that such a replacement rate tends 
to provide benefits that are higher than necessary for individuals with short 
unemployment spells and lower than necessary for individuals with longer 
unemployment spells. 
IMPACT OF BENEFIT TAXATION 
In any consideration of the wage replacement rate and benefit adequacy, it 
is critical to take into account the effect of the taxation of benefits. The 
classification of all UI benefits as taxable income since 1986 has directly 
reduced the net value of benefits .11 Thus, benefit taxation has decreased the 
ratio of after-tax benefits to pre-tax wages, although this effect is not seen 
in the ratio of pre-tax benefits to pre-tax wages that is used throughout this 
report as the definition of replacement rate. 
The Congressional Research Service (1992a) states that the purpose of 
taxing benefits was to treat benefits the same as wages, to raise needed 
federal revenue, and to reduce the incentive to collect benefits for indivi-
duals with substantial income without having to means-test UI benefits. 
Overall, the taxation of UI benefits reflects a view that benefits represent 
a form of additional individual income. 12 
Taxation of benefits affects all households except those that earn too 
little to pay federal income tax. For example, federal taxes would not be 
collected on UI benefits received by the following: (1) a single individual 
who earns less than $6,050 13 per year or (2) a family of four (a married 
couple with two dependent children) that earns less than $19,05014 per 
year. 1S For all other UI recipients, the net after-tax value of UI benefits is 
reduced by the marginal tax rate for the appropriate tax bracket. Thus, the 
value of the benefits is reduced by 15 percent for most households in the 
lowest tax bracket and by 28 percent for most households in the second tax 
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bracket. 16 A definition of the replacement rate that measures after-tax 
benefits as a percentage of pre-tax earnings would also decline based on the 
marginal tax rate. 17 Because of state taxes, the total effect of taxation 
varies across states. IS 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the actual effect 
of benefit taxation on VI benefits. The CBO analysis suggests that 
individuals do pay a significant percentage of their UI benefits in taxes. 
The percentage of taxes paid on benefits increases for individuals in higher 
income ranges (see Table 9-3). For example, those with incomes below 
$10,000 lose, on average, 5 percent of their UI benefits to taxes. 
Individuals with incomes between $15,000 and $50,000 lose, on average, 
between 16 and 20 percent of their UI benefits to taxes. 
~ 
" 
TABLE 9-3. Estimated Effect of Taxing VI Benefits, by Income Category, 1994 
Recipients Total Total Taxes on 
Affected by VI Benefits VI Benefits Taxes as 
Taxation (dollars in (dollars in Percentage of 
Income Category (percent) millions)a millions) VI Benefits 
Less than $10,000 50.0 2,056 142 6.9 
$10,000 to $15,000 82.7 1,761 211 12.0 
$15,000 to $20,000 94.9 2,075 347 16.7 
$20,000 to $25,000 97.6 1,939 374 19.3 
$25,000 to $30,000 98.3 1,804 344 19.1 
$30,000 to $40,000 98.7 2,654 456 17.2 
$40,000 to $50,000 100.0 1,919 329 17.1 
$50,000 to $100,000 100.0 3,344 760 22.7 
Over $100,000 97.1 546 159 29.1 
All 89.8 18,052 3,122a 17.3 
SOURCE: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1994, 274). 
a The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggests that Current Population Survey (CPS) data understate the effects 
of taxation. Because ofunderreporting ofDI benefits in the CPS and underestimates of benefits paid in 1994, CBO 
estimates that taxes collected on benefits probably will be twice as high as the $3.1 billion reported in this table. It 
is likely that this underreporting is more pronounced among households in the lower-income categories. 
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NOTES 
1. Dependent allowances are provided in 13 states (see Chapter 10). 
2. This statement is supported by existing state data on actual individual replacement 
rates. These unpublished data were available from six states: Illinois (1984 and 1985), 
Michigan (1994), Pennsylvania (1988 and 1989), Texas (1994), Washington State (1988 
and 1989), and Wisconsin (1994). 
For the indicated time periods, actual replacement rates in those states (that is, 
individual UI recipients' weckly benefit amounts as a percentage of their average 
weekly base period earnings) were, on average, 62 percent in Illinois, 52 percent in 
Michigan, 72 percent in Pcnnsylvania, 68 percent in Texas, 63 percent in Washington 
State, and 71 percent in Wisconsin. 
When compared with reported replacement rates for comparable time periods, these 
data indicate that the reported rates significantly understate the actual replacement rate 
in all six states. In five of the six states, the actual rate is understated by between 25 
and 30 percentage points. (Reported rates are as follows: 35 percent in Illinois, 39 
percent in Michigan, 42 percent in Pennsylvania, 38 percent in Texas, 38 percent in 
Washington State, and 39 percent in Wisconsin. The most recent data available from 
the U.S. Department of Labor-from the third quarter of 1994-were used for the 
reported replacement rates in Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin). 
3. Although it may be preferable to use nct wages and net benefits, accurate data in 
these categories are considerably more difficult to obtain than comparable pre-tax data. 
As a result, this chapter uses pre-tax data in considering replacement rates. The effects 
of benefit taxation are discussed later in the chapter. 
4. The source of the replacement rate statistics in Figures 9-1 and 9-2 and Table 9-2 
is a series of calculations performed by the ACUC staff based on state laws related to 
eligibility, benefit levels, and benefit durations. For more information on methodology, 
see Chapter 7, note 3. 
5. This analysis was conducted using unpublished data from six states: Illinois (1984 
and 1985), Michigan (1994), Pennsylvania (1988 and 1989), Texas (1994), Washington 
State (1988 and 1989), and Wisconsin (1994). 
For the indicated time periods, state maximum weekly benefit amounts as a 
percentage of state average weekly wages were as follows: 48 percent in Illinois, 
55 percent in Michigan, 67 percent in Pennsylvania, 55 percent in Texas, 55 percent in 
Washington State, and 51 percent in Wisconsin. 
The percentages of UI recipients who had at least one-half of their average base 
period wages replaced in the indicated time periods were as follows: 70 percent in 
Illinois, 76 percent in Michigan, 77 percent in Pennsylvania, 80 percent in Texas, 
90 percent in Washington State, and 83 percent in Wisconsin. 
6. Within this set of criteria, Becker also suggests the goals of providing a replacement 
rate of 50 percent and keeping recipients off welfare. 
7. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, these studies were conducted by 
Blaustein and Mackin (1977) and Burgess and Kingston (1978a,b). They closely 
paralleled a set of studies conducted in the 1950s. For more information on the 1950s 
studies, see Haber and Murray (1966). Generally, the 1950s studies found the 
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following: (1) benefits of at least 50 percent of previous wages were sufficient to cover 
"non-deferrable" expenses, and (2) none of the states studied came close to paying 50 
percent of wages to 80 percent of recipients. 
8. This analysis was conducted by ACVC staff using data from the 1992 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey. 
9. The replacement rate line displays average data for only one category (full-time, 
full-year workers) of hypothetical VI recipients, whereas expenditure lines display 
average data for all possible categories of households within various income ranges. 
Thus, the lines are not strictly comparable, although they do provide a useful 
comparison of recent VI benefit patterns and consumer expenditure patterns that cannot 
be displayed in a more rigorous manner due to the limited data available at the 
individual level. 
10. Long-term recipients are defined as those who have received VI benefits for 4 
months or more. 
II. In 1978, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to include VI benefits as taxable 
income for households with adjusted gross income of at least $25,000, or single 
individuals with gross income of at least $20,000. The income thresholds were reduced 
to $18,000 and $12,000, respectively, in 1982, and were eliminated entirely in 1986. 
Thus, all VI benefits received since 1986 are taxable. Taxes are not withheld at the 
time of VI receipt, but are included in the calculation of year-end gross taxable income. 
This may assist those who face a short-term cash shortage, but not a long-term financial 
crisis, as a result of an unemployment spell. 
12. Thus, policymakers face at least two issues related to taxation of benefits. First, 
should VI benefits be treated as income and, therefore, be taxed? Second, if benefits 
are taxed, should taxes be withheld from the benefit checks, or should such an option 
be made available to recipients? 
13. This is the equivalent of working at minimum wage ($4.25) for 52 weeks per year, 
27 hours per week. 
14. This is the equivalent of working for $9.15 per hour for 52 weeks per year, 40 
hours per week. 
15. These earnings thresholds include the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). It should be noted that the EITC supplements earned income for households 
below a given income level, but does not supplement UI benefits. The receipt of VI 
benefits can have a negative impact on the level of an individual's EITC, however, 
because the level of EITC rises with an individual's actual earnings (which does not 
include VI benefits), but is reduced on the basis of the individual's Adjusted Gross 
Income (AGI, which does include VI benefits). 
The impact of this structure is as follows: VI benefits cannot increase an 
individual's EITC, because it is paid only on carnings (which are not increased by the 
receipt of VI). If the individual's AGI (including VI) is at a level (currently above 
$12,200) at which EITC is being phased out, then the receipt of VI benefits will servc 
to decrease the EITC (at an implicit tax rate of approximately 15 percent). If the 
individual's AGI is not above $12,200, then the level of the EITC will not be affected 
by the receipt of VI benefits. 
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16. Assuming normal standard deductions, single individuals who earn less than 
$28,150 are in the lowest tax bracket, with a marginal tax rate of 15 percent. Single 
individuals who earn less than $59,550 are in the second tax bracket, with a marginal 
tax rate of 28 percent. These income thresholds are somewhat higher for households 
with a spouse or dependent children. There are three other, higher tax brackets. 
A single individual, for example, who earns a total of $25,000 in a year (i.e., in the 
lowest tax bracket), including a total of $4,000 in UI benefits, would have the net value 
of the benefits reduced to $3,400 (85 percent of the pre-tax level). A single individual 
who earns a total of $35,000 in a year, including the same total of $4,000 in UI 
benefits, would have the net value ofthe benefits reduced to $2,880 (72 percent of their 
pre-tax level). 
17. The impact of taxation on individual replacement rates is a complicated matter 
because it depends heavily on whether after-tax benefits are being compared to pre-tax 
or after-tax earnings. 
Throughout this report, as noted earlier, pre-tax benefits are compared to pre-tax 
earnings. When afler-tax benefits are compared to the same pre-tax earnings, the 
replacement rate is reduced by the same percentage as the marginal tax rate. Thus, a 
50 percent replacement rate would be reduced to 42.5 percent for an individual at the 
15 percent marginal tax rate and to 36 percent for an individual at the 28 percent 
marginal tax rate. 
When after-tax benefits are compared to after-tax earnings, however, the 
replacement rates are generally higher than when comparing pre-tax benefits and 
earnings. The Congressional Research Service found that the replacement rate of after-
tax benefits to after-tax earnings was generally 4 to 7 percentage points higher than the 
pre-tax ratio for a low-wage earner (defined as earning $11,400 per year). For a high-
wage earner (defined as earning $44,812 per year), the after-tax ratio was generally 2 
to 4 percentage points higher than the pre-tax ratio (Congressional Research Service 
1988). These differences in pre-tax and after-tax replacement rates are a result of the 
progressivity of the income tax system. 
18. The complexity and diversity of state taxation laws prevent any direct analysis of 
the differences in this report. 
10 / Benefits: 
Variations in 
Level and Duration 
THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS A DETAILED examination of variations in UI 
benefit levels and replacement rates across states and across different levels 
of earnings. The analysis is based in large part on 1994 calculations of 
benefit levels under existing state laws for hypothetical individuals with 
various employment and earnings histories. I This look at the levels of 
benefits paid to individuals who are determined to be eligible for UI 
complements the discussions of eligibility and adequacy in Chapters 7, 8, 
and 9. The following conclusions are based on the results from the 
analysis of benefit variation: 
• Weekly replacement rates and duration-adjusted replacement rates 
for individuals tend to decline as wages increase. 
• On average, full-time, full-year workers who earn less than $11 per 
hour have weekly and duration-adjusted replacement rates greater 
than or equal to 50 percent of previous wages. 
• While average weekly benefit amounts (in constant dollars) have 
declined slightly in the past two decades, they have not declined as 
sharply as average weekly wages have declined. 
• For individuals at the same wage rate, average weekly benefit 
amounts are higher for full-time workers than for part-time 
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workers. Average replacement rates, however, are generally higher 
for part-time workers than for full-time workers. 
III Weekly and total potential benefit amounts vary considerably 
among workers who have worked at the same wage for the same 
number of total hours in their base period. For workers at most 
wage rates, benefits are significantly higher if their hours of work 
are concentrated in two quarters of the base period. 
III In the 13 states that provide higher benefits to individuals with 
dependents, replacement rates are, on average, significantly higher 
for workers with families when compared to those for single 
workers at the same wage level. 
These findings are discussed below. The dimensions of the variations in 
benefit levels and duration are described first. Subsections then address 
variations among single, full-time, full-year workers at various wage rates; 
variations among full-time and part-time workers; variations among full-
year and part-year workers; variations based on the distribution of work 
hours; and, finally, variations among workers with dependents. Reference 
should also be made to Chapter 9 for its discussion of the impact of benefit 
taxation on benefit levels. 
DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION 
Most measures of UI benefits vary according to a number of factors. The 
measures include the weekly benefit amount, the duration and total 
potential benefit amount, the weekly replacement rate, and the duration-
adjusted replacement rate. Each of these measures varies across three 
different dimensions: 
1. The measures vary across individuals, because the level and 
duration of benefits are determined by a formula related to an 
individual's employment and earnings history. The calculation of 
each measure for a variety of hypothetical workers helps demon-
strate the different relationships between an individual's work 
history and the level, duration, and replacement rate of his or her 
benefits. 
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2. The measures also vary across states, because of state differences 
in UI laws and benefit formulas. 
3. The measures vary across time, because of changes in laws and 
formulas over time. 
These variations-particularly across individuals-are discussed below; 
tables and figures provide additional information on individual and state 
variations. The discussion focuses primarily on variations in the average 
levels of these measures in states in which an individual at a given wage 
level is eligible for benefits; the figures provide additional detail on the 
highest and lowest state levels of the measures for each wage level. 
Variations Among Single, Full-Time, Full-Year Workers 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
The weekly benefit amount, which is determined for individuals according 
to a formula based on their employment and earnings history, is often used 
as a measure of the level of UI benefits. This scale, however, is an 
indicator only of the weekly impact of benefits. 
Figure 10-1 illustrates the variation in pre-tax weekly benefit amounts 
for single, full-time, full-year workers with different rates of hourly pay. 
As wages increase, the average benefit level across states rises steadily to 
$224 for an individual earning $12 per hour. Beyond this point, the 
average weekly benefit amount rises more slowly as the hourly rate 
increases, and levels off at $237 for individuals earning more than about 
$16 per hour. The slower increase in the average weekly amount at higher 
wage rates is generally a result of state limits on maximum weekly benefit 
amounts. 
A comparison of time trends in average weekly benefit amount and 
average weekly wages (both adjusted for inflation) is illustrated in 
Figure 10-2. Generally, benefit amounts have tracked trends in average 
weekly wages, with average weekly wages declining more sharply than 
weekly benefit amounts during the past 20 years. More detail on variations 
across states for a worker earning minimum wage is presented in 
Table 10-1, and for a worker earning $10 per hour in Table 10-2. 
FIGURE 10-1. Weekly Benefit Amounts (WBA) for Single, Full-time, Full-year Workers at 
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Hourly pay rate (dollars) 
NOTE: The area between the solid lines represents the range of weekly benefit amounts across 
states; the marked line represents the average weekly benefit amount. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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SOURCES: Council of Economic Advisors (1994) and U.S. Department of Labor (1994c). 
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TABLE 1O-l. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, Full-
year and Earning $4.25 per I-lour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly Adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Repl. Rate Rep!. Rate 
States (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 165 18 2,970 97 67 
Alaska 107 26 2,782 63 63 
Arizona 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Arkansas 85 26 2,210 50 50 
California 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Colorado 102 26 2,652 60 60 
Connecticut 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Delaware 96 26 2,496 56 56 
District of Columbia 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Florida 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Georgia 88 25 2,200 52 50 
Hawaii 106 26 2,756 62 62 
Idaho 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Illinois 84 26 2,184 49 49 
Indiana 98 25 2,450 58 55 
Iowa 96 26 2,496 56 56 
Kansas 93 26 2,418 55 55 
Kentucky 105 26 2,730 62 62 
Louisiana 78 26 2,028 46 46 
Maine 94 26 2,444 55 55 
Maryland 93 26 2,418 55 55 
Massachusetts 85 30 2,550 50 58 
Minnesota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Mississippi 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Missouri 99 26 2,574 58 58 
Montana 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Nebraska 92 26 2,392 54 54 
Nevada 88 26 2,288 52 52 
New Hampshire 100 26 2,600 59 59 
New Jersey 102 26 2,652 60 60 
New Mexico 85 26 2,210 50 50 
New York 85 26 2,210 50 50 
North Carolina 85 26 2,210 50 50 
North Dakota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Ohio 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Oklahoma 88 26 2,288 52 52 
(continued) 
146 
TABLE 10-t. (continucd) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly Adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
States (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 110 26 2,860 65 65 
Pennsylvania 94 26 2,444 55 55 
Puerto Rico 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Rhode Island 102 26 2,652 60 60 
South Carolina 85 26 2,210 50 50 
South Dakota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Tennessee 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Texas 89 26 2,314 52 52 
Utah 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Vermont 98 26 2,548 58 58 
Virginia 89 25 2,225 52 50 
Virgin Islands 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Washington 176 17 2,992 104 68 
West Virginia 92 26 2,392 54 54 
Wisconsin 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Wyoming 88 26 2,288 52 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1 994a). 
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TABLE 10-2. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, Full-
year and Earning $10.00 per Hour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly Adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
States (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 165 26 4,290 41 41 
Alaska 202 26 5,252 51 51 
Arizona 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Arkansas 200 26 5,200 50 50 
California 158 26 4,108 40 40 
Colorado 240 26 6,240 60 60 
Connecticut 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Delaware 226 26 5,876 57 57 
District of Columbia 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Florida 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Georgia 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Hawaii 248 26 6,448 62 62 
Idaho 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Illinois 198 26 5,148 50 50 
Indiana 170 26 4,420 43 43 
Iowa 212 26 5,486 53 53 
Kansas 221 26 5,746 55 55 
Kentucky 229 26 5,954 57 57 
Louisiana 181 26 4,706 45 45 
Maine 192 26 4,992 48 48 
Maryland 217 26 5,642 54 54 
Massachusetts 200 30 6,000 50 58 
Minnesota 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Mississippi 165 26 4,290 41 41 
Missouri 175 26 4,550 44 44 
Montana 208 26 5,408 52 52 
Nebraska 154 26 4,004 39 39 
Nevada 208 26 5,408 52 52 
New Hampshire 179 26 4,654 45 45 
New Jersey 240 26 6,240 60 60 
New Mexico 197 26 5,122 49 49 
New York 200 26 5,200 50 50 
North Carolina 200 26 5,200 50 50 
North Dakota 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Ohio 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Oklahoma 208 20 4,160 52 40 
(continued) 
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TABLE 10-2. (continued) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly Adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
States (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 260 26 6,760 65 65 
Pennsylvania 213 26 5,538 53 53 
Puerto Rico 133 26 3,458 33 33 
Rhode Island 240 26 6,240 60 60 
South Carolina 200 26 5,200 50 50 
South Dakota 168 26 4,368 42 42 
Tennessee 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Texas 209 26 5,434 52 52 
Utah 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Vermont 209 26 5,434 52 52 
Virginia 208 25 5,200 52 50 
Virgin Islands 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Washington 340 20 6,800 85 65 
West Virginia 218 26 5,668 55 55 
Wisconsin 208 26 5,408 52 52 
Wyoming 208 25 5,200 52 50 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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Total Potential Benefit Amount 
Another measure of DI benefit levels is the total potential benefit amount. 
It is calculated for an individual by multiplying weekly benefit amount by 
maximum potential duration. 
Figure 10-3 illustrates variations in total potential benefit amount for 
workers with different hourly earnings. Because of state limits on the 
maximum total benefit amount, the average total potential amount across 
all states reaches a plateau of approximately $6,100, and remains constant 
for individuals with wages equal to or greater than approximately $16 per 
hour. 
Weekly Replacement Rate 
A comparison of weekly benefits to weekly wage, often called a replace-
ment rate, allows the relationship of benefits to previous earnings to be 
considered. Dividing an individual's benefits by his or her previous wages 
over a comparable time period yields the percentage of previous wages that 
are replaced by the payment of DI benefits-the replacement rate for that 
individual.2 (The general definition of the replacement rate used in this 
report is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.) 
The average replacement rate across all states declines as wages 
increase (see Figure 10-4). This pattern reflects the structure of the DI 
benefit system in most states, which often set their maximum weekly 
benefits at between one-half and two-thirds of the average earnings in the 
state.3 As a result, workers with higher than average earnings receive the 
maximum weekly benefit amount, which is generally a smaller percentage 
of their weekly earnings. The average replacement rate is approximately 
55 percent for minimum-wage workers, 50 percent for workers earning 
about $10 per hour, and 40 percent for workers earning about $15 per 
hour. 
Duration-Adjusted Replacement Rate 
A replacement rate that takes duration into account provides a means of 
considering this rate over a time period greater than a week. The duration-
adjusted replacement rate summarized below measures the maximum 
potential percentage of total wages earned in an average 26-week period 
that are replaced by total DI benefits.4 
FIGURE 10-3, Total Potential Benefit Amounts for Single, Full-time, Full-year Workers at 
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NOTE: The area between the solid lines represents the range of total potential benefit amounts 
across states; the marked line represents the average total potential benefit amount. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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FIGURE 10-4. Weekly Replacement Rates for Single, Full-time, Full-year Workers at 
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NOTE: The area between the solid lines represents the range of weekly replacement rates across 
states; the marked line represents the average weekly replacement rate, 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U,S, Department of Labor (1994a), 
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While the average weekly replacement rate is similar to the average 
duration-adjusted replacement rate, the range within which state duration-
adjusted replacement rates fall is considerably narrower than that of weekly 
replacement rates (see Figure 10-5). In particular, at low wage levels, the 
maximum state duration-adjusted replacement rate is much lower than the 
maximum weekly rate. This suggests that those states (such as Alabama 
and Washington) with relatively high weekly benefits for lower-wage 
workers often pay those benefits for fewer than 26 weeks. 
Variations Among Full-Time and Part-Time Workers 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
As one would expect, weekly benefit amounts are typically lower for 
individuals who work part-time during a week (for example, 20 hours per 
week) than for full-time workers at the same wage rate (see Figure 10-6). 
These differences diminish at higher wage levels, as weekly benefit 
amounts approach and reach state maximum levels more quickly for full-
time workers. 
Total Potential Benefit Amount 
Typically, average potential duration of benefits for part-time workers 
varies only slightly as work hours per week change. As a result, average 
total potential benefit amounts are determined almost exclusively by the 
weekly benefit amount and follow a similar pattern to the one described 
above (see Figure 10-7). As expected, therefore, full-time workers are 
eligible for a larger total benefit amount than part-time workers who earn 
the same hourly wages. 
Weekly Replacement Rate 
Weekly replacement rates are generally somewhat higher for part-time 
workers than for full-time workers earning comparable hourly wages. This 
is primarily because replacement rates are generally higher for individuals 
with lower total wages. A full-year worker earning $10 per hour and 
working full-time would have an average replacement rate of 51 percent, 
whereas the same individual working half-time would have an average 
replacement rate of 55 percent. 
;:;: 
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FIGURE 10-S. Duration-adjusted Weekly Replacement Rates for Single, FUll-time. Full-
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NOTES: The area between the solid lines represents the range of duration-adjusted wee~y replace-
ment rates across states; the marked line represents the average duration-adjusted replacement rate. 
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SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1 994a). 
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SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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Because differences in total wages between full-time and part-time 
workers are higher at high hourly wages, the difference in weekly 
replacement rates also increases significantly at higher hourly wage levels. 
For example, among full-year workers earning $20 per hour, the average 
replacement rate would be 30 percent for a full-time worker and 51 percent 
for a half-time worker. 
Variations Among Full-Year and Part-Year Workers 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
For part-time workers, there is little difference in average weekly benefit 
amount between comparable part-year (for example, 26 weeks of work) and 
full-year individuals (see Figure 10-6). Among full-time workers, a full-
year worker earning $10 per hour would receive an average benefit of $203 
per week, whereas a half-year worker would receive an average benefit of 
$191 per week (94 percent of the average weekly benefit amount for the 
full-year worker). This minimal difference disappears at higher wage 
levels. 
Total Potential Benefit Amount 
Because duration of benefits is often based partially on weeks of work, 
total potential benefits vary more than weekly benefit amounts (see Figure 
10-7). A full-year worker earning $10 per hour would be eligible for an 
average total benefit amount of $5,225; a comparable half-year worker 
would be eligible for an average total of $3,784 (72 percent of the average 
total benefit amount for the full-year worker). This difference diminishes 
somewhat at higher wage levels. 
Weekly Replacement Rate 
There is no significant variation in weekly replacement rates between 
similar full-year and part-year workers (see Figure 10-6). 
Variations Based on Distribution of Work Hours 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
Among many individuals who work the same number of total hours in a 
base period (except for those at particularly high wage levels), weekly 
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benefit amounts vary significantly. Individuals who concentrated all of 
their hours of work into a shorter number of weeks (particularly into two 
quarters of the base period) receive, on average, a higher level of weekly 
benefits than workers who worked shorter hours per week but more weeks 
in the base period (and thus, the same number of total hours). 
For example, a worker who earned $10 per hour and worked for 1,040 
hours in the base period would be eligible for an average weekly benefit 
amount of $191 if the work was distributed 40 hours per week in 26 weeks 
that fall within two calendar quarters. The same worker, however, would 
receive an average weekly benefit amount of $110 (only 58 percent of 
$191) if the work was distributed 20 hours per week for 52 weeks. 
Total Potential Benefit Amount 
Average total potential benefit amounts also vary considerably, depending 
on the distribution of the same number of hours of work. Again, most 
workers who worked more hours in concentrated periods receive higher 
total benefit amounts than workers with comparable hours spread over a 
longer period of time.s 
For example, a worker earning $10 per hour would be eligible for an 
average total benefit amount of $3,784 if the work was distributed 40 hours 
per week for 26 weeks in two quarters. The same worker, however, would 
be eligible for an average total benefit amount of $2,801 (74 percent of 
$2,801) with the work distributed 20 hours per week for 52 weeks. 
Variations Among Workers with Dependents 
In the 13 states that use "dependent allowances," benefit levels and 
replacement rates may vary based on an individual's dependents (see Table 
10-3). The method of accounting for dependents, as well as the actual 
impact of dependent allowances, varies considerably across these states. 
Weekly Benefit Amount 
On average, a full-time, full-year single worker earning minimum wage 
would receive $93 per week in UI benefits in the 13 states with dependent 
allowances. A comparable worker with a nonworking spouse6 and two 
dependent children would receive an average of $114 per week in those 
states. For workers earning $10 per hour, the average weekly benefit 
amounts would be $206 and $234, respectively. 
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TABLE 10-3. Comparison of Replacement Rates for Single Individual and Typical 
Family in States with Dependent Allowances, 1994 
Rate for Rate for 
Full-time, Full-year Worker Full-time, Full-year Worker 
Earning $4.25IHour Earning $lO.OOlHour 
State Single Family Single Family 
Alaska 63% 91% 51% 63% 
Connecticut 50 68 50 58 
District of Columbia 50 56 50 53 
Illinois 49 65 50 65 
Indiana" 58 58 43 48 
Iowa 56 65 53 60 
Maine 55 73 48 56 
Massachusetts 50 79 50 63 
Michigan 57 64 54 60 
New Jersey 60 69 60 69 
Ohio" 50 50 50 50 
Pennsylvania 55 60 53 55 
Rhode Island 60 72 60 66 
Average 55 67 52 59 
NOTE: "Family" is defined as containing an unemployed individual, a nonworking spouse, and 
two dependent children. 
SOURCE: ACUC calculations using U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
a In Indiana, only individuals with a high-qualter wage of at least $3,999 qualify for the dependent 
allowance. Thus, a person making $4.25 per hour does not qualify. Although Ohio has a 
dependent allowance, it only increases the maximum benefit amount. It does not affect the two 
individuals in the example above because they qualify for less than the maximum benefit amount. 
Total Potential Benefit Amount 
On average, a full-time, full-year single worker earning minimum wage 
would be eligible for an average total potential benefit amount of $2,441 
in the 13 states; a comparable worker with the family of four described 
above would receive an average of $2,911 in those states. For workers 
earning $10 per hour, the average total potential total benefit amounts 
would be $5,425 and $6,172, respectively. 
Weekly Replacement Rate 
On average, a single worker earning minimum wage would have 55 percent 
of weekly wages replaced in these 13 states (see Table 10-3). The same 
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worker in the family described above would have an average weekly 
replacement rate of 67 percent, an additional 12 percent of previous income 
replaced per state, on average. The increase in replacement rate for a 
worker with a family is as high as 29 percentage points in Massachusetts 
and as low as 0 percentage points in Indiana and Ohio.7 
A full-time, full-year worker who earns $10 per hour would have 
replacement rates of 52 percent and 59 percent, respectively, an additional 
7 percent of previous income replaced per state, on average. The increase 
in the replacement rate is as high as 15 percentage points in Illinois, and 
as low as 0 percentage points in Ohio. 
NOTES 
1. Unless otherwise noted, the source of all statistics and figures cited in this chapter 
is a series of calculations performed by the ACUC staff based on state laws related to 
eligibility, benefit levels, and benefit durations. See Chapter 7, note 3, for a more 
complete discussion of the methods used in making these calculations. 
2. The average replacement rates reported in this chapter are based on pre-tax benefits 
and pre-tax earnings. They are the unweighted averages of all of the state replacement 
rates for a given hypothetical individual in those states in which that individual is 
eligible for benefits. 
3. See Chapter 9 for additional information on the setting of maximum benefit 
amounts. 
4. The duration-adjusted replacement rate is defined as an individual's weekly 
replacement rate times a duration index. The duration index is defined as the 
individual's maximum potential number of weeks of benefits divided by 26. (This is 
the standard maximum benefit duration in all states except Massachusetts and 
Washington, which pay up to 30 weeks in benefits.) Mathematically, this rate is the 
same as the ratio of total potential benefits to the wages previously earned over an 
average 26-week period. Because of complications in calculation, the duration-adjusted 
replacement rate is only reported and analyzed for individuals who were employed for 
a full 52 weeks in the base period. 
If an individual qualified for 26 weeks of benefits, the duration-adjusted 
replacement rate would be the same as the weekly replacement rate, since that 
individual's wages over a 26 week period would be replaced at that weekly rate for all 
26 weeks. If, alternatively, an individual qualified for a maximum of 13 weeks of 
benefits, the duration-adjusted replacement rate would be one-half of the weekly 
replacement rate (since that individual's wages over 26 weeks would only be replaced 
by 13 weeks of benefits at that weekly rate). 
5. This trend diminishes at higher wage levels (approaching $24 per hour), and 
actually reverses after $24 per hour, with workers at those levels who have more weeks 
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of work receiving a slightly higher average total potential benefit amount. Generally, 
this is a result of the combination of state caps on weekly benefit amounts and higher 
durations for workers with more weeks of work. 
6. Not all of the 13 states count a nonworking spouse as a dependent. 
7. The dependent allowances in Indiana and Ohio do not affect this worker because 
they serve only to increase the maximum potential total benefit amount in those states. 
Because this hypothetical worker is not at the maximum benefit level, the existence of 
a dependent allowance provision has no effect. 

11 / Coverage and 
Federal Taxation: 
Exceptions 
SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE SYSTEM of Unemployment Insurance, the 
percentage of the work force covered by the program (that is, the 
percentage of jobs in which an employer pays VI taxes on a worker's 
wages) has gradually increased over time (see Figure 11-1). The most 
recent significant expansions in coverage were legislated in the 1970s, 
when a number of groups-including state and local government employ-
ees, many household workers, employees of many small businesses, and 
workers on large farms-were covered for the first time. In almost all 
industries, federal standards are in place that require coverage on all work 
for employers who pay wages of $1,500 or more in any calendar quarter. l 
Thus, VI coverage today is nearly universal, extending to more than 90 
percent of all civilian employment in the United States (and to almost all 
wage and salaried workers). Only two significant exceptions remain. Self-
employed individuals and agricultural workers on small farms are generally 
not covered under UI. These exceptions are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Concomitant with increased coverage has been an increase in the 
number and types of employers who pay federal UI taxes. Generally, when 
coverage is expanded to a given category of workers, employers are also 
required to pay FVT A taxes on those workers. In addition to the two 
groups of uncovered workers, there are two additional exceptions to 
universal federal VI taxation of employers: state and local government 
employers and nonprofit employers are exempt from FUTA taxation. 
These exceptions are also discussed below. 
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Today, certain elements of the labor market also present a new set of 
challenges for laws that address coverage and taxation in the UI system. 
For example, the increased use of labor contractors and employee leasing 
firms has created substantial new problems in enforcing the intent of 
existing ur laws and regulations. Further, efforts by some employers to 
avoid the payment of UI taxes have increasingly taken advantage of the 
few remaining exceptions to universal coverage. (These issues are 
discussed in Chapter 12.) 
COVERAGE 
Self-Employed Workers 
Federal law does not require that self-employed individuals be covered 
under UI. Generally the self-employed are excluded from state coverage 
not for reasons of principle, but for reasons of practicality; coverage of the 
self-employed is considered infeasible because of the extreme difficulty in 
determining what income they have lost and whether they are employed or 
unemployed in any given week (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a). 
California, however, does have provisions that allow self-employed 
individuals to apply for self-coverage under UI. 
Particular coverage problems may arise for workers employed in jobs 
that have some elements of an employer-employee relationship and some 
elements of self-employment. Difficulties in classification, as well as 
intentional misclassification of jobs, have increased in recent years.2 
Workers on Small Farms 
Agricultural workers are the largest category of wage and salaried 
employees who are not almost completely covered by the UI system. 
Indeed, before UI amendments passed in 1976, agricultural labor was 
excluded completely. Federal law implementing these amendments went 
into effect in 1978, requiring coverage of agricultural workers on larger 
farms. Such farms meet at least one of two criteria: (1) they paid cash 
wages of $20,000 or more for agricultural labor in any calendar quarter 
during the current or preceding calendar year, or (2) they employed 10 or 
more workers for at least one day in each of 20 different weeks during the 
current or preceding calendar year. 
In effect, the 1976 amendments represent a federally imposed min-
imum coverage standard for the agricultural sector. While most states have 
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chosen to use the federal agricultural standard in determining state 
coverage, 8 states elected to provide more liberal coverage of agricultural 
workers than is required by federal law.3 A large percentage of the 
nation's farm workers, but a smaller percentage of total farm employers, 
are located in these 8 states, primarily in the major farm labor states of 
California, Florida, and Texas. California, which includes 25 to 35 percent 
of the nation's farm workers, requires almost universal coverage of 
agricultural workers by covering them on the same basis as workers in all 
other industries.4 
Many of the 8 states chose to expand their coverage around the time of 
the implementation of the 1976 amendments. In California, the Vnited 
Farm Workers union was the force driving the expansion. In other states, 
the decision was generally a response to the belief that some measure 
needed to be taken to address the problems of farm workers. s 
Potential Expansion of Agricultural Coverage 
In considering the potential expansion of VI coverage to agriculture on the 
same basis as all other industries, a number of factors should be taken into 
account. First, past research has suggested that costs to the system would 
increase, although the increase would be relatively small, given the size of 
the VI system.6 Rough approximations suggest that additional benefit costs 
resulting from a national expansion of agricultural coverage to the same 
standards used in all other industries could be between 1 and 2 percent of 
current total VI benefits paid.7 
Second, a large percentage of the nation's agricultural workers is 
already covered either under federal large farm standards or through 
expanded state agricultural coverage.s Thus, a federally mandated 
expansion of coverage would affect only a minority of the nation's farm 
workers (that is, those working in states that do not have substantial 
agricultural employment). 
Third, UI coverage for agricultural workers in California has increased 
the income of an average farm worker there by approximately 7 percent. 
This suggests that VI has a significant effect on the overall earnings of 
covered farm workers (Martin 1994). 
Finally, a number of administrative and compliance problems compli-
cate the issue of farm worker coverage. One particular problem results 
from provisions in FVTA that allow "farm labor contractors" (or "crew 
leaders") to be classified as employers for VI purposes. Worker advocates 
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report that this contributes to widespread fraud and abuse within the 
system, and suggest that it also causes some eligible workers to be denied 
VI benefits (see, e.g., Norton 1994). These issues are discussed in 
additional detail in Chapter 12. The large number of unauthorized agricul-
tural workers also complicates the issue of coverage. 
FUTA TAXES ON EMPLOYERS 
Nonprofit Employers 
Nonprofit employers are also exempt from the FVT A tax. This means that 
they do not pay for any of the administrative costs of the UI system, nor 
do they contribute to the 50 percent of the Extended Benefits program 
financed by the federal governmenC In effect, therefore, nonprofit 
employers are subsidized on these costs by the FUT A taxes that are paid 
by other employers. 
The financial impact of the FUTA exemption for nonprofit organi-
zations is substantial. In 1992, there were more than 50,000 nonprofit 
employers in the United States. These establishments employed more than 
5.7 million employees. lO Removing the FUTA exemption for nonprofit 
organizations would have resulted in approximately $300 million in 
additional annual FUTA revenues.!! 
State and Local Government Employers 
Although UI coverage was expanded in the 1970s to include state and local 
government employees, state and local government units also remain 
exempt from the FUT A tax. This treatment is the result of a constitutional 
prohibition on federal taxation of state governments or their subdivisions. !2 
NOTES 
1. Thirty-three states have adopted this federal definition of employment. The other 
states all use even broader definitions. U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
2. For additional information on misclassification and other compliance issues, see 
Chapter 12. 
3. States with more liberal coverage include California, the District of Columbia, 
Florida, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Texas, and the Virgin Islands. 
4. For farm employers, California requires coverage of all work performed if wages 
paid are greater than $100. The same standard applies to California employers in all 
other industries. 
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5. Telephone conversation with Dr. Philip Martin, University of California-Davis, 
August 23, 1994. 
6. Telephone conversation with Dr. Philip Martin, University of California-Davis, 
August 23, 1994. 
7. This figure represents the rough estimate of the additional cost of extending 
agricultural coverage to all fann workers in those states that have not yet extended 
coverage. The figure is estimated by extrapolating the ratios in California, and applying 
them to the rest of the nation. Overall, however, it is extremely difficult to gauge the 
number offann workers in the United States, the extent of unemployment among those 
workers, or the extent to which currently uncovered workers would qualify for and take 
advantage of the UI system if they were covered. 
Finally, it should be noted that in California, agriculture is a negative reserve 
industry. For example, in 1992, approximately $350 million in VI benefits were paid 
to agricultural workers, but only approximately $150 million were collected in VI taxes 
from agricultural employers. Martin (1994). 
8. There are no accurate estimates of the percentage of the overall agricultural work 
force that is covered by the VI system. 
9. Such employers do, however, reimburse the 50 percent state share of any Extended 
Benefits that their fonner employees receive. 
10. Unpublished calculations from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. These numbers were derived from the Covered Employment and Wages (ES-
202) Program. They include only those nonprofit employers that have chosen to 
reimburse state UI trust funds for costs, rather than pay state UI taxes. This suggests 
that the number of nonprofit employers that are exempt from the FUT A tax may be 
slightly larger, because some nonprofits may choose to pay state UI taxes. 
11. This is an estimate based on calculations perfonned by ACUC staff using 
unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
12. On the state program level, state and local governments are also given the option 
of financing state unemployment benefit costs by reimbursing state trust funds for 
benefits charged, rather than participating in the experience-rated UI tax system. 
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Federal Taxation: 
Compliance Issues 
THE MISCLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS is a highly charged issue that has 
received a great deal of attention in recent years. For purposes of the 
Unemployment Insurance system, workers who are classified as indepen-
dent contractors are considered self-employed; such workers, therefore, are 
not covered under the Unemployment Insurance program in most states. 
In addition, many employers now employ workers through contracts with 
other entities such as employee leasing companies and farm labor 
contractors. Workers hired under such an arrangement often have poorly 
defined employment relationships with multiple parties, creating potential 
complications with regard to their eligibility for UI benefits. The problems 
associated with worker classification issues extend far beyond the UI 
system, however, affecting federal revenue collection, employee protection 
laws, and other labor matters. 
This chapter discusses the issue of worker misclassification generally, 
its impact on tax revenues from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
(FUTA), and its impact on worker eligibility for UI. It also addresses the 
issue of employer liability for payroll taxes in cases of multiparty 
employment relationships, including those that exist in the employee 
leasing and farm labor contracting businesses. 
MISCLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS 
Definition of Independent Contractors 
For federal tax purposes, including those of FUT A, the classification of a 
worker as an employee or an independent contractor is based in common 
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law. Under common law, a worker is an employee if the user of the 
worker's services has the right to direct and control the manner and details 
of the worker's performance. Twenty common law factors, as determined 
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), provide the criteria for determining 
"control."} No single factor is determinative, many factors are subjective, 
and the relative importance of some factors varies across individual cases. 
For state tax purposes, states can make their own distinctions between 
employees and independent contractors, and most use a broader definition 
of employee than the common law test. A majority of the states use the 
"ABC test," according to which any individual who performs a service for 
remuneration is considered to be an employee unless each of the following 
criteria are met: (a) the individual is free from direction and control over 
performance of the work; (b) the service is performed either outside the 
usual course of the business for which it is performed or is performed 
outside of all places of business of the enterprise for which it is performed; 
and (c) the individual is customarily engaged in an independent trade, 
occupation, profession, or business. The remaining states use common law 
or some part of the ABC test to define the employer-employee relationship. 
Scope of the Misclassificaiion Problem 
MiscIassification of workers may be intentional or unintentional. The 
ambiguities in defining the employment relationship leave room for 
differing opinions on classification decisions and for honest mistakes. 
Some employers, however, intentionally misclassify employees as indepen-
dent contractors. By classifying workers as independent contractors, 
employers can avoid payment of payroll taxes (including Social Security 
and state and federal UI), the cost of health care and other employee 
benefits, and additional expenses associated with tax and labor law 
compliance. Thus, companies that misclassify workers can cut costs and 
gain a competitive edge over businesses that comply with the law. 
Number of Misclassified Workers 
Although a number of reports have attempted to estimate the prevalence 
of misclassified workers, doing so has proven to be quite difficult,2 Most 
estimates of the number of misc1assified workers are based on information 
reported by employers and do not include workers of employers who do 
not comply with all employment tax reporting requirements. An IRS study 
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using 1984 data finds that one out of seven employers misclassified 
workers as independent contractors and that more than 3 million workers 
were misclassified (Internal Revenue Service 1989).3 Coopers and Lybrand 
(1994) estimate that the number of misclassified workers in nonagricultural, 
nonmining sectors increased 24 percent between 1984 and 1994, from 3.3 
miIIion to 4.1 million workers; they predict that more than 5 million 
workers wiII be misclassified by the year 2005. 
The Coopers and Lybrand study also reports that misclassification is 
particularly prevalent in the construction and service sectors (see Table 
12-1). The IRS survey finds that the share of misclassified workers in 
these industries is nearly two times the share of misclassified workers 
overall.4 The report also revealed that employers who misclassified work-
ers tended to be small firms with fewer than 100 workers. This suggests 
that, as technological capacity improves and tolerance of work at home and 
"telecommuting" increases, classification issues may increase in other 
industries. 
TABLE 12-1. Percentage of Employers with Some 
Misclassified Workers, by Industry 
Industry 
Construction 























SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service, quoted in Coopers and 
Lybrand (1994, 8). 
Lost Revenue 
Misclassification of workers results in lost tax revenue for federal and state 
governments. Losses occur as a result of nonpayment of payroll taxes by 
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employers, as well as from deduction of business expenses and under-
reporting of income by workers designated as independent contractors. An 
IRS employer survey found that misclassification cost the federal govern-
ment $3.5 billion in 1984: this included $1.7 billion lost in Social Security 
taxes, $1.6 billion lost in income taxes that were not withheld, and $196 
million lost in FUTA taxes (Internal Revenue Service 1989). Coopers and 
Lybrand (1994) project that misclassification will reduce federal tax 
revenues by between $2.5 billion and $4.7 billion annually between 1996 
and 2004. 
Compliance Efforts 
The IRS has traditionally relied on third-party sources (such as workers 
who complain about their classification, employers who compete with 
noncompliant businesses, and referrals from other federal and state 
agencies) for leads that will help identify cases of misclassification. It 
would be possible, however, to pursue a more systematic approach to 
identifying noncompliant employers (U.S. General Accounting Office 
1989). 
Studies have shown that independent contractors who receive all of 
their income from one employer are likely to be misclassified.5 A business 
that uses independent contractors is required to report annual payments of 
$600 or more to the IRS on an information return (Form 1099-Misc).6 
Consequently, by matching information returns and income tax returns of 
independent contractors, it is possible to investigate those businesses that 
are most likely to be misclassifying workers. 
In addition, IRS studies have shown that independent contractors are 
more likely than are employees to underreport income and overstate 
expenses.7 A General Accounting Office study concludes that efforts to 
increase compliance with requirements for filing information returns would 
both increase revenues collected and provide information that would help 
identify misclassified workers.8 
Limits on Enforcement 
IRS authority to correctthe misclassification of independent contractors and 
assess back taxes is limited by Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.9 
Section 530 grants "safe harbor" protection to employers who can show 
"reasonable basis" for classifying their workers as independent contractors. 
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Firms that fall under the "safe harbor" protections are not assessed penalties 
for misclassified workers and are not required to reclassify them. 
Consequently, these employers can continue to treat their workers as 
independent contractors indefinitely. 
The IRS survey found that, in 1984, safe harbor status protected 9 
percent of the approximately 3 million workers who were misclassified, 
and it protected 14 percent of their $16 billion in wages. to The safe harbor 
provision also prevents the IRS from issuing guidelines to clarify the 
common law definition of employee. Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, enacted by Congress in 1982, also constrains revenue collection, by 
limiting employment tax liabilities for businesses that did not qualify for 
Section 530. 11 
MISCLASSIFICATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The VI system frequently uncovers misclassified workers when they apply 
for and are denied VI benefits because employment taxes have not been 
paid on their behalf. In 1990, about 95 percent of the 14,000 requests for 
reclassification received by the IRS came from workers in this situation 
(Daily Labor Report 1991). These VI claimants are ineligible for benefits 
until the state completes an investigation. If the investigation shows that 
the workers were, in fact, employees, then they receive benefits and the 
state attempts to collect unpaid taxes from the employer. 
The misclassification of workers as independent contractors directly 
affects the VI system, since federal and state VI trust funds lose revenue 
and benefits are denied to claimants. Burgess et al. (1994) estimate that 
employers failed to report 11.1 million VI-eligible workersl2 and $70.6 
billion in total wages to VI state agencies annually. The study estimates 
that misclassification and nonreporting cause as much as $728 million to 
be lost in VI tax revenue each year. 
The study finds that a substantial portion of the misclassification of 
workers is systematic, indicating that at least some firms weigh the costs 
and benefits of tax evasion when deciding on their reporting strategy. The 
key predictors of a noncompliant firm are its VI tax rate, turnover rate, and 
the percent of its work force paid as independent contractors. The study 
produces profiles that can be used to target firms for audit, to increase 
collection of VI taxes, and to encourage employers' compliance by 
increasing the risk of audit. 
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MULTIPARTY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
The practice of misclassifying workers as independent contractors is one 
way for firms to avoid the responsibility and associated costs of being an 
employer. Another method is to contract out for workers. In situations 
involving a "host" employer as well as a contractor, the difficulty of 
classification is compounded by ambiguity in determining who is the 
employer. Employee leasing and farm labor contractors are two areas 
where third parties in the employer-employee relationship have created 
uncertainty about payroll tax liability. 
Employee leasing 
Employee leasing firms manage employee services for client businesses in 
order to relieve them of persorulel-related administrative burdens. In 
general, an employer contracts with a leasing company and releases some 
or all of its employees to the leasing company, which then leases the 
workers back to the original employer. The leasing company pays the 
employees' wages, payroll taxes, and benefits, while all other aspects of the 
workers' jobs remain the same. Leased employees differ from temporary 
workers and contract employees in that they usually have long-term, full-
time jobs and receive full benefits. In short, an employee leasing firm 
takes over the work force of a client employer but does not provide the 
workplace, does not supervise workers, and does not have the authority to 
discharge workers (National Staff Leasing Association 1993). The 
employment relationship among the leasing firm, the client, and the worker 
is complex. Frequently the client firm maintains supervisory authority 
while the leasing firm controls payment and wages-producing a situation 
in which control is divided. Often, employee leasing firms assume 
responsibility for payment of VI and other payroll taxes. In some cases, 
however, neither party claims the role of employer, and the workers are 
misclassified as independent contractors. The use of common law factors 
can produce different decisions regarding the proper classification of 
workers in employee leasing arrangements. Further, federal guidance, state 
policies, and court decisions on the issue are often vague and inconsistent. 
Estimates on the number of employee leasing firms and leased 
employees vary, but most agree that the numbers are growing. One report 
suggests that the number of employee leasing firms increased from 
98 firms in 1984 to 1,300 in 1991 (Resnick 1992). The National Assoc-
COVERAGE AND FEDERAL TAXATION: COMPLIANCE ISSUES / 175 
iation of Professional Employee Organizations identified more than 2,100 
employee leasing firms in 1994 (O'Brien 1994). 
Impact on the Unemployment Insurance System 
The practice of employee leasing is of greater importance to the states than 
to the federal government because state ur taxes are experience rated, and 
are therefore dependent on the firm that pays payroll taxes. States have 
addressed the employee leasing issue in a variety of ways. J3 By statute, 
regulation, or practice, some states recognize the employee leasing 
company as the employer for state unemployment tax purposes. Other 
states have taken the position that, in the absence of convincing evidence 
to the contrary, the client company is liable. Still others have taken no 
action at all. 
KRA Corporation and the Urban Institute are currently conducting a 
comprehensive review of the employee leasing industry and its impact on 
the UI system (Cook et al. 1994a). Their interim report identified the 
following areas of concern with regard to the impact of employee leasing 
on UI trust funds: 
III The leasing firm's tax rate may not reflect the experience rating of 
the client firm. Shifting employees from a client firm with a high 
experience rating to a leasing firm with a lower experience rating 
will reduce some firms' taxes, as well as total state tax revenues. 
III In cases in which employees work for more than one employer 
during a year, all employers are required to pay payroll taxes on the 
taxable wage base. When employees of a leasing firm are separated 
from the client firm and reassigned to another client, however, the 
leasing firm remains the sole employer for payroll tax purposes. 
Consequently, contributions to the ur trust funds are reduced. 
III When employee leasing companies' tax rates increase as a result of 
experience rating, they may shift employees through successive 
corporate entities to avoid paying increases in their state UI taxes. 
III Financial failure of the employee leasing company may leave 
delinquent payroll taxes and may result in ineffective charges of UI 
claims. 
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Farm labor Contractors 
The question of identifying the employer responsible for UI taxes is also 
a problem ilP the agricultural industry. Frequently, farm labor contractors, 
also called "crew leaders," coordinate groups of agricultural workers and 
provide workers for farm operators. Federal law provides clear guidance 
regarding the federal UI tax obligations of the parties when a farm labor 
contractor is involved. Farm labor contractors are liable for the FUT A tax 
for laborers working under their direction if one of the following criteria 
is met: (1) the crew leader is certified under the Farm Labor Contractor 
Registration Act of 1963, or (2) all workers furnished by the crew leader 
operate or maintain mechanized equipment provided by the crew leader. 
If these criteria are not met, the farm operator is liable for the FUT A tax 
(Runyan 1992). 
Regardless of whether they are liable as employers, crew leaders are 
required to maintain records, report employment and earnings data, report 
money withheld from workers' pay for any purpose, and report required 
payroll taxes. They are also required to provide the farm operator and 
crew members with this information. 14 
Enforcement, however, remains difficult. The problem with regard to 
farm labor contractors is related primarily to direct noncompliance with 
taxation and reporting requirements. Worker advocates report widespread 
abuse and noncompliance with FUTA regulations by farm labor contrac-
tors, which ultimately can result in worker ineligibility for benefits when 
they apply. This has led critics to propose that farm operators should be 
treated as employers in all cases. In this situation, compliance with legal 
requirements would be more complete, because farm operators can be more 
readily located when information is needed to process or investigate UI 
claims. Farm labor contractors are frequently quite difficult to locate. IS 
Opponents of changing the law to make farm owners or operators 
liable for UI purposes argue that the employer for FUT A purposes should 
be the same entity that is the employer for other purposes. They also argue 
that redefining the employer-employee relationship to improve UI 
compliance would be difficult, because farmland is frequently owned and 
operated by different entities (Holt 1994). 
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NOTES 
1. There are no specific rules regarding the number of criteria that must be met in 
order for a worker to be considercd an employee. The 20 IRS common law factors are 
as follows: (1) comply with employer's instructions about the work; (2) receive training 
from or at the direction of the employer; (3) provide services that are integral to the 
employer's business; (4) provide services that must be rendered personally; (5) hire, 
supervise, and pay workers for the employer; (6) have a continuing working relationship 
with the employer; (7) follow set hours of work; (8) work full-time for an employer; 
(9) do their work on the employer's premises; (10) do their work in a sequence set by 
the employer; (11) submit regular reports to the employer; (12) receive payments of 
regular amounts at set intervals; (13) receive payments for business and/or traveling 
expenses; (14) rely on the employer to furnish tools and materials; (15) lack a major 
investment in facilities used to perform the service; (16) cannot make a profit or suffer 
a loss from their services; (17) work for one employer at a time; (18) do not offer their 
services to the general public; (19) can be fired by the employer; (20) can quit work at 
any time without incurring liability. U.S. General Accounting Office (1989). 
2. Coopers and Lybrand (1994), U.S. General Accounting Office (1989), U.S. House 
of Representatives (1990, 1992a,b). 
3. The IRS Strategic Initiative on Withholding Noncompliance surveyed approximately 
3,000 employers in 1986 and 1987. Responses were based on 1984 data. 
4. In its review of previous studies, Coopers and Lybrand (1994) reports that the IRS 
survey results showed that about 2 percent of employees in the study were misclassified, 
but that in the construction industry and service sectors the share of misclassified 
workers was as high as 3.5 percent. These two sectors accounted for more than 25 
percent of all employers and employees involved in misclassification. 
5. The U.S. General Accounting Office identified more than 190,000 workers 
classified as independent contractors who received all of their income from one of 
32,000 employers during 1985. Interviews with a random sample of 408 of these 
employers showed that about 38 percent may have misclassified workers as independent 
contractors. Detailed examinations of 95 of these employers confirms that 92 had 
misclassified workers. U.S. General Accounting Office (1989). 
6. A business that fails to file an information return can be penalized $50 by the IRS. 
7. This difference, however, narrows in cases where businesses report payments to 
contractors on information returns. IRS data show that independent contractors report 
97 percent of the income that appears on information returns. Without returns, 
contractors report only 83 percent of income. See U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1992c). 
8. Some argue that the enforcement emphasis on rnisclassification is misguided, given 
that it results in a tax loss of $2 billion a year, while underreporting and failure to 
report income by the self-employed result in a tax loss of more than $20 billion. See 
U.S. House of Representatives (1992b). 
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9. Section 530 was originally enacted as a response to complaints from the business 
community about overly aggressive IRS reclassification efforts and large tax assessments 
and penalties. It was intended to be a I-year protection while controversies over 
classification were resolved. In 1982, it was made pennanent. 
10. "Reasonable basis" can include long-standing industry practice, pastIRS audits that 
did not raise classification problems (including audits not made for employment tax 
purposes), or judicial precedent such as IRS rulings (Internal Revenue Service 1989). 
11. Section 3509 limits the liability to 1.5 percent of wages paid to misclassified 
workers and 20 percent of the workers' share of Social Security taxes. The percentages 
double if businesses do not file infonnation returns. In either case, a business pays 100 
percent of its share of Social Security tax. 
12. This estimate is significantly larger than estimates of misclassified workers 
mentioned previously because it refers to all unreported workers-not only to 
misclassified workers. 
13. The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) and the 
Louisiana UI Service have surveyed states to detennine their policies regarding 
employee leasing. Examples of state action include the following: Florida requires 
each employee leasing finn doing business in the state to be licensed as an employee 
leasing finn. Texas passed a staff leasing licensing act that recognizes the staff leasing 
finn as the employer, and polices the industry to ensure compliance with all regulations 
and statutes governing labor laws. Arkansas and Oklahoma have bonding provisions 
to cover loss of UI taxes when employee leasing firms go out of business (Murrie 
1993). 
14. This treatment is consistent with the labor laws covering migrant and seasonal 
workers. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) of 
1982 provides fann workers with protections concerning wages, working conditions, and 
work-related conditions. It also requires fann labor contractors to register with the U.S. 
Department of Labor and to assure necessary protections for farm workers. The MSPA 
holds the farm labor contractor liable for all of its provisions. 
15. Booth (1980), and Norton (1994). 
13 / Reemployment: 
Incentives for the 
Unemployed 
THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM that labor market policy must address 
is that many workers' earnings are insufficient to provide an adequate 
standard of living for their families. This problem has two potential 
sources-either workers' hourly wage rates are low and/or their number of 
work hours is limited. 
Identifying which of these two factors is the more important reason for 
low earnings is critical to the design of effective policy. If the low level 
of wages is the primary problem, then the solution would be either an 
increase in the minimum wage or an income redistribution scheme that 
taxes high-income individuals and transfers that revenue to low-income 
individuals. If workers' inability to work enough hours, or even any hours, 
is the primary problem, however, then the solution would be either an 
expansionary macroeconomic policy or active labor market policy. 
While income maintenance remains an important objective of the 
Unemployment Insurance system, there is growing interest in using some 
of the funds available through the UI system to encourage more rapid 
reemployment of unemployed individuals. Thus, this chapter focuses on 
the second potential source of low income-limited work hours as a result 
of either underemployment or unemployment-and those financial 
incentives that may help improve the situation. 
Three types of financial incentives could be used to facilitate employ-
ment, either as part of the UI system, or as a complement to it. These 
incentives would affect one of the following labor market factors: (1) the 
supply of labor, by increasing the intensity with which an unemployed 
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individual searches for work and/or by affecting the wage rate at which a 
job would be accepted; (2) firms' demand for workers and/or their 
willingness to provide education and training for workers; or (3) the 
process of matching workers with job openings. Each of these three 
categories is discussed in the sections that follow. 
POLICIES AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF LABOR 
Reemployment Bonuses 
A reemployment bonus is an offer of a bonus payment that would be made 
to an unemployed individual when he or she accepted a job offer and met 
other qualifying conditions. I The purpose of the bonus is to encourage 
more rapid reemployment, thereby lowering the overall unemployment rate. 
The bonus can be designed so that the amount of the payment would 
decrease as the length of time that an individual was unemployed increased. 
Alternatively, the amount can remain constant for a specified period of 
time and then expire. In either case, by increasing the implicit cost of 
postponing the point at which a job is accepted, a reemployment bonus 
may give unemployed individuals an incentive to search for jobs more 
intensively and to accept jobs that they might otherwise refuse. 
Essentially, reemployment bonuses pay people to leave the condition 
of unemployment. Thus, they provide a mechanism for distinguishing 
those individuals who are in some sense voluntarily unemployed from those 
who are involuntarily unemployed. If a fairly modest payment could 
induce an individual to search more intensively for work and/or to accept 
a job offer that might otherwise be declined, that individual could be 
regarded as being voluntarily unemployed. If the payment is inadequate 
to induce such a response, however, the likelihood increases that the 
individual is involuntarily unemployed. 
Over the past decade, a number of social experiments have been 
conducted on the reemployment bonus concept. In these experiments, UI 
recipients were randomly assigned either to the "treatment" group that was 
eligible for a reemployment bonus as an alternative to their normal UI 
benefits, or they were assigned to the "control" group that received only 
their normal ur benefits.2 Both groups were then followed to assess the 
effect of the reemployment bonus offer on the speed with which they found 
jobs, as well as the wage rate of the jobs they ultimately accepted. 
The results from these experiments indicate that reemployment bonuses 
do, indeed, have the expected effect. Although only 7 to 22 percent of 
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those who were potentially eligible for the bonuses actually received them, 
the average length of unemployment among the entire group was reduced 
approximately one-half week to 1 week.3 The experiments produced no 
evidence that the bonuses resulted in any reduction in the wage rate of the 
job that was accepted. Taken together, these findings indicate that the 
bonuses operate primarily through increasing the intensity of individuals' 
job search efforts, rather than by inducing the unemployed to accept lower-
paying jobs. The low rate of bonus receipt, however, indicates that more 
intensive job searching was used by and was effective for only a minority 
of the group. 
While there was variation in the results of the reemployment bonus 
experiments, the results generally indicate that reemployment bonuses yield 
net benefits to claimants. From the perspective of society or government, 
however, the results were more mixed. Overall, the results suggest that 
reemployment bonuses may be a cost-effective means for increasing 
employment by a modest amount among those individuals who are offered 
the bonus. 
Experiments have not been able, however, to assess the degree to which 
the reemployment bonuses result only in a re-ordering of the unemploy-
ment queue. To the extent that those who receive the bonuses simply 
displace other unemployed individuals who would have otherwise found a 
job, the experiments overstate the effect that the bonuses would have if 
offered on a broad scale. One assessment suggests that the measured 
impacts could be entirely a result of undetected displacement (Dynarski 
1993). Some simulations also indicate that the displacement that results 
from reemployment bonuses can be substantial, thereby reducing the 
overall increase in employment that results from bonuses. If the estimated 
benefit-cost ratios from the experiments are adjusted to incorporate the 
possibility of substantial displacement effects, the bonuses appear to reduce 
overall social welfare, rather than to increase it. This is particularly likely 
to be the case during periods of high unemployment, when the simulations 
suggest that displacement effects may be the largest (Davidson and 
Woodbury 1991, 1993). 
In sum, the findings from the reemployment bonus experiments and 
related analyses indicate that the effects of such incentives are marginal at 
best. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that most UI 
recipients are involuntarily unemployed.4 Paying recipients to find jobs 
more quickly will have little effect if there are no jobs for them to find. 
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Wage Subsidies 
A wage subsidy is a supplement to a worker's hourly wage rate. The 
government could provide wage subsidies either by periodically distributing 
cash benefits to eligible workers or by reducing the tax liabilities of such 
individuals. Wage subsidies represent another potential vehicle for 
encouraging unemployed individuals to accept jobs more quickly, thereby 
reducing the length of their unemployment spell as well as reducing the 
overall rate of unemployment. Wage subsidies are based on a belief that 
supplementing the wages that an individual receives may make some 
unemployed workers more likely to accept job offers that they otherwise 
would not accept. 5 As with reemployment bonuses, the generosity of wage 
subsidies may be tied to the length of unemployment. Subsidies may be 
made available for a fixed period of time, thereby encouraging unemployed 
workers to accept jobs more quickly in order to receive the subsidy for as 
long as possible. Besides encouraging workers to accept jobs that they 
might otherwise refuse, the limited time frame would encourage a more 
intensive job search. In effect, wage subsidies are equivalent to reemploy-
ment bonuses except that the subsidies are paid to workers over time rather 
than in a lump sum. 
A wage subsidy program could be administered either as part of the VI 
system or as a completely separate program.6 Like reemployment bonuses, 
the potential effectiveness of wage subsidies depends on the extent to 
which the following occur: (1) the payment entices an individual to accept 
a lower-paying job, (2) the payment encourages more intensive job search, 
and (3) jobs actually exist. 
The first of these factors is a function of the "elasticity of labor 
supply," which is a measurement of how much workers' choices about how 
much to work respond to changes in the wages that they face. Since wage 
subsidies increase the effective wage rate that a worker receives (the 
effective wage is the actual wage plus the subsidy), wage subsidies should 
increase the supply of labor.7 There is a large empirical literature, 
however, which indicates that labor supply is fairly unresponsive to 
changes in wages-that is, it is inelastic (Heckman 1993). As a result, it 
would take quite a large increase in wages to induce a substantial labor 
supply response. The inelastic nature of labor supply indicates that wage 
subsidies to workers are likely to be an expensive method for increasing 
employment levels. 
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Perhaps a more fundamental limitation of the employment-enhancing 
potential of wage subsidies to workers is that workers must not only be 
willing to work, but they must also be able to find work. If the supply of 
workers exceeds the demand for workers, then a wage subsidy that 
increases supply (even if by a small amount) might actually result in an 
increase in unemployment, rather than a decrease. That is, if there is 
insufficient demand for workers, wage subsidies to workers might 
compound the unemployment problem, rather than ameliorate it.s 
While there are no experiments on the effects of wage subsidies to 
workers, the results from the reemployment experiments provide useful 
insights into the overall order of magnitude of the labor supply responses 
that might be expected from offering subsidies. This evidence indicates 
that subsidizing workers' wages could be expected to have a modest effect 
on the length of unemployment for those to whom the subsidy was offered, 
but that the effect would be offset by some displacement. During periods 
of high unemployment, the displacement effects might be so large as to 
render the policy counterproductive. 
Self-Employment Subsidies 
An alternative to finding a job with an existing employer is for unem-
ployed individuals to start their own businesses. In the past, however, the 
UI system was a constraint, since UI recipients are required to be available 
to accept a job offer in order to remain eligible for benefits. An individual 
who had just started up a business was therefore ineligible for UI on these 
grounds. Federal law now provides states with the option of incorporating 
a self-employment scheme into their UI programs. This option would 
allow VI-eligible individuals who meet program qualifying requirements 
to collect allowances similar to their UI benefits for a period of time while 
planning and establishing their own businesses.9 
The U.S. Department of Labor has sponsored two experimental 
demonstration projects that test the provision of financial allowances and 
training to UI recipients interested in self-employment who met certain 
qualifications. The specific details of the two programs differed, but their 
results were generally consistent. 10 Only 2 to 4 percent of recipients chose 
to participate and met qualification standards. Approximately half of these 
participants ultimately started a business, significantly higher than the 
control group (composed of similar individuals who were interested in 
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starting a business but were not provided training and financial allowances 
through the program). In addition, the total length of employment for 
participants was longer, on average, than members of the control group 
(Benus et al. 1994). 
Great Britain and France have also made use of self-employment 
projects. The evidence on the effect of the British and French programs 
is fairly consistent with the evidence that has emerged from the U.S. 
demonstration projects (see Bendick and Egan 1987). When offered the 
opportunity, a small percentage of unemployed individuals take advantage 
of the self-employment option. Although a relatively high percentage of 
their businesses have failed within 1 to 2 years of starting up, this failure 
rate does not appear to be markedly different from that which generally 
prevails for all small, start-up firms. On average, participants are more 
highly educated and had higher earnings before unemployment than 
average recipients of unemployment compensation. Observers of Great 
Britain's program report that some of the businesses started under the 
program would have been started even in its absence. 
Overall, the results from the demonstration projects in the United 
States, as well as from the programs in France and Great Britain, indicate 
that there are modest benefits to allowing VI recipients the flexibility 
required to start up businesses while receiving assistance (either in the form 
of living stipends or a lump-sum payment) through the VI system. For the 
vast majority of UI recipients, however, self-employment is unlikely to be 
a viable option. 
POLICIES AFFECTING THE DEMAND FOR LABOR 
The previous section suggests that policies designed to influence the supply 
of labor do have the capacity to encourage somewhat more rapid reemploy-
ment among a minority of the unemployed, although this benefit may come 
at the expense of other unemployed individuals. This displacement is 
likely to be pmticularly problematic during times of relatively high 
unemployment. It is during such times that active labor market policy 
influencing the demand for labor, rather than the supply of labor, is likely 
to be most efficacious. ll 
Employment Tax Credits and Other Hiring Incentives 
The demand-side analogue to supply-side efforts to pay workers to leave 
unemployment (for example, by offering reemployment bonuses) is to pay 
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employers to hire unemployed workers. In theory, offering tax credits to 
employers who hire unemployed individuals represents a fairly simple 
mechanism through which the government can increase the demand for 
labor and thereby increase employment levels and reduce unemployment. 12 
In practice, however, achieving this goal is complicated. First, a 
number of complex design questions must be addressed. Foremost among 
these is the determination of the conditions under which employers would 
be eligible for a tax credit. Presumably, only employers who increased 
their employment above the level that prevailed in some previous period 
would be eligible for a credit. 13 Consideration must also be given to the 
types of employment increases that would qualify an employer for the tax 
credit. For example, new workers hired might be required to have been 
unemployed or economically disadvantaged in order to allow the employer 
to qualify. 
The more restrictions that are applied to the conditions that qualify the 
firm for a tax credit, the smaller will be the employment gain that results 
from it. These, however, are precisely the conditions that minimize the 
cost to the government per job created (Bassi 1985), since the only way 
to entice firms to hire more workers than they otherwise would is to make 
it profitable for them. As a result, the greater the increase in employment, 
the higher the cost per new job created and also the larger the windfall 
profits realized by the firm. If the tax credits are successful in creating 
jobs, then that success is inevitably the result of a redistribution of income 
that generally favors employers. 
To the extent that the tax credit is narrowly focused on a particular 
category of workers, such as the economically disadvantaged, the dual 
problem of large windfalls to firms and high cost per job created is reduced 
(Bassi 1985). Concerns arise in such a situation, however, about the extent 
to which individuals who allow the firm to qualify for the tax credit will 
simply displace other categories of individuals who do not qualify for the 
credit. The extent to which this type of displacement will actually occur 
is a function of the ease with which firms can substitute one type of worker 
for another in response to the changes in their relative wages that result 
from the tax credit. 
The U.S. experience with employment tax credits has been limited to 
the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit 
(TJTC).14 The NJTC, available only in 1977 and 1978, was intended to 
provide countercyclical stimulus. The TJTC, which has been available in 
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some form since 1978, was intended to stimulate employment among 
certain categories of workers (Barnow et al. 1990).15 
Evaluating the impact of these two employment tax credits has proven 
to be difficult, and the literature comes to somewhat mixed conclusions 
about the overall effectiveness of this approach to stimulating 
employment. 16 There does appear to be some consensus, however, that the 
effectiveness of both the TJTC and the NJTC has been limited by the 
complexity of the rules governing the credit. In addition, the impact of the 
credits has been reduced because many employers did not know of the 
existence of the tax credit programs. Further, evidence from the NJTC, in 
particular, suggests that there was a considerable windfall realized among 
some of the employers who did take advantage of the credit. Evidence 
from the TJTC suggests that the tax credit may stigmatize those individuals 
who are eligible for it, thereby reducing employers' willingness to hire 
them (Burtless 1985). 
The conclusion that emerges from the research on these programs is 
that carefully designed, well-publicized employment credits may have a 
capacity to stimulate employment, either in general or for a targeted 
category, although it should be expected that some windfall profit is 
created for employers (Barnow et al. 1990). 
One possibility that could be used in future tax credits would be to fund 
the credits through the UI system. A mechanism could be created through 
which employers could receive the UI benefits for which individuals would 
have been eligible, thereby reducing the costs of hiring those individuals. 
One component of a social experiment in Illinois tested the effects of a 
related concept. Employers were offered a cash bonus for hiring a UI 
claimant who met certain eligibility standards and who chose to participate. 
Overall, the program was marked by relatively low participation rates, as 
only 65 percent of claimants who were offered the opportunity to 
participate chose to do so. Although the program showed some positive 
short-term effects, there was no significant effect over a full year, as 
measured by changes in either weeks of unemployment or benefits 
collected. 17 The results suggest that the positive effects of such a program 
are likely to be marginal. 
If implemented, any program designed to encourage worker hiring 
would also require provisions to minimize displacement and the incentive 
to replace workers once their UI subsidies had been exhausted. Inevitably, 
there would also be some windfalls to those employers who would have 
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hired the unemployed even without this incentive. An advantage of this 
approach, however, is that it would not require a new funding source, since 
it would take funds currently used for income maintenance and use them 
for promoting employment. i8 
Training Tax Credits or Grants 
An alternative to providing financial incentives to employers for hiring 
additional workers is to provide incentives for firm-sponsored education 
and/or training. Research evidence generally suggests that employer-
provided training represents one of the most effective methods of 
preventing unemployment and promoting wage growth for the workers who 
receive it. Consequently, while training incentives would not have an 
immediate impact on the demand for labor, they could have a long-term 
impact. 
In recent years, a growing number of state governments have been 
offering training tax credits or grants to employers, either as an incentive 
to entice prospective employers to locate within the state or to promote 
earnings growth of the states' citizens. As of 1990, 46 states had at least 
one state-financed training program (Barnow et al. 1990). While a few of 
these programs have been in existence for decades, the majority of them 
were created in the late 1980s in response to a growing perception that the 
private sector was providing less than the optimal amount of training. 
As with employment tax credits, careful consideration must be given 
to the design of these programs so that additional training is created 
without subsidizing firms to provide training they would have provided 
even in the absence of the tax credit. The states have addressed this 
problem in a variety of ways, including limiting the types of firms that are 
eligible for the training programs (for example, including firms with 
financial need) and limiting the types of training that the program will 
subsidize (for example, offering basic skills training rather than job-specific 
training). States have funded the programs in a variety of ways, such as 
through general revenues, lottery funds, and earmarked payroll taxes that 
often have been shifted from VI trust funds. The level of funding of these 
programs has ranged from $50,000 in Vermont to $55 million in California 
(Barnow et al. 1990). 
There are few formal evaluations of these state-sponsored programs. 
Several evaluations have found that state training grants often serve as a 
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catalyst to encourage firms to embark on training programs and ultimately 
to invest more of their own resources in training. 19 While the findings 
from these studies must be considered preliminary, they provide no 
evidence that state-financed training initiatives are simply displacing private 
spending that would otherwise take place. The finding of minimal 
displacement is at least partially the result of the targeting mechanisms that 
states use, which attempt to identify those firms, such as small, financially 
distressed companies, that are least likely to be providing training. 
Two studies have attempted to identify the effect of such programs on 
the workers within the firms that receive state training grants, using data 
from California's Employment Training Panel (ETP) Program. 20 Both 
studies found that workers who completed courses of training provided 
through the ETP Program enjoyed significantly higher earnings and lower 
unemployment over the course of a follow-up period that lasted several 
years. What these studies are not able to determine, however, is the extent 
to which these findings are merely the result of "self-selection" by 
participants?l Nevertheless, the gains to workers in these programs do 
appear to be larger than those which accrue to participants in postsecondary 
vocational training-for example, those taught at a community college 
(Moore and Blake 1992). Once again, while these findings must be 
considered preliminary, they are consistent with the interpretation that 
education and training for adult workers is most valuable when it takes 
place within firms. 
In sum, the preliminary evidence from state-sponsored, in-firm 
education and training programs is generally positive. There is little 
evidence that displacement is a serious problem, and the gains to the 
workers in these firms may be significant. 
Economic Development Initiatives 
Training tax credits and grants offered by states are often one component 
of a larger financial package consisting of other tax incentives and/or 
infrastructure improvements that states may offer either to encourage 
existing firms to expand or to entice new firms to locate within the state. 
In some cases, these packages are offered only in specially designated 
"enterprise zones," areas with persistently high unemployment rates. 
In general, the evaluation literature on the effectiveness of these 
economic development initiatives has not been optimistic. A consensus 
REEMPLOYMENT: INCENTIVES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED / 189 
seems to be emerging that state (and local) governments often give away 
more in benefits to firms than the residents recoup in return.22 Further-
more, states and localities may be involved in a national "zero-sum" game 
in which they bid for a fixed number of employers and jobs; when one 
state wins, another loses. In this situation, the primary beneficiaries of 
economic development initiatives are firms and their stockholders. 
The evidence on enterprise zones is only slightly more optimistic, with 
some authors cautiously concluding that while enterprise zones are no 
panacea, notable improvements in economic activity have occurred in at 
least some cases.23 There appears to be no research, however, on the cost-
effectiveness of using enterprise zones for job creation.24 Whatever their 
job creation potential, it must again be kept in mind that at least some of 
the new jobs created within enterprise zones will be at the expense of jobs 
that would have been created elsewhere. 
Short-Time Compensation Programs 
When firms experience declines in demand, an alternative to laying off 
workers is to implement a "work-sharing" program that reduces the number 
of hours of work among a broader group of workers. For example, instead 
oflaying off 20 percent of a firm's workers, the hours of all workers could 
be reduced by 20 percent each. By adjusting hours of work instead of the 
number of workers, the cost of unemployment, both financial and 
otherwise, is broadly shared, rather than being borne by a relatively small 
proportion of workers. At the same time, a participating firm is able to 
retain its skilled workers and avoid the costs of hiring new workers when 
demand is restored to its previous level. 
The existing VI system may, in many states, represent an impediment 
to work sharing. Since the earnings of most individuals who are working 
part-time are sufficiently high to disqualify them from receiving VI, 
workers as a group may prefer the layoffs of some (who could then collect 
VI), rather than having to share the income loss without any offsetting 
compensation from the VI system. 
Short-time compensation (STC) programs represent an innovation 
within the VI system that can be used to encourage work sharing as an 
alternative to unemployment. By relaxing the earnings disqualification in 
those cases in which reductions in work hours are made in lieu of layoffs, 
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it is possible to use the UI system to compensate workers for some portion 
of the earnings that they lose due to work sharing. 
A limited STC option is currently available to states. The first STC 
program in the United States was introduced in California in 1978. Since 
then, 16 other states have implemented similar programs. In a typical STC 
program, individuals would work 4 days per week and receive UI benefits 
for the fifth day of each week. A number of European countries, most 
notably Germany, have relied heavily on STC programs for many years as 
a means of alleviating the hardship associated with unemployment.25 
As is the case with most labor market policies, it is difficult to isolate 
the impact of STC programs. In general, however, the evaluations of STC 
programs are quite positive, indicating that the overall benefits of the 
programs outweigh the costs, and that under some circumstances (and 
assumptions), the net benefits of the programs can be substantial. The 
programs are not, however, cost saving from the perspective of the 
government. That is, they result in larger outlays from the UI trust funds 
than would occur if layoffs were used as the alternative. 
Despite their apparent benefits, the use of STC programs in those states 
in the United States that allow them has been quite low. Indeed, it is much 
lower than utilization rates in other countries.26 There are a number of 
possible explanations for this, including the following: (1) employers do 
not know about the program; (2) fringe benefits represent an impediment 
to STC;27 (3) the application and certification process is burdensome; and 
(4) the experience rating of the VI system in the United States acts as a 
deterrent. 
As it now stands, the minimal utilization of STC programs in the 
United States limits their potential for reducing unemployment. If some 
of the problems outlined above could be overcome, the evaluation literature 
indicates that STC might represent a viable alternative for relieving some 
of the suffering that unemployment causes. 
MATCHING LABOR SUPPLY WITH LABOR DEMAND 
Economists have long been interested in the process by which unemployed 
workers find job vacancies, as well as in the process by which employers 
find appropriate job applicants. While some of the time spent during 
search processes is good in that it can lead to a better matching of workers' 
skills and preferences with employers' needs, too much time spent in 
REEMPLOYMENT: INCENTIVES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED / 191 
search is wasteful. There is a clear role for public policies that reduce 
these inefficiencies by providing information about the labor market. Many 
of the programs that provide this information are discussed in Chapter 14. 
Provision of Relocation Assistance 
Another mechanism for facilitating a better matching process between 
job openings and unemployed workers is to provide relocation assistance 
to the unemployed. There are at least two reasons to believe that such 
assistance might improve the job-matching process. First, moving is 
expensive, and the unemployed are the least likely to be able to afford the 
expenses of relocation. Second, geographic pockets of unemployment can 
persist for extended periods. For example, throughout the past decade, the 
unemployment rate in West Virginia has been at least 50 percent above the 
national rate, and at times it has been twice the national rate. 
For many individuals in such depressed labor markets, it is likely that 
the only way they will be able to find jobs is to relocate. This has led the 
federal government to conduct a number of relocation demonstration 
projects, in which workers were provided financial assistance for moving 
expenses if they found a job outside of their current geographic area. 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of the projects, however, are not positive.28 
A recent experiment in New Jersey, for example, indicated that 
providing unemployed individuals with job search assistance and relocation 
assistance did not result in any better reemployment outcomes than those 
that resulted from providing individuals with job search assistance alone. 
The only condition under which relocation assistance appears to be 
remotely effective is in a significantly depressed labor market. Even then, 
it appears to be effective only for some of the youngest members of the 
labor force. 
The weight of the evidence from the federal government's relocation 
demonstration projects and experiments indicates that in isolated cases, 
such as profoundly depressed labor markets, relocation assistance may be 
effective. In most other situations, however, it does not appear to be a 
cost-effective mechanism for assisting the unemployed in finding new jobs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Financial incentives designed to improve the employment and earnings 
opportunities of workers can take one of three forms. First, some policies 
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attempt to affect labor supply either by creating incentives for the 
unemployed to search more intensively for work or by reducing the wage 
rate at which unemployed workers are willing to accept employment. 29 
The results from the reemployment bonus literature indicate that this type 
of policy may have a marginal effect on employment. During times of 
high unemployment, however, such policies might actually be counter-
productive. In those instances, such programs face a fundamental 
constraint: the provision of monetary incentives for the unemployed to 
accept jobs cannot improve an unemployment situation that is caused by 
a problem of labor demand rather than of labor supply. 
Investing in the employment and training of unemployed individuals is 
intended to affect the quality of the labor supply. A mounting body of 
empirical evidence, however, suggests that such efforts are often not cost-
effective when they are provided by the government (see Chapter 14). 
Firm-provided education and training, on the other hand, appear to be quite 
effective in increasing the earnings of an individual and reducing the 
probability of his or her unemployment. This suggests that publicly 
financed education and training efforts in the future would be more 
effective if they were more closely linked to the private sector than they 
have been in the past. 
The second category of labor market policy is designed to affect the 
demand for labor. Although there is evidence that demand is typically 
more of a constraint in the labor market than is supply, the United States 
has experimented in only a limited manner with policies that focus on 
increasing the demand for labor. The few effOlis that have been under-
taken (employment tax credits for businesses) have not met with significant 
success. It is possible, however, that well-structured, well-publicized 
initiatives designed to increase demand could be effective. Further, if these 
initiatives were tied to efforts that promote firm-provided education and 
training for workers, it is possible that the long-term employment and 
earnings prospects of workers could be improved. 
One potential strategy might be to offer unemployed workers a time-
limited voucher that could be used in one of two ways. The individual 
could cash in the voucher upon accepting a job, as with a reemployment 
bonus, or the individual could turn the voucher over to an employer who 
could then cash it in (resulting in a wage subsidy to the firm). The 
advantage of this approach is that it would encourage more intensive job 
search by the unemployed, but at the same time it could stimulate the 
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demand for labor in cases where that is the constraining factor. If such an 
approach were accompanied by state or federal programs or grants to 
stimulate firm-financed education and training, long-term as well as short-
term employment and earnings opportunities might be improved. 
Finally, providing unemployed individuals with better labor market 
information-the third category of labor market policy-may be a cost-
effective method for reducing the length of time that it takes the unem-
ployed to find jobs. The provision of labor market information is 
discussed further in Chapter 14. 
The compilation of evidence in this chapter, however, suggests strongly 
that there is no single solution. Policies that stimulate the supply of labor 
without affecting the demand for labor are likely to prove futile. On the 
other hand, active labor market policies that stimulate the demand for 
employment, encourage employers to provide more education and training 
to workers, or provide the unemployed with better labor market infor-
mation may represent steps in the right direction. In the end, however, 
there is no substitute for a strong labor market. Active labor market policy 
can serve as a complement to macroeconomic policy, but it cannot be a 
substitute for it. Both are needed if the employment and earnings prospects 
of workers are to improve. 
NOTES 
1. For example, those who become reemployed might be required to remain employed 
for a certain period of time. 
2. The bonuses ranged from twice the weekly ur benefit to one-half of the remaining 
UI payments for which an individual would be eligible before exhausting all benefits. 
3. For additional information on the evidence from reemployment bonuses, see 
Anderson et al. (1990); Corson et al. (1989, 1992); Decker and O'Leary (1992); 
Spiegelman et al. (1992); Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987). 
4. Abraham (1983), for example, reports that the number of workers looking for jobs 
generally is substantially in excess of the number of job vacancies. During the late 
1970s, for example, she estimates a ratio of 5:1 between job seekers and job vacancies. 
5. Wage subsidies could either be permanent or temporary. Because permanent wage 
subsidies are generally a form of income redistribution rather than a tool for active labor 
market policy, they are not considered in this discussion. 
Essentially, wage subsidies paid to workers serve as a fmID of insurance against the 
reduction in wages that workers often face after they are dislocated from their jobs. 
Some analysts, in fact, prefer to characterize wage subsidies as a form of insurance 
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(Baily et al. 1993). This "wage insurance" could either be self-financed by the indi-
vidual, or collectively financed by the government. 
Markets for private wage insurance are likely to be plagued by two major problems. 
The first is adverse selection-those individuals who would be most likely to want to 
purchase wage insurance would be disproportionately likely to be in need of it, thereby 
driving up its costs. Second, low-income individuals who might stand to benefit from 
wage insurance might not purchase it because they could not afford it. The fact that 
there is currently no market mechanism for providing wage insurance indicates that 
these problems might be impossible for the private market to overcome. 
6. It should be noted, however, that the implementation of wage subsidies could be 
quite difficult for the government to monitor. It would be in the interest boili of 
workers and their employers to collude in reporting low hourly wages, rather than low 
hours of work, in order to qualifY for the subsidy. 
7. Consistent with the findings of the empirical literature, this statement is based on 
the assumption that there is a non-negative elasticity of labor supply (that is, that the 
substitution effect outweighs the income effect). 
8. Economists have considered a variety of aspects of the operation ofthe labor market 
that tend to prevent wages from falling in response to an excess supply of workers. 
Some of the sources of downward rigidity in wages include imperfect information, the 
existence of contracts (eiilier implicit or explicit), and minimum wage legislation. See 
Davidson (1990) for a review of many of these issues. To the extent iliat these factors 
create a downward rigidity in wages (that is, a tendency for wages to fail to decline 
sufficiently to eliminate unemployment), wage subsidies targeted at workers will fail to 
produce the intended results. 
9. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 103-
182), states with self-employment programs may make unemployed workers eligible for 
self-employment assistance if the individuals meet ilie following conditions: they are 
(1) eligible for regular VI benefits, (2) identified through a worker profiling system as 
likely to exhaust benefits, (3) participating in approved self-employment assistance 
activities, and (4) actively engaged full-time in activities related to establishing a 
business. 
10. For example, Washington made lump-sum payments to eligible individuals, while 
Massachusetts provided biweekly payments equal to an individual's regular VI benefits. 
11. An alternative to active labor market policy is expansionary macroeconomic 
policy. A discussion of macroeconomic policy, however, is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
12. Alternatively, unemployed workers could be given vouchers that would enable 
employers who hire iliem to get an immediate rebate, rather than waiting until they filed 
tax returns. 
13. Otherwise, the tax credit would generate large windfall profits to firms relative to 
the number of jobs created. 
H·. The credit is only available for certain categories of economically disadvantaged 
and/or handicapped individuals. 
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15. Other similar tax credits have been implemented for research (the Research and 
Experimentation Tax Credit) and investment (the Investment Tax Credit). A recent 
literature review by Barnow et al. (1990) indicates that the lessons learned from the 
evaluations of these two alternative types of credits are essentially analogous to those 
from the NJTC and the TJTC. 
In addition, the Illinois reemployment bonus experiment included a subcomponent 
that experimented with bonuses to employers (see Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987). 
Since bonuses are equivalent to subsidies, except that they are paid in lump sum form, 
the results from the Illinois experiment are relevant to this discussion. Essentially, the 
findings are consistent with those from the evaluations of the tax credits. Bonuses to 
employers had marginal effects, and the effects seem to result almost entirely from 
increased hiring of women. 
16. Barnow et al. (1990), and Bishop and Montgomery (1993). 
17. Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987), and Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). 
18. Whether or not such an approach would create a drain on the UI trust funds would 
depend on the magnitude of employers' response. 
19. See Creticos and Sheets (1989), and Bassi (1994). 
20. See Moore and Blake (1992), and Moore et al. (1988). Funds for these programs 
are generated through an earmarked payroll tax. At the inception of the program, the 
VI payroll tax was reduced by the amount of the training payroll tax, thereby holding 
employers harmless. Thus, this payroll tax represents a diversion of UI trust funds. 
21. If the more able or more motivated individuals enroll in and complete such 
programs, then participants' higher earnings and lower unemployment after the program 
may be a result of their greater ability or motivation rather than a result of the program 
itself. 
22. See, for example, Milward and Newman (1989) for a review of the research on 
this issue. 
23. See Rubin (1990) for a review of the empirical literature on enterprise zones. 
24. Rubin (1990) does attempt a cost-effectiveness study for enterprise zones in New 
Jersey. Her analysis, however, is simply based on retums to state expenditures rather 
than focusing on job creation. 
25. Most of the material in the remainder of this section is drawn from Cook et al. 
(1993). 
26. In states with programs, the average usage has been about 0.2 percent of UI 
claimants, whereas in Germany the usage rate has ranged from 10 to 17 percent. 
27. Most states do not require the on-going payment of fringe benefits in order for a 
firm and its employees to qualify for an STC program. Nevertheless, most participating 
firms do continue to provide fringe benefits. 
28. The remainder of this section is based on Cook et al. (1994b). 
29. This latter option could include self-employment as an alternative to accepting a 
job offer from an existing firm. 

14 / Reemployment: 
Services for the 
Unemployed 
FACILITATING THE REEMPLOYMENT of unemployed individuals has been 
cited as an explicit objective of the Unemployment Insurance system 
(Blaustein 1993). This objective has taken on a new urgency in recent 
years and has placed additional burdens on existing reemployment 
programs. A number of publicly financed reemployment services and 
programs are available to help unemployed individuals find jobs.' These 
programs, sponsored by both federal and state agencies, vary widely in 
their eligibility requirements, services, size, and scope. In recent years, as 
workers' unemployment and their reemployment prospects have become 
more closely linked to their education and training histories, additional 
investment in education and training has increasingly come to be viewed 
as the solution to the reemployment problems of unemployed workers. 2 
Receiving UI benefits neither precludes nor guarantees individuals' 
participation in most of these programs. Some programs, however, are 
targeted to youths or to new labor market entrants and are therefore not 
available to experienced workers, whereas others are targeted specifically 
to dislocated workers with job experience. This chapter focuses predomi-
nately on the reemployment services available through programs sponsored 
by the U.S. Department of Labor for which a number of UI recipients may 
be eligible.3 
Existing Department of Labor programs include the Employment 
Service, Trade Adjustment Assistance, Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance, North American Free Trade Agreement Adjustment 
Assistance, and Title II-A of the Job Training Partnership Act. In addition, 
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the Worker Profiling Initiative is a new effort that is designed to provide 
assistance to the long-term unemployed. Overall, these programs vary 
greatly, but each one provides services that are aimed in some way at 
enhancing individuals' labor market opportunities. Despite the variety of 
available programs, only a small percentage of UI claimants participate.4 
Research has been conducted on many of the existing programs to 
determine their effectiveness. Studies find that certain service strategies are 
most effective in serving the unemployed. The evidence generally supports 
the following conclusions: (1) early intervention is important in facilitating 
the reemployment of displaced workers; (2) job search assistance and on-
the-job training appear to improve the employment and earnings of 
dislocated workers; (3) the impact of short-term classroom training appears 
to be marginal, at best; and (4) there is no available research evidence on 
the effectiveness of long-term training on the employment and earnings of 
dislocated workers. These conclusions are explored in the sections that 
follow. 
REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES IN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Receipt of Reemployment Services 
Little descriptive information is available on the services that UI claimants 
receive, but the available data indicate that only a small portion of UI 
recipients participate in any type of reemployment services. One recent 
survey of UI claimants who were about to exhaust their benefits found that 
only 1.4 percent had either participated in on-the-job training or in 
occupational training programs.5 Beyond the services and work registration 
provided by the Employment Service, only 6 percent of the UI claimants 
had participated in job search assistance classes, job clubs, or job counsel-
ing. Eighty-two percent of respondents, however, said they would have 
acceptedjob search assistance at the start of their UI claim period, and 72 
percent would have accepted skills training at the start of the claim period 
(Richardson et al. 1989). 
The survey finds, however, that 80 percent of recipients who are about 
to exhaust their benefits are no longer interested in reemployment services. 
It is likely that this is in part because they would no longer be able to rely 
on income support while receiving services such as training. Overall, the 
results indicate that most of the long-term unemployed do not receive 
reemployment services, and that early intervention strategies are particu-
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larly important because they allow claimants to emoll in reemployment 
programs before their UI benefits are exhausted. 
The remainder of this section discusses specific programs. It provides 
an overview, a description of program eligibility requirements, the services 
available, the numbers of individuals served, the funding source and levels, 
and any available evidence on effectiveness, for each of the following 
programs: the Employment Service, Trade Adjustment Assistance, Econ-
omic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance, North American Free 
Trade Agreement Adjustment Assistance, and Title II -A of the Job Training 
Partnership Act program for adults. 
Employment Service 
The Employment Service (ES) was established through the Wagner-Peyser 
Act of 1933 as a federal-state partnership to assist the unemployed in 
finding public- or private-sector employment. Because there are only 
general federal mandates and because states have a great deal of flexibility 
in customizing their own programs, the quality and quantity of services 
provided varies significantly across states. 
More than 1,700 local ES offices deliver services to ES applicants. 
While the primary mission of the ES is to perform a labor exchange 
function, the program's mission and responsibilities have changed signif-
icantly over time. Current mandated responsibilities of the ES include the 
following: administration of "work test" requirements for VI; certification 
of individuals for the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit;6 provision of counseling, 
testing, and other employment-related services; administration of special 
programs for targeted groups, such as Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance; certification of alien labor and verification of 
employer compliance with regulations; and collection of labor market 
information (Kulik 1994). 
Local ES offices are funded primarily (97 percent) through a payroll 
tax levied on employers under FUT A, with a small portion (3 percent) of 
funding from general revenues (Kulik 1994). Significant cutbacks in 
federal funding for ES between 1982 and 1987 resulted in subsequent 
reductions both in the size of the staff and in the number of local offices. 
Unlike the other programs discussed in this section, eligibility require-
ments for using the ES are minimal; an individual must only be legally 
authorized to work in the United States. Essentially, the ES program must 
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provide assistance to anyone who seeks it. Approximately one-fourth of 
all job seekers register with the ES (Jacobson 1994). Approximately 40 
percent of these individuals register with the ES in order to fulfill 
eligibility requirements in other programs, including UI, food stamps, and 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Kulik 1994). The UI eligibility 
requirement results in a direct linkage between the ES and UI. 
In program year 1992, 21 million individuals registered with the ES. 
Of these, 2.7 million were placed in jobs (13 percent). Expenditures for 
program year 1992 were $768 million, which represents a cost of $268 per 
job placement, or $37 per applicant.1 Over time, less than 2 percent of all 
job openings have been filled through the ES. Many ES applicants also 
receive services other than actual job placements: approximately 41 percent 
are referred to jobs, 3 percent receive counseling, and 2 percent are 
referred to training. E 
The ES has been subject to substantial criticism for the quality of the 
services it provides. The criticisms include the following (Kulik 1994): 
.. Those who use the ES are often more disadvantaged than are other 
job seekers (that is, they are younger, have less work experience, 
and have longer prior spells of unemployment) and use the ES only 
after other job search methods have failed. 
l1li Less than half of those who register with the ES actually receive 
subsequent services. As noted above, an even smaller fraction (17 
percent) actually find jobs through the ES. UI claimants experience 
an even lower ES placement rate. 9 
.. Although the ES fills approximately 60 to 70 percent of the job 
orders it receives, many of these are low-skill and low-wage jobs. 
Employers do not usually post high-skill jobs either because they 
do not believe the ES serves the appropriate clientele or because 
they question the ES's ability to screenjob applicants appropriately. 
.. The placement rate for the ES has declined significantly over the 
past 20 years. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the decline in the placement 
rate (Kulik 1994). First, the ES may be significantly underfunded. 
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Second, the capacity of the ES to produce results for applicants may be 
reduced by the many applicants who register solely to maintain their 
eligibility for other programs. 
Program Impacts 
It is difficult to evaluate the ES program and to assess the validity of the 
criticisms of the ES. In large part, this is a result of the fundamental 
nature of the ES' s mandate. Because the ES cannot turn away individuals 
who desire service, it provides services disproportionately to many of the 
most disadvantaged members of the labor force. This makes it difficult for 
researchers to disentangle the effect of the ES on the reemployment status 
of applicants from the effects of the disadvantaged status of many of the 
applicants. Nevertheless, the weight of the existing evidence suggests the 
following conclusions regarding program impacts: 1o 
III Women, older workers, and some dislocated workers who use the 
ES are estimated to return to work more quickly and to experience 
higher earnings than nonusers with similar characteristics. 
III Individuals who use the ES do not have significantly lower 
reemployment wages than individuals who do not. This suggests 
that those placed by ES do not trade quicker job placement for 
lower pay. 
iii Additional earnings resulting from ES placement are due to 
additional time spent working, not to higher placement wages. 
III Because the average ES cost per individual served is so low, the ES 
appears to be cost-effective (despite its modest impact on the 
reemployment prospects of the unemployed). 
III The declines in ES placement rates over the past 20 years are a 
result of both significant reductions in federal funding and increased 
mandates to register hard-to-place individuals. 
II The ES often assists job seekers who lack good information about 
pay and location of jobs and who may have failed to find jobs 
through normal search methods. 11 
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III Performance, as measured by increased placement rates, increases 
significantly in ES offices under the following circumstances: 
performance goals are established and measured; state officials 
conduct annual on-site visits to assess performance; the ES office 
is involved with other placement or job training programs; individ-
ual intake interviews are performed instead of group interviews; 
offices have self-service systems where job lists can be viewed by 
job seekers without the assistance of ES staff; and the ES offices 
are physically located at a separate location from the UI office (that 
is, the ES office is perceived as an employment source without the 
negative connotations of an "unemployment" office). 
Trade Adjustment Assistance 
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program for workers was 
established in 1962 to compensate workers for lost income resulting from 
job losses associated with trade liberalization. With annual expenditures 
in Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 of $181 million, T AA is currently the largest of 
the programs designed to assist displaced workers whose job losses are 
associated with federal policies (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Ways and Means 1994). 
In order to qualify for assistance, unemployed workers from a firm 
must petition for certification. Current certification criteria require that the 
following conditions be met: a significant share of the firm's work force 
is threatened with dislocation; sales or production have decreased; and 
increased imports have "contributed importantly" to the reductions in 
employment, sales, or production. The certification process for T AA 
services can be lengthy, requiring an intensive investigation by representa-
tives of the U.S. Department of Labor. The federal investigation can take 
up to 60 days and states may take additional time (anywhere from 2 weeks 
to 2 months) before notifying workers of their eligibility (U.S. General 
Accounting Office 1992a). 
Since its inception, the program and its emphasis have changed 
significantly. There are currently two primary components of TAA: 
income support and reemployment assistance. These are discussed in the 
following sections. 
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Income Support 
Because few individuals met the program's initial eligibility criterion-that 
trade liberalization be the "single most important" cause of unemploy-
ment-the T AA program was practically nonexistent between 1962 and 
1974. Liberalization of eligibility requirements and expansion of benefits 
in 1974 brought about increased participation in the program. Between 
1974 and 1981, the emphasis of T AA was on providing financial assistance 
to the unemployed. Cash benefits (called trade readjustment allowances, 
or TRAs) were based on a national standard of 70 percent of workers' 
former gross weekly wage. 12 
In 1981, changes in the T AA program were instituted to decrease 
program costs and remove the perceived reemployment disincentives that 
resulted from the program's relatively high wage replacement rate. 
Benefits were reduced to an individual's weekly UI benefit level available 
under the state's regular UI system, and these benefits were made available 
only after UI was exhausted. 13 Benefits are now available for a base period 
of 52 weeks, with an additional 26 weeks of TRA available if necessary for 
the completion of an approved training program. In addition, the 
certification process was administered with greater scrutiny, once again 
resulting in fewer workers meeting the eligibility criteria for the program. 
As a result of these changes, the T AA program is currently much 
smaller than in the past. In 1980 and 1981, program expenditures averaged 
$1.5 billion, and an average of 407,000 individuals were served annually. 
By 1991, only 25,000 displaced workers received cash assistance totaling 
$116 million, in an average amount of $169 per week, for an average 
duration of 23 weeks. Payments in 1993 were made to only 10,000 
workers at a cost of $51 million, generally because many eligible workers 
received Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) payments in lieu 
of TRA payments. 14 
Reemployment Assistance 
Beginning in 1988, the T AA program placed additional emphasis on 
encouraging recipients to return to work by instituting mandatory training 
requirements. Although training and job search assistance had been avail-
able prior to 1988, new legislation established a separate funding source to 
ensure thatthese services were provided. In addition, the receipt of TRA 
payments was made contingent upon participation in an approved training 
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program. IS Available services include skills training, counseling, vocational 
testing, job search and placement, and other supportive services. More than 
19,400 individuals received reemployment assistance in FY 1993, primarily 
in the form of training. 16 Total expenditures for reemployment assistance 
in FY 1993 were $80 million, the highest level to date. Despite the 
mandatory training requirement, two recent studies indicate that only 50 to 
60 percent of TRA program participants actually participated in T AA 
training in post-1988 periods. I? 
The General Accounting Office reports that a significant problem with 
TAA is its inability to respond to the needs of dislocated workers in a 
timely manner (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). Because research 
indicates that workers who receive timely assistance are more likely to find 
rapid reemployment, this limitation is significant-it not only extends the 
period of unemployment, but also reduces the options for enrolling in 
longer-term training. The TAA certification process appears to be the most 
significant constraint. 
Program Impacts 
A recent evaluation of the T AA program found that individuals who 
received TAA-provided training had lower employment rates and lower 
earning levels in the first 3 years following their initial VI claim than those 
TRA program participants who did not receive training (Corson et al. 
1993).18 However, by the end of the 3-year period, trainees earned almost 
$500 more per quarter than TRA recipients who did not participate in 
training. 19 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance 
The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance program 
(EDWAA) amended Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
in 1988. Under this program, states are allocated federal funds to provide 
training and related services to dislocated workers. These funds are distrib-
uted to states on the basis of their state unemployment rates, with the states 
typically dispersing these funds to JTPA service delivery areas, which have 
primary responsibility for administering the EDW AA program. 
The criteria for being designated "dislocated" (and therefore eligible for 
services) under EDWAA are quite broad. They require only that workers. 
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be either terminated, laid off, or long-term unemployed, and have limited 
opportunities for future employment in their previous industry, occupation, 
or community. Eligibility assessment is usually made on the state or local 
level. 
In program year 1993, there were 226,000 total EDWAA participants, 
who were served at a cost of $352 million?O EDWAA funds are generally 
used to provide classroom training, on-the-job training, and job search 
assistance to program participants. Relocation assistance is also authorized 
by EDW AA, but is only offered by a few of the local programs. Unlike 
T AA participants, few EDW AA participants receive any income support 
beyond regular UI (Congressional Budget Office 1993). 
In program year 1990, 38 percent of EDWAA participants received 
short-term and long-term classroom training, often via local school systems 
and community colleges. About 26 percent of participants received job 
search assistance, and another 17 percent participated in on-the-job training 
activities.21 Although no national program information is available on the 
duration of training activities, a GAO study of three states' EDW AA 
programs found that few participants have enrolled in long-term training 
programs; about 70 percent of EDWAA participants enrolled in short-term 
(l3 weeks or less) training programs, and less than 10 percent received 
training that lasted 27 weeks or more.22 The GAO report finds that 
ED W AA, like T AA, often fails to respond to dislocated workers' needs in 
a timely manner. Approximately 63 percent of program participants are 
placed in jobs and they received an average starting wage of $9.40 per hour 
in program year 1994.23 No evaluations of the impact of the program have 
been conducted. Consequently, it is unclear what the earnings and employ-
ment outcomes of the participants would have been in the absence of the 
EDWAA program. 
North American Free Trade Agreement Adjustment Assistance 
As part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an 
adjustment assistance program was established in January 1994 to provide 
assistance for workers who lose their jobs as a result of increased imports 
from Canada or Mexico or because of production shifts to those countries. 
States are required to make preliminary eligibility determinations within 10 
days of application, and the U.S. Department of Labor must make final 
eligibility determinations within 30 days. Services provided after initial 
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state certification include on-site counseling and job search assistance. 
Services that are provided following U.S. Department of Labor certification 
include counseling, testing, job placement assistance, and training. 
Program training expenditures are capped at $30 million per year. Income 
support is also available in the form of TRAs for up to 52 weeks after 
regular UI benefits expire. As with TAA, the level of income support is 
equal to the worker's regular VI benefit payments under state law. The 
program is generally similar to TAA, with two major exceptions: 
(1) training waivers are not granted, and (2) workers have a more stringent 
deadline for enrolling in training services. 
Title II-A of the job Training Partnership Act 
Title II-A of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), the largest of the 
Department of Labor's training programs, provides block grants to states 
to fund training and other services to economically disadvantaged youth 
and adults.z4 Funding is distributed to states for local programs on the 
basis of a statutory formula that considers unemployment and poverty 
levels,zs The goal of the program is to increase individuals' occupational 
and educational skills, thereby increasing employment and earnings and 
reducing welfare dependency. Adult program participants must be at least 
22 years of age, and 90 percent of participants must be "economically 
disadvantaged.,,26 Although Title II-A is less likely to serve VI claimants 
than the previously discussed interventions, its lessons remain pertinent to 
current and future training initiatives.27 
Under Title II-A, JTPA provides a wide range of services, including 
classroom training, on-the-job training, job search assistance, work 
experience, remedial education, supportive services, and other types of job-
related assistance (such as personal counseling, vocational counseling, and 
transitional assistance).28 In program year 1994, there were 584,000 
participants in Title II-A; 329,000 of the participants were adults. The total 
cost for the adult program was $722 million. The average adult trainee 
stays in the program for 30 weeks, at a total training cost of about $3,400. 
In program year 1991, 44 percent of adult enrollees receive classroom 
training, 15 percent receive job search assistance, 15 percent receive on-
the-job training, and the remaining 26 percent receive other services (U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means 1994).29 
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Program Impacts 
Title II-A is one of the few large-scale programs that has been evaluated 
using an experimental design. During the late 1980s, more than 17,000 
JTPA applicants in 16 locations were randomly assigned into either a 
treatment or a control group (Bloom et al. 1994). The key findings from 
this experiment are the following:30 
III Overall, the estimated annual earnings gain for adult women who 
actually received Title II-A services was $734 (a 15 percent 
increase), while the estimated gain for adult men was $639 (an 8 
percent increase).31 
III Among those receiving the on-the-job training/job search assistance 
service strategy, the estimated annual earnings gain for adult 
women was $917 (a 15 percent increase), while the gain for adult 
men was $844 (a 10 percent increase).32 
l1li Among those receiving the classroom training service strategy, 
neither adult men nor women had statistically significant earnings 
gains. 
l1li Among those receiving other services, adult women experienced 
statistically significant annual earnings gains of $1 ,580 (39 percent). 
It is unclear to the researchers why these gains were so large. 
Adult men did not experience statistically significant increases in 
earnings. 
l1li Overall, the estimated annual net social benefits of Title II-A 
enrollment were $213 for each adult woman and $228 for each 
adult man. 
The findings suggest that most of the estimated earnings gains were due 
to increased hours of work rather than to increased wages. The most 
consistently positive program impacts were realized in the on-the-job 
training/job search assistance service strategy subgroup.33 The study offers 
no firm evidence that the classroom training service strategy produced 
earnings gains for adults. 
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Evidence from Displaced Worker Demonstration Projects 
Results from a variety of displaced worker demonstration projects generally 
indicate that classroom skill training did not appear to improve individuals' 
reemployment prospects or earnings significantly. Job search assistance, 
however, did increase the short-term earnings of participants and decrease 
the amount of UI benefits paid. Other significant findings from these 
demonstration projects suggest that many of the displaced workers could 
not adapt to classroom training, and many program graduates could not 
find training-related jobs despite targeting course selection to the local 
labor market area.34 
NEW INITIATIVES IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Worker Profiling Initiative 
As part of the 1993 Emergency Unemployment Compensation legislation, 
each state is required to implement a "profiling" system within its UI 
program. Profiling is an attempt to identify early during their unemploy-
ment spell those individuals who have characteristics associated with 
dislocated workers or the structurally unemployed. The profiling strategy 
is based upon research indicating that the early identification of dislocated 
workers and the provision of comprehensive job search assistance is 
effective in reducing the length of unemployment spells (Corson et al. 
1989). 
The U.S. Department of Labor's profiling model is based on the 
following characteristics: recall status, union hiring hall agreement, years 
of schooling, job tenure, state employment changes in workers' previous 
industry and occupation, and state total unemployment rate.35 States can 
create a customized profiling model to fit their own circumstances, using 
selected elements to estimate the probability that an unemployed individual 
will face substantial reemployment difficulty. Those claimants with the 
highest estimated probability of difficulty, based on the characteristics 
listed above, are to be referred to reemployment services no later than their 
fifth week of unemployment. Claimants who are identified via profiling 
must participate in reemployment services as a condition of continuing 
eligibility for UI benefits. The reemployment services, which are to be 
provided primarily through ES and EDW AA, include job search assistance, 
career counseling, and training. 
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The profiling system, which was piloted in three states during FY 1994, 
is being implemented in two waves-one in FY 1994 and the other in FY 
1995. The U.S. Department of Labor has allocated $9 million in FY 1994 
and 1995 for development and support of the profiling initiative. It is 
estimated that 1.4 million (16 percent) of the 8.8 million individuals 
receiving VI initial benefit payments will receive profiling services once 
the program is fully operational in FY 1995.36 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented above suggests the following conclusions regarding 
reemployment assistance programs in general: 
III Early intervention is important in facilitating the reemployment of 
displaced workers. 
III Job search assistance and on-the-job training appear to improve the 
employment and earnings of dislocated workers. The Employment 
Service, which primarily provides job referrals and job search 
assistance, is cost-effective, although it has only a small effect on 
reemployment prospects. 
III The impact of classroom training appears to be marginal, at best, 
although the focus of research has been on short-term classroom 
training. There is no research evidence on the effectiveness of 
long-term training on the employment and earnings of dislocated 
workers. 
NOTES 
1. Employers and labor unions also provide training and other services to workers. 
2. In 1993, the average earnings of a full-time, full-year, male worker (over age 25) 
were $50,000 for workers with a 4-year college degree; $36,000 for workers with a 2-
year degree; and $30,400 for workers with a high school degree. The figures for a full-
time, full-year, female worker (over age 25) were $33,200, $26,400, and $21,000, 
respectively. This reflects a wage gap of 61 percent between male college graduates 
and male high school graduates, and a gap of 63 percent between female college 
graduates and female high school graduates. U.S. Department of Commerce (forth-
coming). 
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3. Although this chapter focuses on reemployment programs sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, other federal agencies sponsor employment and education 
programs that offer employment assistance to individuals in need. Many of these 
programs, however, serve only youth, new labor force entrants, or re-entrants without 
recent labor force experience. 
In addition to the federally sponsored programs, there are a number of state-funded 
efforts. These state-sponsored programs frequently offer services to employed workers 
who are at risk of losing their current jobs, whereas federal programs focus more on 
unemployed workers. While a review of these state retraining efforts is beyond the 
scope ofthis chapter, interested readers are referred to Chapter 13 and to Bamow et al. 
(1990) for additional information. 
4. It is possible that VI claimants' low participation rates in employment and training 
programs are partially a result of eligibility standards that render individuals who 
participate in "unapproved" training programs "unavailable for work," and therefore, 
ineligible for benefits. 
5. Richardson et al. (1989). The research was conducted during the late 1980s on 
claimants in the last 4 to 5 weeks of the period in which they were eligible for VI 
benefits. The majority of those surveyed were older males who had not attended 
college. 
6. See Chapter 13 for more information on the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. 
7. Unpublished data from U.S. Department of Labor. 
8. The proportion of ES applicants receiving services has remained relatively stable 
over the past 15 years (Kulik 1994). 
9. Possible reasons for this include the following: (1) they are overqualified for the 
jobs available, (2) their wage expectations are high, and (3) VI benefits discourage their 
job search. 
10. For a review of ES studies, see Kulik (1994) and Jacobson (1994). 
11. Research on work search indicates that many job seekers obtain employment 
through contacts and word-of-mouth and that ES is used as a last resort (Jacobson 
1994). 
12. This amount was capped at 100 percent of the average weekly wage for workers 
in the manufacturing sector. 
13. Prior to 1981, TRAs served as a supplement to UI benefit payments. 
14. Information for 1991 and 1993 is from U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Ways and Means (1994). 
15. TRA participants can receive a waiver from this training requirement, which 
allows them to receive TRA for up to 26 weeks when legitimate reasons prevent them 
from participating in training. Waivers are granted under one of the following 
conditions: (1) a worker cannot reasonably be expected to benefit from training, (2) a 
worker is not qualified to undertake available training, (3) training is not available, or 
(4) there is not a reasonable expectation of employment following training. 
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16. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1994). In 
addition, 594 workers received job search allowances to seek work outside their 
commuting area, and 750 received relocation assistance to obtain ajob in another area. 
17. Corson et al. (1993), and U.S. General Accounting Office (1992a,b). According 
to Corson et al. (1993), training received was often long-term (more than a year), and 
almost three-fourths of it was provided at vocational training centers or local community 
colleges. About three-fourths of trainees enrolled in skills training as opposed to 
general education. The most frequent occupations chosen for retraining were 
manager/professional, technical, administrative support, and mechanical/repair. 
18. To some extent, these results are not surprising, since trainees are more likely to 
have made a significant career change by choosing training in a new occupation or a 
job in a new industry. 
19. These results led the study's authors to suggest that TAA's mandatory training 
requirement should be made voluntary, as it was prior to 1988, and that a job search 
requirement and job search assistance may be better strategies to increase the overall 
employment and earnings prospects of TRA recipients. 
20. Unpublished data from U.S. Department of Labor. 
21. The remaining 19 percent received other services (U. S. Department of Labor 
1992a). Program activity data for EDW AA are no longer collected on a national level. 
22. The states were Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1992a). 
23. Unpublished data from U.S. Department of Labor. 
24. When possible, this section focuses on the program for adults. 
25. The majority of funds are distributed to local community Service Delivery Areas 
(SDAs). SDAs are usually units of local government with populations of 200,000 or 
more; there were 635 SDAs in program year 1989. At the local level, Private Industry 
Councils (PICs) are established to provide oversight and guidance for the job training 
programs in the SDA. PICs typically include representatives from business, educational 
agencies, organized labor, community-based organizations, public employment services, 
economic development agencies, and rehabilitation agencies. 
26. "Economically disadvantaged" is defined as having a family income below 125 
percent of the poverty line over the 6 months prior to program entry. Youths in JTP A 
Title II·A must be between 16 and 21 years of age. Separate provisions are available 
for older workers under this program. At least 65 percent of participants must have one 
barrier to employment, such as a basic skills deficiency, or being a high school dropout, 
a welfare recipient, disabled, an ex-offender, or homeless. 
27. The majority of adult JTPA Title II-A enrollees do not receive UI due to lack of 
work experience or because ofthe circumstances surrounding their separation from their 
last job. Only 14 percent of JTPA Title II-A adult participants who completed the 
program in program year 1992 received UI benefits. Unpublished data from U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
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28. Unlike its predecessor program, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA), Title II-A has no provision for public-sector employment and does not 
emphasize work experience in its training. 
29. Program activity data for JTPA Title II-A are no longer collected on a national 
level. 
30. Before random assignment, individuals were classified into one of three service 
group strategies-classroom training in occupational skills and/or basic education (CT); 
on-the-job training and/or job search assistance (OJT/JSA); or othcr scrvices (OS), 
which included JSA but not CT or OJT. 
Three important caveats of this study should be pointed out. First, the 16 sites 
chosen were not representative of the JTPA Title II-A population as a whole, and 
therefore the results cannot be generalized to the entire Title II-A program. Second, the 
interpretation of the effectiveness of the individual services must be viewed with caution 
since Title II-A applicants were assigned to services, but did not necessarily receive 
them. Among adults in the Title II-A treatment group, 71 percent actually received the 
assigned CT training, 51 percent received OJT/JSA, and 44 percent received OS. Third, 
the study measures the incremental effects of Title II-A, since control group members 
had access to services outside of Title II-A. For the adults in the comparison group, 41 
percent received CT, 22 percent received OJT/JSA, and 27 percent received OS. 
31. Although all treatment group members were given access to Title II-A services, 
only 51 percent enrolled in and received the services. Therefore, the average impact 
per service recipient represents the estimated impact of the effect of receipt of JTP A 
services. 
In contrast, the average impact per assignee represents the effect of access to JTP A 
services. The estimated annual earnings gain for adult women who were assigned to 
receive Title II-A services was $470 (a 10 percent increase), whereas the estimated gain 
for adult men was $391 (a 5 percent increase). 
32. Overall, adult women in the control group had mean earnings of$12,241 and adult 
women in the treatment group who received services had an estimated mean earnings 
of $14,078, creating an increase of 15 percent. Of the women who were assigned to 
the on-the-job trainingljob search assistance service strategy, the control group had 
mean earnings of $15,027 and adult women in the treatment group who received 
services had an estimated mean earnings of$17,3l9. Thus, women who received on-the 
job training/job search assistance earned, on average, 15 percent more than the women 
in the control group. 
Although the gains realized by men were not statistically significant for the entire 
period, they were found to have statistically significant earnings gain of $1,125 in the 
second post-program year. 
33. The most "employable" applicants were often assigned to this service strategy. 
34. Leigh (1990). Demonstration projects were conducted in cities in Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, and Texas. 
35. U.S. Department of Labor memorandum to all State Employment Security 
Agencies (Farmer 1994). 
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36. The VI claimants who will not be receiving profiling services either expect to be 
recalled, are unlikely to exhaust VI benefits (based on model specifications), drop out 
of the system prior to referral to the program, or are misclassified by the program. 

Appendix A / 
Financing: Background 
Figures and Tables 
THIS COLLECTION OF FIGURES AND TABLES contains historic and state-by-
state information related to the financing of the Unemployment Insurance 
system. Included are data on the high cost multiple, the relationship 
between trust fund solvency and benefit recipiency, federal and state tax 
rates and tax collections, the reserve ratio, state taxable wage bases, and 
federal loans to state UI trust funds. 
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FIGURE A-2. States with Adequate Reserves as Measured by High Cost Multiple, 
1955-1993 
60 -,---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Year 
- High cost multiple> 1.5 ~ High cost multiple> 1 
NOTES: Data are for all SO states and the District of Columbia. Data are included for Puerto Rico 
beginning in 1961 and for the Virgin Islands beginning in 1978. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1994c) and U.S. General Accounting Office (19SS). 
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TABLE A-I. Federal Unemployment Tax Act Provisions, 1939-1993 
Gross FUTA Offsetting Potential Net FUTA Inflation-Adjusted 
Year Tax Rate Credit Tax Rate Wage Base per Worker Cost 
Effective (percent) (percent) (percent) (dollars) (1993 dollarsa) 
1939 3.00 2.7 0.30 3,000 94 
1960 3.10 2.7 OAO 3,000 59 
1970 3.20 2.7 0.50 3,000 56 
1972 3.20 2.7 0.50 4,200 72 
1973 3.28b 2.7 0.58 4,200 79 
1974 3.20 2.7 0.50 4,200 62 
1977 3.40c 2.7 0.70 4,200 70 
1978 3.40 2.7 0.70 6,000 93 
1983 3.50 2.7 0.80 7,000 81 
1985 6.20 5.4 0.80 7,000 75 
1993 6.20 5.4 0.80 7,000 56 
a The calculation of the 1993 price index is based on 11 months of data. 
b Reflects an 0.08 percent increase in federal unemployment tax in 1973 only to pay for additional benefit costs . 
• C A temporary surtax was enacted in 1977 for the Extended Benefits program; it was extended in 1987 and again in 1990. It is 
due to expire in January 1995. 
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FIGURE A-4. Reserve Ratio and FUTA Wage Base, 1940-1993 
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TABLE A-2. Reserve Ratios, by State, 1993 
State Reserve Ratio State Reserve Ratio 
Puerto Rico 8.39 North Dakota 1.59 
Virgin Islands 6.60 Tennessee 1.58 
Oregon 4.63 Kentucky 1.57 
Vermont 4.37 Rhode Island 1.56 
Alaska 4.32 Nebraska 1.49 
Wyoming 4.08 West Virginia 1.49 
Washington 4.05 Florida 1.45 
Idaho 3.49 Arizona 1.26 
Iowa 3.20 South Dakota 1.23 
Delaware 3.05 Colorado l.l5 
Kansas 3.03 Pennsylvania l.l2 
Hawaii 3.01 Virginia 1.01 
New Mexico 2.91 Ohio 0.88 
Wisconsin 2.87 Arkansas 0.87 
Utah 2.82 California 0.87 
Mississippi 2.74 Illinois 0.71 
North Carolina 2.60 Maine 0.62 
Louisiana 2.47 Minnesota 0.59 
New Jersey 2.23 Maryland 0.54 
Oklahoma 2.13 Michigan 0.42 
Indiana 2.05 Texas 0.30 
Alabama 1.94 New York 0.07 
Montana 1.91 District of Columbia 0.05 
Georgia 1.79 Connecticut 0.00 
South Carolina 1.77 Massachusetts 0.00 
New Hampshire 1.71 Missouri 0.00 
Nevada 1.68 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994c). 
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TABLE A-3. State Taxable Wage Bases, by State, 1994 
Taxable Taxable 
Wage Base Wage Base 
State (dollars) State (dollars) 
Hawaii 25,000 Ohio 8,750 
Alaska 23,800 Delaware 8,500 
Virgin Islands 22,000 Georgia 8,500 
Idaho 20,400 Louisiana 8,500 
Washington 19,900 Maryland 8,500 
Oregon 19,000 Missouri 8,500 
New Jersey 17,200 Alabama 8,000 
Rhode Island 16,400 Kansas 8,000 
Utah 16,200 Kentucky 8,000 
Nevada 15,900 New Hampshire 8,000 
Minnesota 15,100 Pennsylvania 8,000 
Montana 15,1 00 Vermont 8,000 
Iowa 13,900 Virginia 8,000 
North Carolina 13,200 West Virginia 8,000 
New Mexico 13,100 Arizona 7,000 
North Dakota 13,000 California 7,000 
Wyoming 11,400 Florida 7,000 
Massachusetts 10,800 Indiana 7,000 
Oklahoma 10,700 Maine 7,000 
Wisconsin 10,500 Mississippi 7,000 
Colorado 10,000 Nebraska 7,000 
District of Columbia 9,500 New York 7,000 
Michigan 9,500 Puerto Rico 7,000 
Arkansas 9,000 South Carolina 7,000 
Connecticut 9,000 South Dakota 7,000 
Illinois 9,000 Tennessee 7,000 
Texas 9,000 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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FIGURE A-6. State Unemployment Insurance Tax Collections per Worker, 1940-1993 
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FIGURE A-7. Amount of Federal Loans and Number of States with Outstanding Loans, 
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Appendix B / 
Benefits: Background 
Figures and Tables 
THIS COLLECTION OF FIGURES AND TABLES contains historic and state-by-
state information related to Unemployment Insurance benefits and benefit 
claimants. Included are data on demographic characteristics of claimants, 
benefit recipiency rates, the ratio of VI claimants to job losers, duration of 
benefit payments and unemployment spells, the percentage of claimants 
who exhaust benefits, total ur benefits paid by program type, weekly 
benefit amounts, and selected eligibility requirements. 
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TABLE B-l. Demographic Characteristics, 1993 (percent) 
Civilian Total 
Characteristic Labor Force Unemployed UI Claimants 
Age 
16 to 34 43 58 42 
35 to 54 45 34 46 
55 and over 12 8 12 
Gender 
Men 54 56 60 
Women 46 44 40 
Race 
White 85 75 N.A. 
Black 11 21 N.A. 
Other 4 4 N.A. 
NOTE: "N.A." indicates data are not available. 
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994a) 
and unpublished Unemployment Insurance data. 
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TABLE B-2. Ratio of Unemployment Insurance Claimants to Total Unemployed, 
by State, 1993 
State IUffU State IUffU 
Alaska 63.6 Florida 30.1 
Hawaii 53.1 North Dakota 30.0 
Vermont 53.1 Michigan 29.8 
District of Columbia 45.3 Missouri 29.4 
Connecticut 45.0 Colorado 28.5 
Washington 44.4 Wyoming 28.5 
Oregon 43.3 Arizona 28.3 
Idaho 40.5 Mississippi 27.7 
Pennsylvania 39.9 Kentucky 27.5 
Wisconsin 39.8 Maryland 27.5 
Rhode Island 39.7 North Carolina 27.2 
Montana 38.9 Utah 27.0 
New Jersey 38.7 Maine 26.2 
Arkansas 37.6 South Carolina 25.4 
Massachusetts 36.5 Ohio 24.9 
Iowa 36.4 West Virginia 23.5 
Nebraska 35.8 Alabama 22.5 
California 34.6 Louisiana 21.8 
New York 34.5 Texas 21.4 
Tennessee 33.7 Georgia 21.3 
Puerto Rico 33.0 Oklahoma 21.1 
Delaware 32.1 New Mexico 20.7 
Nevada 32.0 Indiana 20.6 
Illinois 31.8 New Hampshire 20.3 
Kansas 31.8 Virginia 17.0 
Minnesota 31.6 South Dakota 15.3 
NOTE: Data for the Virgin Islands are not available. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994b). 
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FIGURE B-5. Percentage of UI Claimants Exhausting Benefits, 1940-1993 
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TABLE B-3. Weekly Benefit Amount, by State, 1993 
Weekly Benefit Weekly Benefit 
Amount Amount 
State (dollars) State (dollars) 
Hawaii 252 West Virginia 167 
Connecticut 234 Oklahoma 164 
Massachusetts 234 Wyoming 164 
New Jersey 224 Maine 163 
District of Columbia 223 Vermont 163 
Michigan 215 Idaho 162 
Rhode Island 211 Arkansas 158 
Minnesota 210 California 156 
Pennsylvania 210 Kentucky 156 
New York 200 Montana 151 
Illinois 195 Georgia 150 
Washington 192 North Dakota 150 
Kansas 189 Arizona 149 
Colorado 186 Missouri 149 
Texas 184 South Carolina 147 
Delaware 183 New Mexico 144 
Ohio 183 Indiana 142 
Wisconsin 183 Iowa 142 
Utah 181 New Hampshire 142 
Maryland 180 Nebraska 138 
Oregon 180 South Dakota 131 
Virgin Islands 177 Tennessee 131 
Nevada 175 Alabama 129 
Alaska 171 Mississippi 127 
Virginia 169 Louisiana 119 
North Carolina 168 Puerto Rico 89 
Florida 167 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994c). 
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TABLE B-4. Minimum Qualifying Requirements for Minimum Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits and Minimum Duration, by State, 1994 
Minimum Benefits 
Required Minimum Weekly 
Earnings in Work Benefit 
State Base Period Required" Amountb Weeksc 
Alabama $1,032 X $22 15+ 
Alaska 1,000 X 44 to 68 16 
Arizona 1,500 X 40 12+ 
Arkansas 1,215 X 45d 9 
California 1,125 40 14+ 
Colorado 1,000 25 13+ 
Connecticut 600 X 15 to 22 26 
Delaware 0 20 24 
District of Columbia 1,950 X 50 20 
Florida 400 X 10 10 
Georgia 1,350 X 37 9+ 
Hawaii 130 X 5 26 
Idaho 1,430 X 44 10 
Illinois 1,600 X 51 26 
Indiana 2,500 X 50 14 
Iowa 1,090 X 31 to 38 11+ 
Kansas 1,860 X 62d 10 
Kentucky 1,500 X 22 15 
Louisiana 1,200 X 10 8 
Maine 2,286 X 35 21+ to 22 
Maryland 900 X 25 to 33 26 
Massachusetts 2,400 14 to 21 10+ to 30 
Michigan 1,340 X 42 15 
Minnesota 1,250 X 38 10+ 
Mississippi 1,200 X 30 13+ 
Missouri 1,500 X 45 11+ 
Montana 1,318 X 54 8 
Nebraska 1,200 X 20 20 
Nevada 600 X 16 12+ 
New Hampshire 2,800 X 32 26 
New Jersey 2,460 X 69 15 
New Mexico 1,285 X 39d 19+ 
New York 1,600/1 ,200e X 40 26 
North Carolina 2,324 X 22 13 to 26 
North Dakota 2,795 X 43 12 
Ohio 1,702 X 42 20 
Oklahoma 4,160 X 16 20+ 
(continued) 
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TABLE B-4. (continued) 
Minimum Benefits 
Required Minimum Weekly 
Earnings in Work Benefit 
State Base Period Required" Amountb Weeksc 
Oregon $1,000 X $66d 5+ 
Pennsylvania 1,320 X 35 to 40 16 
Puerto Rico 280 X 7 26 
Rhode Island 1,780 X 41 to 51 15+ 
South Carolina 900 X 20 15 
South Dakota 1,288 X 28 18+ 
Tennessee 1,480 X 30 12+ 
Texas 1,517 X 41 9+ 
Utah 1,800 X 17 10 
Vermont 1,628 36 26 
Virginia 3,250 X 65 12 
Virgin Islands 1,287 X 32 13+ 
Washington 0 73d 16+ to 30 
West Virginia 2,200 X 24 26 
Wisconsin 1,350 X 46 12 
Wyoming 1,650 X 40 12 to 26 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994a, 3-27 to 3-29, 3-45 to 3-47). 
a An "X" indicates that a state directly or indirectly requires work in at least 2 quarters of the base 
year. States with a dash (-) have the minimum work requirement specified as an earnings 
amount. 
b When two amounts are given, the lower amount is for a single individual and the higher amount 
includes dependents' allowances for 1 dependent child and/or nonworking spouse. 
c A range of weeks is presented when the calculation for minimum weeks varies with qualifying 
earnings. 
d Minimum benefit amount is computed annually as a percentage of average weekly wage. 
e The higher amount resulting from two formulas is used to determine an individual's required base 
period earnings. 
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TABLE B-5. Qualifying Requirements for Maximum Potential Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits and Maximum Duration, by State, 1994 
Maximum Benefits 
Required Earnings Weekly 
States in Base Period Benefit Amount Weeks 
Alabama $12,870 $165 26 
Alaska 22,250 212-284 26" 
Arizona 14,429 185 26 
Arkansas 19,812 254b 26 
California 11,960 230 26" 
Colorado 27,144 261 b 26 
Connecticut 12,680 317-367b 26" 
Delaware 12,190 265c 26 
District of Columbia 17,420 335b 26 
Florida 26,000 250 26 
Georgia 19,238 185 26 
Hawaii 8,762 337b 26" 
Idaho 19,857 235b 26 
Illinois 12,285 235-311 b 26 
Indiana 15,786 170-192 26 
Iowa 16,458 211-259b 26 
Kansas 19,500 250b 26 
Kentucky 19,283 229b 26 
Louisiana 17,428 181b 26 
Maine 15,444 198-297b 26 
Maryland 8,028 223 26 
Massachusetts 27,083 325-487b 30" 
Michigan 19,810 293b 26" 
Minnesota 23,790 305b 26" 
Mississippi 12,870 165 26 
Missouri 13,650 175 26 
Montana 21,700 217b 26 
Nebraska 12,009 154 26 
Nevada 17,940 230b 26 
New Hampshire 24,500 197 26 
New Jersey 20,242 347b 26 
New Mexico 8,537 197b 26 
New York 11,980 300 26" 
North Carolina 21,996 282b 26 
North Dakota 19,302 232b 26 
Ohio 12,376 238-319 26 
Oklahoma 15,405 237 26 
(continued) 
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TABLE B-5. (continued) 
Maximum Benefits 
Required Earnings Weekly 
States in Base Period Benefit Amount Weeks 
Oregon $22,720 $285b 26 
Pennsylvania 13,080 329-337b 26 
Puerto Rico 5,320 133b 26 
Rhode Island 22,389 310-387b 26 
South Carolina 15,834 203b 26 
South Dakota 13,104 168b 26 
Tennessee 19,240 185 26 
Texas 23,589 245 26 
Utah 23,882 248b 26 
Vermont 9,405 209 26 
Virginia 20,800 208 26 
Virgin Islands 16,458 211b 26 
Washington 30,600 340b 30 
West Virginia 26,500 280b 26 
Wisconsin 15,795 243 26 
Wyoming 18,333 220b 26 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1994a, 3-35 to 3-37, 3-45 to 3-47). 
a Benefits are extended when the unemployment rate in the state reaches a specified level. 
b Maximum benefit amount is indexed with the state average weekly wage. 
C Maximum benefit amount varies with trust fund balance. 
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Benefits: State-by-State 
Comparison Tables 
THIS COLLECTION OF TABLES reports detailed infonnation on state-by-state 
benefit levels, durations, and replacement rates for hypothetical individuals with 
different employment characteristics. These individuals vary across hourly 
wage level, hours of work per week, and weeks of work per year. The tables 
report data for all states except Michigan for individuals with any combination 
of the following characteristics: 
Hourly wage rate: 
Hours of work per week: 
Weeks of work per year: 
$4.25 or $10.00 
20 or 40 
26 or 52 
Chapter lOin this report discusses variations in benefit level and duration 
for workers who vary across these dimensions and also for workers with 
dependents. In addition, Chapter 10 contains figures that display average 
benefit amounts, durations, and replacement rates for various individuals across 
all states in which they are eligible for benefits. 
SOURCE AND METHODS 
The source for all tables in Appendix C is a series of calculations perfonned 
by the staff of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. These 
calculations were based on eligibility, benefit level, and benefit duration criteria 
across states, as reported in U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
Calculations were made systematically for hypothetical individuals with 
different characteristics. All benefit levels refer to pre-tax benefits, and all 
replacement rates relate pre-tax benefits to pre-tax earnings. For a small 
number of states, the benefit amounts reported are approximate, based on 
estimated equations that were derived from state benefit tables. 
Only state laws were considered in making the calculations reported in 
these tables. Hence, case law and nonlegislative regulations were not taken 
into account; it is possible that such factors could have affected some state 
eligibility or benefit calculations. 
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TABLE C-l. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, 
Full-year and Earning $4.25 per Hour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 165 18 2,970 97 67 
Alaska 107 26 2,782 63 63 
Arizona 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Arkansas 85 26 2,210 50 50 
California 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Colorado 102 26 2,652 60 60 
Connecticut 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Delaware 96 26 2,496 56 56 
District of Columbia 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Florida 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Georgia 88 25 2,200 52 50 
Hawaii 106 26 2,756 62 62 
Idaho 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Illinois 84 26 2,184 49 49 
Indiana 98 25 2,450 58 55 
Iowa 96 26 2,496 56 56 
Kansas 93 26 2,418 55 55 
Kentucky 105 26 2,730 62 62 
Louisiana 78 26 2,028 46 46 
Maine 94 26 2,444 55 55 
Maryland 93 26 2,418 55 55 
Massachusetts 85 30 2,550 50 58 
Minnesota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Mississippi 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Missouri 99 26 2,574 58 58 
Montana 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Nebraska 92 26 2,392 54 54 
Nevada 88 26 2,288 52 52 
New Hampshire 100 26 2,600 59 59 
New Jersey 102 26 2,652 60 60 
New Mexico 85 26 2,210 50 50 
New York 85 26 2,210 50 50 
North Carolina 85 26 2,210 50 50 
North Dakota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Ohio 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Oklahoma 88 26 2,288 52 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-l. (continued) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 110 26 2,860 65 65 
Pennsylvania 94 26 2,444 55 55 
Puerto Rico 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Rhode Island 102 26 2,652 60 60 
South Carolina 85 26 2,210 50 50 
South Dakota 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Tennessee 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Texas 89 26 2,314 52 52 
Utah 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Vermont 98 26 2,548 58 58 
Virginia 89 25 2,225 52 50 
Virgin Islands 85 26 2,210 50 50 
Washington 176 17 2,992 104 68 
West Virginia 92 26 2,392 54 54 
Wisconsin 88 26 2,288 52 52 
Wyoming 88 26 2,288 52 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1 994a). 
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TABLE C-2. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, 
Full-year and Earning $10.00 per Hour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 165 26 4,290 41 41 
Alaska 202 26 5,252 51 51 
Arizona 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Arkansas 200 26 5,200 50 50 
California 158 26 4,108 40 40 
Colorado 240 26 6,240 60 60 
Connecticut 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Delaware 226 26 5,876 57 57 
District of Columbia 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Florida 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Georgia 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Hawaii 248 26 6,448 62 62 
Idaho 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Illinois 198 26 5,148 50 50 
Indiana 170 26 4,420 43 43 
Iowa 212 26 5,486 53 53 
Kansas 221 26 5,746 55 55 
Kentucky 229 26 5,954 57 57 
Louisiana 181 26 4,706 45 45 
Maine 192 26 4,992 48 48 
Maryland 217 26 5,642 54 54 
Massachusetts 200 30 6,000 50 58 
Minnesota 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Mississippi 165 26 4,290 41 41 
Missouri 175 26 4,550 44 44 
Montana 208 26 5,408 52 52 
Nebraska 154 26 4,004 39 39 
Nevada 208 26 5,408 52 52 
New Hampshire 179 26 4,654 45 45 
New Jersey 240 26 6,240 60 60 
New Mexico 197 26 5,122 49 49 
New York 200 26 5,200 50 50 
North Carolina 200 26 5,200 50 50 
North Dakota 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Ohio 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Oklahoma 208 20 4,160 52 40 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-2. (continued) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit RepJ. Rate RepJ. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 260 26 6,760 65 65 
Pennsylvania 213 26 5,538 53 53 
Puerto Rico 133 26 3,458 33 33 
Rhode Island 240 26 6,240 60 60 
South Carolina 200 26 5,200 50 50 
South Dakota 168 26 4,368 42 42 
Tennessee 185 26 4,810 46 46 
Texas 209 26 5,434 52 52 
Utah 200 26 5,200 50 50 
VelTI10nt 209 26 5,434 52 52 
Virginia 208 25 5,200 52 50 
Virgin Islands 200 26 5,200 50 50 
Washington 340 20 6,800 85 65 
West Virginia 218 26 5,668 55 55 
Wisconsin 208 26 5,408 52 52 
Wyoming 208 25 5,200 52 50 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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TABLE C-3. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Half-time, 
Full-year and Earning $4.25 per Hour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 93 16 1,488 109 67 
Alaska 71 26 1,846 84 84 
Arizona 44 26 1,144 52 52 
Arkansas 45 26 1,170 53 53 
California 48 26 1,248 56 56 
Colorado 51 26 1,326 60 60 
Connecticut 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Delaware 48 26 1,248 56 56 
District of Columbia 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Georgia 44 25 1,100 52 50 
Hawaii 53 26 1,378 62 62 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 51 26 1,600 60 60 
Indiana 54 23 1,242 64 56 
Iowa 48 26 1,248 56 56 
Kansas 62 24 1,488 73 67 
Kentucky 52 26 1,352 61 61 
Louisiana 39 26 1,014 46 46 
Maine 44 26 1,144 52 52 
Maryland 47 26 1,222 55 55 
Massachusetts 42 30 1,260 49 57 
Minnesota 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Mississippi 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Missouri 49 26 1,274 58 58 
Montana 54 26 1,404 64 64 
Nebraska 48 26 1,248 56 56 
Nevada 44 26 1,144 52 52 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 
New Mexico 42 26 1,092 49 49 
New York 43 26 1,118 51 51 
North Carolina 42 26 1,092 49 49 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 44 26 1,144 52 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-3. (continued) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 66 22 1,452 78 66 
Pennsylvania 47 26 1,222 55 55 
Puerto Rico 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Rhode Island 51 26 1,326 60 60 
South Carolina 42 26 1,092 49 49 
South Dakota 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Tennessee 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Texas 45 26 1,170 53 53 
Utah 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Islands 42 26 1,092 49 49 
Washington 88 17 2,190 104 68 
West Virginia 46 26 1,196 54 54 
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 44 26 1,144 52 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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TABLE C-4. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Half-time, 
Full-year and Earning $10.00 per Hour, 1994 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Alabama 165 21 3,465 83 67 
Alaska 119 26 3,094 60 60 
Arizona 104 26 2,704 52 52 
Arkansas 100 26 2,600 50 50 
California 96 26 2,496 48 48 
Colorado 120 26 3,120 60 60 
Connecticut 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Delaware 113 26 2,938 57 57 
District of Columbia 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Florida 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Georgia 104 25 2,600 52 50 
Hawaii 124 26 3,224 62 62 
Idaho 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Illinois 99 26 2,574 50 50 
Indiana 114 26 2,964 57 57 
Iowa 113 26 2,938 57 57 
Kansas 110 26 2,860 55 55 
Kentucky 123 26 3,198 62 62 
Louisiana 92 26 2,392 46 46 
Maine 112 26 2,912 56 56 
Maryland 109 26 2,834 55 55 
Massachusetts 100 30 3,000 50 58 
Minnesota 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Mississippi 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Missouri 117 26 3,042 59 59 
Montana 104 26 2,704 52 52 
Nebraska 108 26 2,808 54 54 
Nevada 104 26 2,704 52 52 
New Hampshire 114 26 2,964 57 57 
New Jersey 120 26 3,120 60 60 
New Mexico 100 26 2,600 50 50 
New York 100 26 2,600 50 50 
North Carolina 100 26 2,600 50 50 
North Dakota 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Ohio 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Oklahoma 104 26 2,704 52 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-4. (continued) 
Total Duration-
Weekly Potential Weekly adjusted 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) (percent) 
Oregon 130 26 3,380 65 65 
Pennsylvania 110 26 2,860 55 55 
Puerto Rico 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Rhode Island 120 26 3,120 60 60 
South Carolina 100 26 2,600 50 50 
South Dakota 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Tennessee 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Texas 105 26 2,730 53 53 
Utah 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Vermont 116 26 3,016 58 58 
Virginia 105 25 2,625 53 50 
Virgin Islands 100 26 2,600 50 50 
Washington 208 17 3,536 104 68 
West Virginia 109 26 2,834 55 55 
Wisconsin 104 26 2,704 52 52 
Wyoming 104 26 2,704 52 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor (1994a). 
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TABLE C-5. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, 
Half-year and Earning $4.25 per Hour, 1994 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Alabama 165 15 2,475 97 
Alaska 71 20 1,420 42 
Arizona 88 17 1,496 52 
Arkansas 85 17 1,445 50 
California 85 26 2,210 50 
Colorado 102 14 1,428 60 
Connecticut 85 26 2,210 50 
Delaware 96 24 2,304 56 
District of Columbia 85 26 2,210 50 
Florida 85 13 1,105 50 
Georgia 88 13 1,144 52 
Hawaii 106 26 2,756 62 
Idaho 85 16 1,360 50 
Illinois 84 26 2,184 49 
Indiana 98 14 1,372 58 
Iowa 96 15 1,440 56 
Kansas 93 16 1,488 55 
Kentucky 52 26 1,352 31 
Louisiana 39 26 1,014 23 
Maine 94 21 1,974 55 
Maryland 93 26 2,418 55 
Massachusetts 85 19 1,615 50 
Minnesota 85 17 1,445 50 
Mississippi 85 17 1,445 50 
Missouri 99 15 1,485 58 
Montana 83 16 1,328 49 
Nebraska 92 20 1,840 54 
Nevada 88 17 1,496 52 
New Hampshire 51 26 1,326 30 
New Jersey 102 20 2,040 60 
New Mexico 85 26 2,210 50 
New York 85 26 2,210 50 
North Carolina 85 16 1,360 50 
North Dakota 68 14 952 40 
Ohio 85 26 2,210 50 
Oklahoma 88 20 1,760 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-5. (continued) 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Oregon 66 22 1,452 39 
Pennsylvania 94 26 2,444 55 
Puerto Rico 85 26 2,210 50 
Rhode Island 102 16 1,632 60 
South Carolina 85 17 1,445 50 
South Dakota 85 18 1,530 50 
Tennessee 85 13 1,105 50 
Texas 89 13 1,157 52 
Utah 85 14 1,190 50 
Vennont 98 26 2,548 58 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Islands 85 17 1,445 50 
Washington 176 16 2,816 104 
West Virginia 46 26 1,196 27 
Wisconsin 88 20 1,760 52 
Wyoming 88 15 1,320 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor 
(1994a). 
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TABLE C-6. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Full-time, 
Half-year and Earning $10.00 per Hour, 1994 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Alabama 165 21 3,465 41 
Alaska 119 20 2,380 30 
Arizona 185 19 3,515 46 
Arkansas 200 17 3,400 50 
California 158 26 4,108 40 
Colorado 240 14 3,360 60 
Connecticut 200 26 5,200 50 
Delaware 226 24 5,424 57 
District of Columbia 200 26 5,200 50 
Florida 200 13 2,600 50 
Georgia 185 14 2,590 46 
Hawaii 248 26 6,448 62 
Idaho 200 16 3,200 50 
Illinois 198 26 5,148 50 
Indiana 170 17 2,890 43 
Iowa 212 16 3,392 53 
Kansas 221 16 3,536 55 
Kentucky 123 26 3,198 31 
Louisiana 92 26 2,392 23 
Maine 192 21 4,032 48 
Maryland 217 26 5,642 54 
Massachusetts 200 19 3,800 50 
Minnesota 200 17 3,400 50 
Mississippi 165 21 3,465 41 
Missouri 175 20 3,500 44 
Montana 197 16 3,152 49 
Nebraska 154 23 3,542 39 
Nevada 208 17 3,536 52 
New Hampshire 114 26 2,964 29 
New Jersey 240 20 4,800 60 
New Mexico 197 26 5,122 49 
New York 200 26 5,200 50 
North Carolina 200 16 3,200 50 
North Dakota 160 14 2,240 40 
Ohio 200 26 5,200 50 
Oklahoma 208 20 4,160 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-6. (continued) 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Oregon 130 26 3,380 33 
Pennsylvania 213 26 5,538 53 
Puerto Rico 133 26 3,458 33 
Rhode Island 240 16 3,840 60 
South Carolina 200 17 3,400 50 
South Dakota 168 21 3,528 42 
Tennessee 185 14 2,590 46 
Texas 209 13 2,717 52 
Utah 200 14 2,800 50 
Vermont 209 26 5,434 52 
Virginia 208 13 2,704 52 
Virgin Islands 200 17 3,400 50 
Washington 340 16 5,440 85 
West Virginia 109 26 2,834 27 
Wisconsin 208 20 4,160 52 
Wyoming 208 15 3,120 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor 
(1994a). 
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TABLE C-7. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Half-time, 
Half-year and Earning $4.25 per Hour, 1994 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep\. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Alabama 93 15 1,395 109 
Alaska 54 20 1,080 64 
Arizona 44 17 748 52 
Arkansas 45 16 720 53 
California 48 23 1,104 56 
Colorado 51 14 714 60 
Connecticut 42 26 1,092 49 
Delaware 48 24 1,152 56 
District of Columbia 0 0 0 0 
Florida 42 13 546 49 
Georgia 44 13 572 52 
Hawaii 53 26 1,378 62 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 51 26 1,600 60 
Indiana 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 48 15 720 56 
Kansas 62 12 744 73 
Kentucky 26 26 676 31 
Louisiana 19 26 494 22 
Maine 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 47 26 1,222 55 
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota 42 18 756 49 
Mississippi 42 18 756 49 
Missouri 49 15 735 58 
Montana 54 16 864 64 
Nebraska 48 20 960 56 
Nevada 44 17 748 52 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 
New Mexico 42 26 1,092 49 
New York 43 26 1,1l8 51 
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-7. (continued) 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Oregon 66 11 726 78 
Pennsylvania 47 26 1,222 55 
Puerto Rico 42 26 1,092 49 
Rhode Island 51 16 816 60 
South Carolina 42 18 756 49 
South Dakota 42 18 756 49 
Tennessee 42 13 546 49 
Texas 45 13 585 53 
Utah 42 14 588 49 
Vennont 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Islands 42 18 756 49 
Washington 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 24 26 624 28 
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 44 15 660 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor 
(1994a). 
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TABLE C-8. Benefit Simulation for Single Individual Working Half-time, 
Half-year and Earning $10.00 per Hour, 1994 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Alabama 165 15 2,475 83 
Alaska 78 20 1,560 39 
Arizona 104 17 1,768 52 
Arkansas 100 17 1,700 50 
California 96 26 2,496 48 
Colorado 120 14 1,680 60 
Connecticut 100 26 2,600 50 
Delaware 113 24 2,712 57 
District of Columbia 100 26 2,600 50 
Florida 100 13 1,300 50 
Georgia 104 13 1,352 52 
Hawaii 124 26 3,224 62 
Idaho 100 16 1,600 50 
Illinois 99 26 2,574 50 
Indiana 114 14 1,596 57 
Iowa 113 15 1,695 57 
Kansas 110 16 1,760 55 
Kentucky 62 26 1,612 31 
Louisiana 46 26 1,196 23 
Maine 112 21 2,352 56 
Maryland 109 26 2,834 55 
Massachusetts 100 19 1,900 50 
Minnesota 100 17 1,700 50 
Mississippi 100 17 1,700 50 
Missouri 117 15 1,755 59 
Montana 98 16 1,568 49 
Nebraska 108 20 2,160 54 
Nevada 104 17 1,768 52 
New Hampshire 60 26 1,560 30 
New Jersey 120 20 2,400 60 
New Mexico 100 26 2,600 50 
New York 100 26 2,600 50 
North Carolina 100 16 1,600 50 
North Dakota 80 14 1,120 40 
Ohio 100 26 2,600 50 
Oklahoma 104 20 2,080 52 
(continued) 
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TABLE C-8. (continued) 
Total 
Weekly Potential Weekly 
Benefit Duration Benefit Rep!. Rate 
State (dollars) (weeks) (dollars) (percent) 
Oregon 66 26 1,716 33 
Pennsylvania 110 26 2,860 55 
Puerto Rico 100 26 2,600 50 
Rhode Island 120 16 1,920 60 
South Carolina 100 17 1,700 50 
South Dakota 100 18 1,800 50 
Tennessee 100 13 1,300 50 
Texas 105 13 1,365 53 
Utah 100 14 1,400 50 
Vermont 116 26 3,016 58 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 
Virgin Islands 100 17 1,700 50 
Washington 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 54 26 1,404 27 
Wisconsin 104 20 2,080 52 
Wyoming 104 15 1,560 52 
NOTE: Data are not available for the state of Michigan. 
SOURCE: ACUC staff calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor 
(J994a). 

Appendix D / 
Eligibility: Costs of 
Alternative Requirements 
Data were not available at time of publication. 
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Appendix E / 
1994 Findings and 
Recommendations 
Note: The material contained in this appendix is reprinted from Chapter 2 
of the first annual report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Com-
pensation, published in February 1994. 
PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed since the 
inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length of time that 
individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply during recessions, has 
also increased slowly but steadily during non-recessionarytimes. Workers 
who have been laid off from their jobs are now less likely to return to their 
previous jobs than has historically been the case. This indicates an increase 
in the level of long-term unemployment in the economy. 
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as a 
means of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term unemployment. 
The system was never intended to combat long-term unemployment. The 
purpose of the Unemployment Insurance system, and in particular the 
Extended Benefits program, must be expanded if the system is to deal 
effectively with the changing nature of unemployment. In doing so, 
however, careful consideration must be given to the funding of the system, 
in order to ensure that expenditures for combatting long-term unemploy-
ment do not drain the Unemployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It 
must also be recognized that while Unemployment Insurance reform is a 
necessary component of developing effective strategies for dealing with 
long-term unemployment, other reforms-especially among programs for 
dislocated workers-will be needed. 
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Recommendation 
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded to 
enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system to 
provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well as short-
term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are long-term 
unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment Insurance 
benefits, provided they are participating in job search activities or in 
education and training activities, where available and suitable, that 
enhance their re-employment prospects. To maintain the integrity of 
the Unemployment Insurance income support system, a separate 
funding source should be used to finance job search and education 
and training activities for long-term unemployed workers.' 
THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits by the 
unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 1947-the first 
year for which data on the system are available. In addition to the long-
term downward trend in receipt of benefits, there was a pronounced decline 
in the early 1980s, just as the economy entered a recession. 
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance system 
are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused by the 
changing demographics of the labor force, the changing industrial and 
geographic composition of employment, and a decline in the solvency of 
states' Unemployment Insurance trust funds. The sharp decline in receipt 
of benefits in the early 1980s appears to be attributable primarily to 
changes in federal policies which encouraged the states to increase the 
solvency of their trust funds by restricting eligibility for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits and/or increasing employers' tax rates, as well as 
independent state efforts to improve their trust fund solvency. 
• One member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' payroll 
taxes should not be used as the funding source. Another member emphasizes 
that such a recommendation must be considered in the context of reform of 
dislocated workers programs. 
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The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured by 
the Insured Unemployment Rate (lUR). The IUR is the number of 
Unemployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of individuals 
in UI-covered employment. Since the inception of the Extended Benefits 
program in 1970, states have been required to use the state IUR as a 
"trigger" that determines whether or not individuals who have exhausted 
their regular UI benefits are eligible for Extended Benefits. 
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less reliable 
indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that Extended 
Benefits will trigger on in states with high unemployment. In addition, just 
as the IUR was experiencing a marked decline during the recession of the 
1980s, the "trigger" level required to become eligible for Extended Benefits 
was raised. 
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in the 
trigger level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits program to 
trigger on as unemployment continued to rise during this most recent 
recession. As a result, Congress found it necessary to pass a series of 
emergency extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits. The Council 
finds that emergency extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits are 
extremely inefficient since they are neither well-timed nor well-targeted. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reform the Extended Benefits program prior 
to the onset of the next recession, in order to minimize the need for future 
emergency legislation. 
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be used 
to trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect measures exist, 
the best available evidence about the condition of the overall labor market 
within a state is the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), which indicates the 
supply of individuals who are unable to find work. It should be noted, 
however, that beginning in 1994, the TUR rates will be affected by the 
redesign of the Current Population Survey. An alternative measure of the 
labor market conditions that are faced by Unemployment Insurance 
recipients is the Adjusted Insured Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is 
the IUR adjusted to include those individuals who have exhausted their 
regular Unemployment Insurance benefits. 
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are available on 
some measures of local labor market conditions, these data are extremely 
unreliable measures of the true conditions that the unemployed face. 
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Furthermore, there would be substantial administrative difficulties in using 
either substate or regional data for triggering Extended Benefits. 
The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers that 
have been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are 
available within a state, the thresholds built into the triggers have been 
problematic. These thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate 
(whether measured by the IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that prevailed 
over the previous two-year period (by a factor of 120 percent for the IUR 
or 110 percent for the TUR). 
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number of 
states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. However, 
the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which Extended 
Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest unemployment, as well 
as hastening the point at which such states trigger off the Extended 
Benefits program. As a result, the thresholds have caused dissatisfaction 
among some with the operation of the program since those states suffering 
the most economic hardship are triggered on for the shortest period of time. 
This problem could be addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting 
the triggers at a slightly higher level. 
Recommendation 
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing need to 
reform the Extended Benefits program. 
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended 
Benefits program should trigger on when a state' s seasonally adjusted 
total unemployment rate (STUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured 
before the Current Population Survey redesign.' Two members of the 
Council recommend that each state should have the choice of using 
either the STUR trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold requirement 
of 110 percent above either of the two previous years, or an IUR or 
AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold requirement of 120 
percent over the previous two year period . 
• Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should be set at 6.5 
percent regardless of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that 
result from the redesign of the Current Population Survey. 
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The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms 
promptly. Although the Council has reservations about the inefficient 
targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend the existing 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six month period to 
provide a bridge program until these Extended Benefits reforms can 
be implemented.' 
Recommendation 
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the purpose of 
determining whether or not Extended Benefits are available within a 
given area. 
FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance system 
as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing nature of unemployment are 
compromised by incorporating its trust funds into the unified federal 
budget. While the flow of funds into the Extended Unemployment Comp-
ensation account may be adequate to finance the recommended Extended 
Benefits reform, such reform is complicated by the use of dedicated 
Unemployment Insurance trust funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. 
Several members of the Council believe that prompt action should be taken 
to correct this situation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust 
fund accounts should be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and 
requires careful consideration within a broader context. The Council 
intends to revisit this issue in its future deliberations. 
Recommendation 
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's recom-
mendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest increase 
in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500," 
• Two members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation should be extended . 
•• Two members object to this recommendation. 
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WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended Benefits 
program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, those 
individuals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a minimum 
wage job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. While the 
Council understands that recipients of both regular and extended Unem-
ployment Insurance benefits have an obligation to search actively for work 
and accept appropriate job offers, the Council finds the current federal 
requirements to be excessively onerous. All states use a "suitability" test 
to determine the jobs which claimants are required to accept to remain 
eligible for benefits. This test gives states the flexibility to ensure adequate 
work search by claimants, while protecting unemployed workers' living 
standards and job skills by permitting them to decline substandard jobs. 
The States are in a better position to determine appropriate mechanisms for 
enforcing a work search test, given the particular conditions of their labor 
markets. 
Recommendation 
The federal requirement that individuals who are receiving Extended 
Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is offered, or become 
ineligible for benefits should be eliminated. Each state should be 
allowed to determine an appropriate work search test, based on the 
conditions of its labor market. 
STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 
Findings 
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment Insurance 
benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least partially caused 
by the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. During the past 
decade, many states with low or negative trust fund reserves have found 
themselves in the position of either having to increase taxes on employers 
in the midst of an economic downturn, or having to take measures to 
restrict eligibility and benefits for the unemployed. Some believe that this 
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reliance on pay-as-you-go funding has worked to the overall detriment of 
the Unemployment Insurance system. 
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation to 
begin to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment Insurance 
system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good economic times 
and a drawing down of reserves during recessions. The Council finds, 
however, that any move toward creating federal guidelines for states' 
Unemployment Insurance trust fund accounts must be carefully weighed. 
Otherwise, there will be a risk of creating undue incentives for the states 
to restrict the eligibility and level of Unemployment Insurance benefits in 
order to achieve the solvency guidelines. The Council intends to make 
specific recommendations on this issue in future reports. 
FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
Findings 
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of alien 
agricultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. 
Currently, the wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas are 
exempt from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This exemption 
is set to expire on January 1, 1995. 
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against 
continuing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien agricultural 
workers are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on whom FUT A 
taxes must be paid. This cost differential may create an incentive for 
substitution of foreign workers for u.s. workers, which argues in favor of 
repeal of the exemption. Furthermore, the process of certifying workers 
and issuing H2-A visas imposes costs on the federal and state governments 
that have the responsibility for overseeing this process. The vast majority 
(97 percent) of the cost of the certification process is funded through the 
FUT A tax. Since FUT A serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of 
the certification process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the 
exemption of H2-A workers from FUTA taxation. 
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive Unemploy-
ment Insurance benefits since their visas require that they return to their 
country of origin within ten days after their employment terminates. 
Consequently, these individuals cannot meet the "available for work" test 
of the Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA taxes would be 
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imposed upon the wages of individuals who cannot receive Unemployment 
Insurance benefits, which argues against imposing the FUT A tax on their 
wages. 
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA 
taxation of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against 
continuing that exemption. 
Recommendation 
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers (H2-A 
workers) should be subject to FUT A taxes. 
Appendix F / 
Charter 
The Council's Official Designation 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (hereinafter called 
"Council"). 
The Council's Objectives and the Scope of its Activity 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment 
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State 
administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the 
program and to make recommendations for improvement. 
Period of Time Necessary for the Council to Carry Out its Purposes 
Four years. 
The Agency and/or Official to Whom the Council Reports 
The President and the Congress. 
The Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support to the 
Council 
The Unemployment Insurance Service of the Employment and Training 
Administration of the Department of Labor. 
Membership 
The Council shall consist of 11 members as follows: 
(A) Five members appointed by the President, to include representatives of 
business, labor, State government, and the public. 
269 
270 / ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
(B) Three members appointed by the President pro tempore ofthe Senate, 
in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member of the 
Committee on Finance of the Senate. 
(C) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking 
member of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives. 
(D) The President shall appoint the Chairman of the Council from among 
its members. 
(E) In appointing members under subparagraphs (B) and (C), the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives shall each appoint-
(i) one representative of the interests of business, 
(ii) one representative of the interests of labor, and 
(iii) one representative of the interests of State governments. 
A Description of the Duties for Which the Council is Responsible 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment 
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State 
administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the 
program and to make recommendations for improvement. Not later than 
February 1, 1995, the Council shall submit to the President and the Congress 
a report setting forth the findings and recommendations of the Council as a 
result of its evaluation of the unemployment compensation program, including 
the Council's findings and recommendations with respect to determining 
eligibility for extended unemployment benefits on the basis of unemployment 
statistics for regions, States or subdivisions of States. 
The Estimated Annual Operating Costs in Dollars and Staff Years for 
Such Council 
It is anticipated that expenditures will be approximately $1,200,000, including 
six FTEs. 
The Estimated Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings 
It is anticipated that the Council will meet five times during each year. 
Termination Date 
January 31, 1996. 
Appendix G / 
Calendar 
November 15, 1991 
January 24, 1992 
May 11, 1993 
September 20, 1993 
September 21, 1993 
December 9, 1993 
January 10, 1994 
January 11-12, 1994 
April 21-22, 1994 
June 16-17, 1994 
August 18-19, 1994 
Establishment of Council by statute 









Focus Groups of UI Claimants 
San Francisco, California 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
San Francisco, California 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Springfield, Oregon 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Portland, Maine 
Council Research Conference 
Portland, Maine 
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September 8, 1994 
September 8-9, 1994 
Focus Groups of VI Claimants 
New York, New York 
Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
New York, New York 
November 30-December 1, 1994 Council Meeting and Public Hearing 
Denver, Colorado 
January 4, 1995 Council Meeting 
Washington, DC 
Appendix H / 
Public Hearings 
THE ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS HELD six sets of public hearings in order to 
provide individuals and organizations with an opportunity to present their views 
and recommendations regarding the improvement of the Unemployment 
Insurance system. Members of the public were asked to address a variety of 
topics related to Unemployment Insurance. 
More than 100 witnesses have presented testimony before the Council and 
many more have submitted written statements. Both the hearings and the 
written statements have proven to be a rich source of information, providing 
many new perspectives on Unemployment Insurance issues. The Advisory 
Council expresses its appreciation to the members of the public who took the 
time to share their time and ideas with the members of the Council. These 
witnesses are listed below. 
In order to continue encouraging broad-based participation with regard to 
both geography and perspective, the Council will hold additional hearings as 
it continues its work. 
WITNESSES WHO PRESENTED TESTIMONY 
Jonathan Baird, New Hampshire Legal Assistance 
Milt Bartholomew, Douglas County Farmers Co-op, Oregon 
Mal)' Frances Bartlett, Maine Welfare Directors Association 
Robert Becker, Raff and Becker, New York 
Lee Beyer, Oregon State Representative 
Stephen Bingham, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation 
Malcolm Bonner, California 
John Bourg, Louisiana AFL-CIO 
Sandra Boynton, Maine 
Deborah Bronow, State of California Employment Development Department 
Keith Brooks, New York Unemployed Committee 
Frederic Buse, New York Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance 
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Sally Cansino, Oregon 
Hui Lian Chen, Chinese Progessive Association Workers Center, Massachusetts 
Larry Clark, Gibbens Company, Utah 
Brenda Cochrane, San Francisco State University 
Clarence Cooper, Suffolk University, Massachusetts 
Leighanne Napua Cote, Maine 
Gene Derfler, Oregon State Representative 
Loleta Didrickson, Illinois Department of Employment Security 
John Dorrer, New England Training and Development Corporation, Massachusetts 
Robert Du Val, Unemployment Cost Control, New Jersey 
Eunice Elton, Private Industry Council of San Francisco 
Maurice Emsellem, National Employment Law Project, New York 
Ron Eskin, Merrimack Valley Legal Services, Massachusetts 
James Evatz, JCPenney Company, Texas 
Terry Evert, Gibbens Company, California 
Arthur Fandel, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment Insurance and 
Seneca Systems & Services 
Gary Fitch, Agricultural Affiliates, New York 
Irv Fletcher, Oregon AFL-CIO 
Roger Gette, Legal Services of North Texas 
Jeff Gilbert, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 
Mary Katherine Gillespie, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Bruce Goldstein, Farrnworker Justice Fund, Washington, DC 
Edward Gorham, Maine AFL-CIO 
David Gough, Gibbens Company, Colorado 
Betty Graham, National Association of Unemployment Insurance Appellate Boards, 
Colorado 
Wayne Graham, Oregon 
John Gray, South Brooklyn Legal Services 
Monica Halas, Greater Boston Legal Services, Massachusetts 
Gary Hanamoto, Oregon 
James Handy, Maine State Senate 
Sandra Hansberger, Lewis and Clark Legal Clinic, Oregon 
Robert Harvey, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
Christine Hastedt, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Maine 
Robert Haynes, Massachusetts AFL-CIO 
James Holt, Labor Policy Association, Washington, DC 
Charles Howarth, Council of State Chambers of Commerce, California 
John Hudacs, New York State Commissioner of Labor 
John Humphrey, U.S. Department of Labor, California 
Warren Hysell, Boise Cascade Corporation, Idaho 
James Jackson, Texas Employment Commission 
Thomas Jackson, California 
Judy Johnson, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Patrick Johnston, California State Senate 
Keir Jorgensen, Amalgated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 
New York 
Bob Kenyon, U.S. Dcpartment of Labor, Texas 
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Richard King, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on Unemployment 
Insurance 
Rena Kottcamp, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training 
Yvonne Kroll, Job Service North Dakota 
Erik Lang, Colorado Rural Legal Services 
Laurie Larrea, Private Industry Council of Dallas 
Ed Leslie, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington State 
David Lien, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Leslie Linson, Legal Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts 
Paul Lodico, Mon Valley Unemployed Committee, Pennsylvania 
Larry Malo, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Walter Mankoff, New York State Advisory Council on Unemployment Insurance and 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union 
Charles Marciante, New Jersey AFL-CIO 
Rodolfo Mares, Jr., Legal Services of North Texas 
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis 
Pamela Mattson, Oregon Employment Department 
Lorrie McKinley, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania 
Eric Millage, Employers Unity, Colorado 
Kathy Moore, Kennebec VaHey Technical College, Maine 
Martin Morand, Pennsylvania Center for the Study of Labor Relations 
Suzanne Murphy, Unemployment Tax Control Associates, Massachusetts 
Dave Murrie, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission 
Irv Newhouse, Washington State Joint Legislative Task Force on Unemployment 
Insurance 
Nils Nordberg, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training 
Larry Norton, Texas Rural Legal Aid 
Ellen Palmer, Lane Community College, Oregon 
Diana Pearce, Women and Poverty Project, Washington, DC 
Don Peitersen, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 
Manuel Perez, Oregon Legal Services 
Marvin Perry, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training 
Ted Potrikus, Retail Council of New York 
Donnie Potts, Texas 
Norman Raffael, The Weyerhauser Company, Washington State 
Tom Rankin, California AFL-CIO 
Cynthia Rice, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Ted Roberts, Texas Association of Business 
John Rooney, Jr., Jon-Jay Associates, Massachusetts 
Carol Ross-Evans, California Tax Payers Association 
Dominic Rotondi, New York 
Rashan Sanchez, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Scott Schapiro, The Frick Company, New York 
Anthony Serrano, GC Services, California 
Emmett Sheppard, Texas AFL-CIO 
Bob Shiprack, Oregon State Representative 
Charlotte Sibley, Farmworker Legal Services of New York 
Peter Sorenson, Oregon State Senate 
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Vernon Stoner, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Keith Talbot, Camden Regional Legal Services, New Jersey 
Steve Tegger, Oregon Workforce Quality Council 
Gail Thayer, Maine Department of Labor 
Liston Thomasson, Mississippi Employment Security Commission 
David Tilton, Oregon Legal Services 
Allan Toubman, Maine Department of Labor 
Dale Tuvey, United Claims Management, Washington State 
Donald Vial, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy 
Judy Villa, BankAmerica Corporation, California 
Don Villerejo, California Institute for Rural Studies 
Richard Virgili, California 
Eloise Vitelli, Maine Displaced Homemakers Program 
John Watt, Oregon State Representative 
Patricia Webber, Maine 
Joseph Weisenburger, New Hampshire Department of Employment Security 
Libby Whitley, American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, DC 
Jonathan Wilderman, Wilderman and Linnett, Colorado 
Christine Worthington, Texas 
Stephen Yelenosky, Legal Aid Society of Central Texas 
Rick Zimmerman, New York Farm Bureau 
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